

## Power, Pedagogy, and the “Women Problem”: Ameliorating Philosophy

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**ABSTRACT:** *Being a member of a minority group makes it harder to succeed in academic philosophy. Research suggests that students from underrepresented groups have a hard time in academic philosophy and often drop out instead of pursuing a career in philosophy, despite having the potential to become excellent philosophers. In this paper, I will argue that there is a specific way of thinking about traditional conceptual analysis within analytic philosophy that marginalizes underrepresented groups. This has to do with what kinds of analyses we philosophers think are worthy of conducting and with who we think are worthy of pursuing such analyses. I will then show why this is particularly worrisome for the profession of philosophy as an institution geared towards the love of knowledge and argue that it should be in our interest as philosophers to find ways to prevent this marginalization of underrepresented groups. Finally, I will provide an example of how to do philosophy differently that does not exclude members of underrepresented groups and suggest ways in which the teaching of analytic philosophy can directly counter the discriminatory practices of academic philosophy.*

In philosophy, especially analytic philosophy, there are certain minority groups who are neither represented by the subject matter nor presented with the same possibilities for advancing in the field. “Women” are one of those minority groups.<sup>1</sup> Being a member of such a minority group makes it harder to succeed in academic philosophy. Furthermore, research suggests that students of underrepresented groups have a hard time in academic philosophy and often—despite having the potential to become excellent philosophers—drop out instead of pursuing a career in academic philosophy. This is worrisome for at least two reasons: (1) It prevents particular students from flourishing in philosophy and from gaining knowledge, and (2) it contributes to the narrow scope of philosophical research and slows down the process of making epistemically sound philosophy. First, by marginalizing those students that are members of minority groups, analytic philosophy harms those students. It structurally prevents some students from gaining more knowledge and flourishing. Second, by contributing to the high dropout rate of students that are members of minority groups, the scope of philosophy excludes underrepresented topics (those topics of interest to minority groups). Furthermore, it should be in the interest of all philosophers to strive for good philosophy. However, by excluding some students—those that have the potential to become excellent philosophers—academic philosophy slows down the process of delivering good philosophy. Thus, as analytic philosophers, we should address the marginalization of minority groups in philosophy and find a way of teaching and doing philosophy that prevents this marginalization.

In the first section, I will argue that there is a specific way of thinking about traditional conceptual analysis within analytic philosophy which is discriminatory against underrepresented groups when combined with the set-up of academic philosophy.<sup>2</sup> This has to do with which analyses,

we (as philosophers) think, are worth conducting and who, we think, are worthy of pursuing these analyses. (Section 1) I will then show why this is particularly worrisome for the profession of philosophy as an institution that teaches the love of knowledge. (Section 2) Further, I will show that there are ways to do philosophy differently that do not exclude members of underrepresented groups. For example, Sally Haslanger's contributions to the topic—if understood correctly—suggest a way of doing analytic philosophy which is not discriminatory and which can even help fight discriminatory practices. (Section 3) Finally, in the last section, I will suggest a couple of ways in which the teaching of analytic philosophy can directly counter the discriminatory practices of academic philosophy. (Section 4)

## 1

There is a specific way of thinking about traditional conceptual analysis within analytic philosophy which marginalizes underrepresented groups when it is combined with the specific set-up of academic philosophy: the predominantly white, male, and middle class teachers, the aggressive debating styles, etc. This has to do with which analyses, we (as philosophers) think, are worth conducting and who, we think, are worthy of pursuing these analyses. One central focus of so-called analytic philosophy is and always has been a certain way of doing conceptual analysis.<sup>3</sup> Unfortunately, this traditional conceptual analysis is nearly perfect for dismissing any views that do not hold on to beliefs of objective truth and *a priori* thinking. Let me explain. Traditionally conceptual analysis was taken to be what Williamson famously describes as “armchair-thinking”. In his words,

The traditional methods of philosophy are armchair ones: they consist of thinking, without any special interaction with the world beyond the chair, such as measurement, observation or experiment would typically involve. (2007: 1)

The idea is roughly that we can simply sit back and arrive at an analysis of the concept in question by *a priori* thinking. This hypothesis is constituted by two claims:

- (1) the semantic internalism claim: the (objective) truth or right analysis of a concept in question can be known through introspection;
- (2) the intensional definition claim: there is an intensional definition for the concept in question.

The idea that we can arrive at an analysis of a concept while sitting in our armchair implies that, first, there *is* such a concept (in my head), and, second, that we neither have to do empirical research nor have to engage with the things denoted by the term in question to know it. I think the first claim is rather obvious. It would not make sense for me to sit in my armchair doing philosophical analyses, if I did not believe that I could arrive at some truth doing so. Furthermore, I do not merely believe that I can arrive at *some* truth doing so, but that I arrive at *the* truth doing so. Thus, not believing in some form of semantic internalism would render my philosophical analysis *ad absurdum*. Semantic internalism broadly is the theory that an individual can have access to knowledge claims by reflection.

In other words, semantic internalism assumes that concepts are in the head and that through reflection I can gain access to the concept in question. Therefore, according to semantic internalism, my specific social position as an individual has no implications for my analysis, the world around me does not influence the meaning of the concepts.

What about the second claim, namely that there is an intensional definition for the concept in question? In comparison to an extensional definition—the meaning of a concept is given by specifying its extension, that is, by specifying all objects that fall under the concept—, an intensional definition describes a definition that gives the meaning of a concept by specifying its necessary and sufficient conditions. While giving an extensional definition works best by actually “looking” at the extensions of the concept and therewith often involves some form of descriptive analysis, intensional definitions can be given by mere introspection. If I sit in my armchair for an *a priori* analysis of some concept in question, I use my intuitions and experiences to come up with the best possible intensional definition of the concept in question. So far, so good. However, again, the claim needs to be stronger: I need to be convinced that my result is not just *any* definition. For example, a definition should not only have meaning for myself, while someone else’s analysis yields some other definition of the concept. This implies that I have to believe that I, as the analyst, do not bring my personal history or social positioning into the analysis. Why do I need to be convinced of this stronger claim? Because again, thinking that whatever my analysis yields is totally arbitrary—taking a relativist stance—renders my analysis *ad absurdum*. There would not be any impact of my thinking except for wasting my time. Thus, taking both claims into account—the semantic internalist claim and the intensional definition claim—implies that I take a stance of *aperspectivity*. Thus, the argument goes, if I am not conditioned by my social position, then I should accept intensional definitions; and if I do not have any impact on the observations I make, then I should believe in semantic internalism. (cf. Haslanger 2012: 70)

There are many arguments for why this practice is particularly marginalizing for minority groups in philosophy when combined with the current set-up of academic philosophy.<sup>4</sup> Let me raise only two here. First, the view that the best analysis can only be provided introspectively (i.e., while sitting in an armchair) indicates the method of “reflective thinking.” Imagine the following “armchair-thinking”-scenario, in which philosophy professor A wants to know what *X* is: A, being convinced by the armchair-method, sits down in his comfortable rocking chair and starts thinking about some intuitions he has about *X* and about different cases and principles related to *X*. Luckily, after a while he reaches a reflective equilibrium and can give a definition for *X*. What about these intuitions he so accurately considers? Obviously he does not conduct any empirical research or talk to anyone—he is all on his own in his rocking chair (except for his clumber spaniel but the dog is not of much help). The intuitions he considers and on which he bases his answer are therefore his own. Unfortunately, not everybody has the same intuitions. (cf. Antony 2012, Buckwalter and Stich 2010, Nisbett et al. 2001, Weinberg et al. 2001) And by ill luck, the philosopher is a male, white, heterosexual, able-bodied, and middle class person with academic upbringing and background. Contra the semantic internalism claim, his intuitions reflect his person and his social situation. Epistemic knowers—in this case, the philosopher—are *situated* knowers. (cf. Anderson 1995a and 1995b, Code 1991, Jaggar 1983, Scheman 1995) Philosophers come to have the intuitions they have because of their socio-historical

position. Most philosophers are similar to our armchair-philosopher in their social position and therefore many answers philosophy has given reflect male, white, heterosexual, abled, and middle class ideas.<sup>5</sup> This makes it very hard for anybody not fitting in this frame of the philosopher to succeed or even to be heard at all.

Second, embedded in this idea of the philosopher separate from his standpoint and epistemically neutral is the assumption that some people just “have it” while others do not. In other words, some have a talent for rational and reflective thinking and philosophy and others do not. I have met several senior professors who claimed to detect after a few minutes of conversation or after an hour of seminar who has a talent for philosophy and who does not. Unfortunately, there is still a bias towards attributing rational and reflective thinking to (white) men. (Haslanger 2008: 213 and 2012: 47) For example, Haslanger writes:

[...] these ideals of rationality and rational selves have typically been defined in contrast to what are assumed to be characteristic features and capacities of women: Women are guided by emotion or feeling rather than reason; women are not capable of impartiality or abstract thought; women are more intuitive and closer to nature than men, and so on. (2012: 47)

Professors are quicker in judging a person to be good in philosophy if they think that person is a (white) man. When I was an undergraduate student I took a class on philosophy of mathematics. There was one other woman among the twenty or so participants. In one of the first sessions the professor went to the blackboard and drew a square and a heart. Pointing at the square he said “this is how men do math,” pointing at the heart “and this is how women do math, which is why we stick to men’s skills.” That was in 2008. Haslanger describes the same experience:

In graduate school, one of my teachers told me that he had “never seen a first rate woman philosophy and never expected to because women were incapable of having seminal ideas.” (2008: 211)

We all employ stereotypes and schemas. In fact, we need schemas to organize and respond to the world quickly and go about our everyday business, but some of these stereotypes lead to discriminations and other lead to preferential treatment. In the case at hand, “we” attribute the desirable characteristic of *being good in philosophy* to (white) male students, while at the same the undesirable stereotype of *not being fit for philosophy* is attributed to female students.<sup>6</sup> Note, that such attribution of stereotypes and/or biased judgement is not a conscious process, rather it is implicit; in other words, social behaviour is not always under conscious control. (Greenwald and Banaji 1995) Also, and quite obviously, it is only possible to judge someone as “being good in philosophy” if that person is not too shy and is forthcoming about their ideas. Both are attributes that men are (mostly) better at. That this is the case has to do with the fact that men already feel entitled to do philosophy; while as one of the few women in the seminars who are being openly told that we “don’t have what it takes to do philosophy,” we mostly feel like the odd ones out.<sup>7</sup>

I have argued that the claims of semantic internalism and intensional definitions can be particularly marginalizing for philosophy students who are members of underrepresented groups when combined with the culture of male entitlement in academic philosophy. For example, in 2010, philosophy had a lower rate of female PhD-students than most of the physical sciences<sup>8</sup>—despite the fact that no fewer women than men take philosophy classes in college. Thompson et al. (2016: 1) write:

In 2012 in the United States, for every 100 men graduating with a college degree, 141 women graduated. For decades now, more women have been enrolled in American universities than men. Yet, during these same decades, the proportion of women who major in philosophy has remained stagnant, hovering below one-third. So, while almost 60% of college graduates are now women, only 30% of philosophy majors are women [...] With women getting just 30% of philosophy bachelor's degrees, it's no surprise that the ratio of women to men is so low among philosophy graduate students (30%) and professors (20.7%).<sup>9</sup>

These numbers are particularly worrisome for the profession of philosophy as an institution that teaches the love of knowledge. I contend that the fact that analytic philosophy marginalizes members of underrepresented groups is worrisome for at least two reasons: (1) It prevents particular students from flourishing in philosophy and from gaining a particular kind of knowledge, and (2) it contributes to the narrow scope of philosophical research and slows down the process of epistemically good philosophy. First, by marginalizing those students that are members of minority groups, analytic philosophy harms those students as subjects that come to the profession to learn. It structurally prevents some students from gaining more knowledge and flourishing, while it provides this knowledge to others. It is wrong to epistemically disadvantage a student due to her membership in a particular social group (say, the social group of women) that is underrepresented in philosophy. Furthermore, the marginalizing of said student not only prevents her from gaining knowledge, it also restricts her flourishing in general. By being marginalized in this way, she is restricted in developing her love of the subject, her own identity, and following the life path she has set out for herself. This can, furthermore, involve an economic disadvantage: dropping out of philosophy can lengthen her studies and thereby force her to pay more student tuition and get her to the job market later. It should be in the interest of any subject to not (unfairly) burden some of its students more than others and it should be in the particular interest of philosophy as an institution that teaches the love of knowledge to not (unfairly) restrict some of its students from flourishing in the pursuit of knowledge.

Second, by contributing to the high drop-out rate of students that are members of minority groups, the scope of philosophy excludes underrepresented topics (those topics of interest to minority groups). Dotson (2012) argues that academic philosophy is not a productive environment for diverse philosophers. Rather, engaging in topics, methods, or philosophers that diverge from the canon is made hard at best in philosophy, if not impossible. Furthermore, members of underrepresented

groups in particular often have an interest in topics and methods that diverge from the canon of philosophy. Also, it should be in the interest of all philosophers to strive for bringing about the best possible philosophy. However, by excluding some students—students that have the potential to become excellent philosophers—the norms of academic philosophy slows down the process of delivering good philosophy. It excludes some voices that could play a significant role in bringing about the best possible philosophy. Discouraging some students (say, women) from advancing in academic philosophy will lead to talented philosophers not graduating, not getting a job, not getting their work read, etc. But, as Saul argues, to “get the best possible philosophy being done, we need the best philosophers to receive proper encouragement and good jobs, and to be working in environments where they can produce their best work.” (2013: 50) Some of these best philosophers might dropout of philosophy before they even have a chance to contribute to it. In other words, there are two reasons why we should work towards making philosophy more inclusive: for reasons of fairness and for the sake of philosophy.

## 3

I have argued that the claims of semantic internalism and intensional definitions can be particularly marginalizing for philosophy students that are members of underrepresented groups when combined with the culture of male entitlement in academic philosophy. And I have identified two reasons why this is particularly worrisome for academic philosophy: for reasons of fairness and for the sake of philosophy. Luckily, there is no reason to give up yet. By explicating Haslanger’s philosophical projects of conceptual analysis I will show that there are ways to do philosophy differently that do not exclude members of underrepresented groups.<sup>10</sup> Haslanger’s contributions to the topic of conceptual analysis—if understood correctly—suggest a way of doing analytic philosophy which is not marginalizing and which can even help to fight unfair practices.

In several papers Haslanger provides an insightful account of conceptual analysis within analytic philosophy. Broadly, she claims that we are mistaken in assuming that there is only one way of doing analysis and that, further, we do not need to accept traditional armchair philosophy. In other words, it is not the case that the (objective) truth or right analysis of the concept in question can be known internally or that there is an intensional definition for the concept in question. Instead, she argues that there are three different kinds of concepts:

[**manifest concept**]: the concept we take ourselves to be applying;

[**operative concept**]: the concept we are in fact applying;

[**target concept**]: the concept we should be applying.

Respectively, there are three ways of conducting conceptual analysis:

[**the internalist approach**]: the question “what is X?” is answered by *a priori* methods and by reaching a reflective equilibrium that takes into account intuitions about the concept and its cases and principles.

[**the descriptive approach**]: the question “what is  $X$ ?” is answered by considering what objective types our epistemic vocabulary tracks, i.e. it identifies paradigm cases for fixing the referent of the term and draws on (quasi) empirical methods to explicate the relevant kind or type to which the paradigm belongs.

[**the ameliorative approach**]: the question “what is  $X$ ?” is substituted by the question “what is the point of having  $X$ ?”, i.e. which concept could actually do the best work for us?<sup>11</sup>

Only the internalist approach, resulting in the manifest concept, uses the methods popularly and strongly associated with analytic philosophy, namely *a priori* methods. The descriptive approach, yielding the operative concept, takes up some ideas of externalism and empirical research methods. This approach is therefore in less danger of being marginalizing than the first. But it is the ameliorative approach, yielding the target concept, that I want to focus on as an example of doing analytic philosophy, which is not marginalizing and which can even help to fight unfair educational practices.

Haslanger’s ameliorative inquiry diverts from the aforementioned armchair philosophy in two ways: (1) it is a distinctly *normative* conceptual analysis. It starts with a particular set of goals that a group should hold and asks what the concept of *F*-ness should be given those goals. The resulting concept of *F*-ness is the target concept of *F*. Such an inquiry is normative because it asks what the concept in question *should* be and because it aims at particular goals. And (2) ameliorative inquiry need not be in line with our intuitive understanding or our use of the concept in question; it can be revisionary. In other words, ameliorative projects have a particular epistemic subject that *normatively* engages in conceptual analysis; it not only affirms the situated position of the philosopher, but takes her to be invested in particular projects and analyses.

In response to Haslanger’s ameliorative project, the armchair philosopher could argue<sup>12</sup> that firstly, amelioration is contextualized and secondly, contextualized amelioration is not a new project, but rather what many philosophers in the past have done. The question “what is the practical task of concept  $X$ ?” is trivially and truly answered by saying that it enables us to talk about  $X$ . But the ‘us’ is not unique and neither is this a normative question. The concept  $X$  should not enable us to talk about  $X$ , it simply provides the opportunity to do so. Therefore, we need to talk about *contextualized* amelioration: in particular contexts we adjust concepts to our practical purposes of the speaker and her audience. However, this is not a new idea. Normative considerations shaped the tradition of analytic philosophy all along. The armchair philosopher could then think, for example, that Frege, Wittgenstein, and Carnap were all ameliorators. This would lead the armchair philosopher to propose that amelioration is indeed *universal amelioration* in so far as Haslanger’s considerations of amelioration are involved in all philosophical analysis. The idea that there can be three different ways of engaging in conceptual analysis is mistaken, rather, armchair philosophy as an introspective endeavor always has an ameliorative aspect—however, this ameliorative aspect is far from being normative.

Now there is some truth to these ideas, but they misunderstand Haslanger's underlying point. In my understanding, Haslanger explicitly develops a way to engage in conceptual analysis that takes seriously our social positions and our normative investment in certain topics as philosophers. She argues for a particularly normative way of doing philosophy. But she does not say that ameliorative projects are motivated in the sense that, for example, Wittgenstein motivated his linguistic turn. Without question he adjusted concepts to our practical purposes. However, Haslanger implies more than this. Ameliorative projects in her sense have a political motivation, which can be seen by the examples she uses. One of those examples is the concept of *woman*. In analysing that concept Haslanger aims at showing that women are a genuine type (instead of a gerrymandered or random collection of individuals). The thought is that providing such a concept can be useful in showing what is wrong with patriarchal oppression of women. This is clearly a normative motivation for the analysis and it is a motivation that derives from her own social position—it is a topic she is deeply invested in. (Haslanger 2012, Haslanger 2006)

To please the armchair philosopher, we could say that there are two distinct ameliorative projects. We can adjust concepts to our practical purposes, or we can adjust concepts to our normative purposes. The two projects are similar in so far as they are based on specific considerations. But they differ in that the first is mainly *unreflective*: we are driven by the aim of arriving at some target concept in question and our socialisation, biases, and so on push us towards a certain adjustment of the manifest and/or operative concept that has the benefit of being practically more useful. The second is *deliberate*: we are driven by the aim of arriving at some target concept that fulfils some specific normative purpose and in line with our normative aim we adjust the manifest and/or operative concept. It is this deliberate way of doing ameliorative analysis that can help strengthen minority groups in philosophy. The ameliorative project—when understood properly—involves being practically engaged and normatively aware, and as such it is the ideal replacement for the “armchair model” of conceptual inquiry that can lead to the marginalization of underrepresented groups.

I should make one last comment here. In response to my argument, some people might respond with the critique that such ameliorative analysis is still highly theoretical and academic and in no way a good practice to politically change the environment of philosophy. Maybe that is right. But I do not claim that doing ameliorative analysis should be the only thing we do. In fact, neither does Haslanger. She states that:

Ideology critique of the sort I've described can help create conceptual space for such change, but thought can never replace action. (2012: 475)

Ameliorative analysis can provide a space where we acknowledge our normative aims and where we can develop those concepts that are deeply important to us. In this sense, ameliorative projects help to tackle the unfair aspects of armchair philosophy as outlined above and it can diversify philosophy by making room for subjects and methods that lie outside of the traditional canon of philosophy. The concepts we employ and the terms we use create the world we live in as much as that world creates us and our language. So to end discrimination (in philosophy and elsewhere) we need to tackle our concepts and terms as well as the world we live in. To provide a flourishing context for *all* philosophy



students, we desperately need to change the set-up of academic philosophy as well as the way in which we engage in philosophical thinking.

## 4

I have argued that armchair philosophy—specifically the claims of semantic internalism and intensional definitions—can be particularly marginalizing for philosophy students that are members of underrepresented groups when combined with the culture of male entitlement in academic philosophy. And I have identified two reasons why this is particularly worrisome for academic philosophy: for reasons of fairness and for the sake of philosophy. On a good note, I have shown that not all projects of conceptual analysis contribute to marginalizing members of underrepresented groups, and I have provided the example of Haslanger’s ameliorative projects. As philosophers we should aim at diversifying the profession and a first step to do so is to change the way we engage in philosophical thinking inside and outside the classroom. I will conclude this paper by suggesting two strategies that we can adopt in the classroom to counter the marginalizing effects on those students that are members of underrepresented groups: diversifying the methods we teach and diversifying the discussion in the classroom.

First, besides teaching the traditional armchair method, we can broaden our methods and include other ways to do conceptual analysis. These can include Haslanger’s descriptive and ameliorative inquiries, but also methods from experimental or critical philosophy; e.g., pragmatic analysis, critical analysis, standpoint analysis, and so on. If we want to teach our students a broad range of methods of conceptual analysis—and I have argued that we should—we can do so by: (a) choosing philosophical texts where different methods of conceptual analysis are employed; (b) showing the limits of, for example, the armchair method and asking students to come up with other ways to conduct philosophically fruitful analyses; (c) providing different examples that show that depending on the question we fare better with one analysis rather than another (e.g., intensional definitions are useful when we want to provide generalized accounts, extensional definitions are useful when we have a small and diverse sample of objects, etc.); and (d) showing students that what they assume to be a neutral perspective of investigation is usually a situated position. These and other tools can broaden the spectrum of possible conceptual analysis for students and show how their diverse perspectives can be beneficial for our philosophical engagement. In this sense we can diversify the methods we teach.

Second, even when we present diverse reading material and diverse methods of conceptual analysis, students that are members of underrepresented groups participate in classroom discussions less than others. Besides diversifying the methods of philosophical thinking, we should also aim at diversifying the discussion we have with our students. Let me suggest the following tool by which we can encourage diverse participation without putting certain students in the spotlight: we can ask our students to send us one (or more) questions that engage with the assigned reading material before class. We can then read all questions before class and pick a couple of questions that are particularly interesting or engaging, always keeping in mind that the set of questions we pick should be by students from diverse social groups. When we start the discussion in the classroom, we can read the

questions we have picked beforehand to the class—highlighting the interesting and good ways they engage with the material. We can then ask the students who wrote the presented questions to elaborate on their thoughts before starting a discussion with everyone. This way, we encourage students from diverse social groups to participate in class, but we make sure that they are well prepared (they wrote a good question) and we give them a feeling of being good philosophers by stressing the good quality of the question before we make them talk—therefore providing them self-confidence to speak up in class.

These two ways of diversifying the philosophical methods and the discussions in the classroom can help create a philosophical set-up that is inclusive for everyone in the classroom. It can therefore help counter the marginalizing effects of armchair philosophy. To sum up, I have argued that the narrow conception of armchair philosophy can be marginalizing for philosophy students that are members of underrepresented groups when combined with the culture of male entitlement in academic philosophy. I have, further, identified two reasons why this is particularly worrisome for academic philosophy: for reasons of fairness and for the sake of philosophy. However, I have also shown that not all projects of conceptual analysis contribute to marginalizing members of underrepresented groups and I have provided the example of Haslanger's ameliorative projects. Finally, I have concluded this paper by suggesting two strategies that we can adopt in the classroom to counter the marginalizing effects on those students that are members of underrepresented groups: diversifying the methods we teach and diversifying the discussion in the classroom. Now we just need the will to do it.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> For numbers concerning “women” in philosophy in the UK see Beebee, Helen and Jenny Saul 2011.

Important essays about the discriminatory ideology of philosophy are Haslanger 2008 and Dotson 2012.

<sup>2</sup> By the “set-up of academic philosophy” I mean the fact that most lecturers in philosophy are white, male, and middle class, the aggressive debating style common to philosophical discussions, and so further.

<sup>3</sup> Even though other and more descriptive, normative, and experimental methods have gained importance in analytic philosophy, *a priori* philosophy still is the most common method with which analytic philosophers work.

<sup>4</sup> I am not going to consider outright hostility against minority groups (e.g., sexual abuse of female students in philosophy departments) or any reasons, which are not connected to the methodological claims given above. I can also not consider every argument for why academic philosophy in particular is marginalizing for underrepresented groups. For a good argument of why and how knowledge attribution in general is discriminatory, see Haslanger 2012: 344.

<sup>5</sup> See the following article for numbers of the overwhelming majority of white male philosophers in academic philosophy: [https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/women-in-philosophy-do-the-math/?\\_r=0](https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/women-in-philosophy-do-the-math/?_r=0); accessed: April 30, 2017.

<sup>6</sup> I use the terms ‘male’ and ‘female’ broadly in the sense that we physically judge some persons to be male while we judge others to be female; this is not meant as an endorsement of the binary gender system. For an overview of stereotypes and stereotyping see Blum 2004. For an explanation of schemas see Valian 1998.

<sup>7</sup> This issue is also connected to stereotype threat. Female students who believe in the “just having it”-myth are more prone to stereotype threat. Carol Dweck conducted a study on stereotype threat with math students. She concludes: “It looks, then, as though the view of math as a gift can not only make women vulnerable to declining performance, it can also make them susceptible to stereotypes, so that when they enter an environment that denigrates their gift, they may lose the desire to carry on in that field.” (2006: 6) This is not only true for math but also for (analytic) philosophy in general.

<sup>8</sup> See this chard:

[https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbXhlcGFjb21taXR0ZWVvbnR0ZXN0YXR1c29md29tZW58Z3g6NThlNmFiNTZjMTc5ZDE0Mw](https://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&pid=sites&srcid=ZGVmYXVsdGRvbWFpbXhlcGFjb21taXR0ZWVvbnR0ZXN0YXR1c29md29tZW58Z3g6NThlNmFiNTZjMTc5ZDE0Mw;); accessed: April 30, 2017.

<sup>9</sup> See also Beebee 2013, Norlock 2012, and Paxton et al. 2012.

<sup>10</sup> This is, of course, only one side of the coin: to stop underrepresented groups from being marginalized in philosophy, we cannot merely tackle its methodological problems, but we have to take seriously the discouraging “set-up” of academic philosophy. For different arguments that take this into account, see Hutchison and Jenkins 2013.

<sup>11</sup> These three ways of conceptual analysis are taken from Haslanger 2006, see also Haslanger 2012: 223f., 342, 367, 371, 386 and 395.

<sup>12</sup> Similar arguments were, for example, brought forward in a talk (“The Philosophical Significance of Ameliorative Projects”) by Herman Cappelen at an Arché workshop on Haslanger’s ameliorative projects in St. Andrews at the 15th October 2013.

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