*Reason vs. Will for Altr*uism:

Some Implications for Moral Education

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Two questions will be addressed in this paper; first, whether altruism can be rational; second, whether rationality can give a strength of will to be altruistic. In answering both questions, this paper will take advantage of the rational choice framework and Confucian morality.

First of all, it will argue that altruistic concerns can be rational. It will explore an account of reflective rational choice rich enough to allow for the development of altruistic concern and care. Self-interested agents can reflectively come to have reasons for altruism. In arguing for compatibility between rationality and morality, this paper claims neither that self-interest is constituted entirely by being moral nor that morality completely overrides self-interest. Rationality and altruism are certainly distinguishable. Even so, it does not follow that they are inconsistent or incompatible with each other. Bread and butter are distinguishable, but hardly incompatible, and the same may be true of rationality and altruism. But this paper will also pay attention to the limits of what may be called rational altruism. We can rationally practice altruistic behavior by nurturing concern and respect for family, friends, neighbors and so on. But this does not claim that we can afford to care about every one. This paper doubts that rational altruism requires us to care about every one.

Furthermore, this paper acknowledges the empirical fact that we sometimes fail morally not so much because we lack sufficient reason to be moral as because we lack sufficient strength to be moral. We have a problem that the homo *economicus of* the rational choice model does not: namely, we sometimes lack the strength of will to do what is in our best interest. Telling the truth sometimes takes more courage than we muster, even when we forsee being intensely disappointed with ourselves *if* we lie. Being rational in a complete sense is a profoundly demanding activity.

Given the fact that merely justifying rational altruism does not, in and *of* itself, necessarily suffice to move people, we will argue that virtue education is needed because of our weaknesses in living up to demands of rational altruism. Virtue may be a valuable corrective to our standing temptation to do wrong; Reason cannot be a source of primary commitment to do the right thing. What, more precisely,

is virtue needed to remedy? That our motivation is imperfect needs no elaboration: Weakness of will or akrasia is painfully familiar. The proposal is that virtue is needed to remedy the common failures of imperfectly motivated people who can rationally justify altruism.

Of course, we remain unclear how effectively this virtue ethics is applicable to moral education in contemporary society destroyed by the ravages of modernism, but the main argument of this paper is that the tradition of virtue education is still relevant for meaningful moral education.

ACTUAL HOMO ECONOMICUS VS. HYPOTHETICAL HOMO ECONOMICUS

The rationality of the *homo economicus is* the standard conception of rationality in contemporary theories of rational choice. Within the conception of rationality of the *homo economicus* an action is rational if it is the one that will best achieve a person's ends.

Utility or expected utility maximization is a typical principle which represents the rationality of the *homo economicus.* This concept of rationality as (expected) utility maximization is largely used by the moral philosophers who accept the theory of rational choice in establishing the theory of morality. For instance, John Harsanyi (1982) insists that when an individual makes moral value judgements, he has them as the principle of expected average utility maximization applicable to a situation of uncertainty. When John Rawls (1971) talks about the rationality of the persons in the original position, he claims that each, in choosing between principles, tries as best as he can to advance his nontuistic interests.

But Rawls's idea is that we should imagine ourselves choosing the basic rules to govern our society from behind a veil of ignorance or a veil of uncertainty. We are asked to imagine that we have forgotten who we are, what our social positions and particular preferences and plans in life are. There is no suggestion that we actually are behind a veil of ignorance because for Rawls this is, at best, a mind game.

But that, in and of itself, does not provide any reason for supposing that people will act upon those principles. The demonstration of Rawls and Harsanyi gets no motivational grip upon people unless they are already motivationally predisposed to «do the right thing» whatever that might be. For those who harbor an inchoate sense of justice, their vivid way of revealing the moral truth may prove motivationally compelling. If so, however, it is merely because a predisposition was already there waiting, in our motivational structure, for the demonstration of moral truth to link up with. For people who lack that sort of predisposition, the Rawlsian argument about what they would choose from behind the veil of ignorance simply cannot move them to action.

This uncertainty based model certainly enforces morality by asking us to imagine that we do not know our articular positions. But it cannot get a motivational grip on people who lack the predisposition to behave morally from start. In order to deal with motivational problems, we have to start from a real, rational choice model rather than a hypothetical rational choice model. It is not necessary to see the subjects of rational choice as a real, ordinary *homo economicus* rather than the homo economicus behind a veil of uncertainty.

Then our problem is whether tuistic concerns are rational enough for a real ordinary *homo economicus* to accept. In arguing for rational altruism, we believe that because the instrumental rationality of the *homo economicus is* silent on the question of how we come to have the ends we do, it will be not useful in explaining how we come to have ends that are tuistic. But a reflective rationality of the autonomous agent can allow that ends as well as means can be criticized.

THE HOMO ECONOMICUS AS AN AUTONOMOUS PERSON

That human begins have desires interests, and inclinations which play an important role in their actions. But in order to argue that human beings are capable of altruistic desires and interests, we have to hold the assumption that normal human beings are autonomous, in addition to the assumption that they are self-interested utility maximizes. The image of the rational, self-determining, autonomous chooser implies that a person can reflect on what should be done or what it would be desirable to do.

The autonomous agent is one who is reflective and self-critical about his or her beliefs and attitudes, wants and preferences, desires and inclinations. The autonomous agent is self-conscious, able to step back as to scrutinize engagements of beliefs and practice. It is possible to understand autonomy in terms of belief and practice. At the level of belief, the quest for Rawlsian reflective equilibrium is an action of an autonomous person, though it is only one option of many. At the level of practice, I am desirous X and also have a desire not to desire X.
Gerald Dworkin's (1988) distinction between first-order desires and second-order desires is particularly relevant here. An example would be the desire to smoke. Dworkin links autonomy to second-order desires, desires to be the sort of person who is motivated or not motivated by certain first-order desires. The desire not to crave cigarette, is a second-order desires. According to Dworkin, one is autonomous or self-determining when one is (1) able to reflect critically from the standpoint of one's second-order desires, on one's first-order desires and (2) able to endorse from this standpoint the first order desires that moves one to act- which involves being able, to a certain extent, to harness the motivation associated with their second-order desires, should this be necessary to bring them into conformity with one's second-order desires. It should be noted, however, that the core of this account of autonomy is the possibility of adopting a critical stance toward the desires that move one, and we may have the conceptual resources to do this without invoking second-order desires.

Undoubtedly the autonomous person's current engagements (e.g. desires) are first-order data and their critical review (producing desires about one's desires) represents a second-order monitoring. Then, a question arises; Can one have third order desires about one's second-order desires about one's first-order desires? Does a regress threaten? We believe that there is a possibility of indefinite regress, but a harmless one: there are no limits to human self-reflectiveness.

The notion that human beings are rational, self-determining, free choosers, responsible for their actions is certainly different from the image of the self-interested utility maximizer, but we believe that they are compatible with each other. The notable difference between them is that the former is a broader concept than the latter, thus it is possible to argue that the former can incorporate the later

within its framework on a mutatis mutandis basis. The reason for this compatibility is that the choice made by an autonomous agent is ordinarily described as a rational choice since it is supported by reasons and rational capacities are the guide in finding reasons for action.

However, there are some considerations which are worthy of noting when we wish to broaden the model of the self-interested agent in order to incorporate altruistic concerns. It is important to pay attention to the way in which people not only question how they can help a person in a given situation but also question why they should help that person. The latter is nothing more than the question concerning why some one should be altruistic. The fact that autonomous beings call into question why they should be altruistic implies that moral uncertainty is generated in the context of setting moral ends, not to mention with respect to deciding in the efficient means for achieving these ends. If this is so, then our reflection is concerned with settling such uncertainty and hence there is a possibility that our rational choice can be committed to setting the ends of action. There has been a debate on the issue as to whether rationality can mean something beyond instrumentality. What we can claim here is that we do not have to exclude this possibility from the realm of rationality. There is nothing in rationality per se to either support or object to such exclusion.

RATIONAL ALTRUISM

Thomas Nagel (1970) notes the parasitic nature of altruism. According to him, «altruistic reasons are parasitic upon self-interested ones; the circumstances in the lives of others which altruism requires me to consider are circumstances which those others already have reason to consider from a self-interested point of view.» Tuistic reasons are parasitic on nontuistic reasons in a second way, insofar as reflective nontuism is the need from which our tuisitc concerns grow.

Nagel's argument implies that we do not really give a rationale for tuistic concerns until we explain nontuistic concerns. Yet this is only part of the picture, since it is possible to claim that the apparently parasitic relation between nontuistic concerns and tuistic concerns can be symbiotic. If altruism has to be nurtured, it is necessary to appeal to egoistic reasons to initiate the nurturing process. In the nurturing process, nontuistic rationality should be regarded as presupposing reflective rationality. A reflective kind of rationality allows for the possibility of developing tuistic and altruistic concerns. Altruistic concerns lead us to the possibility of deeper and broader satisfaction of human desires and wants. They give us more to live for than we have if we care only about ourselves.

It is instrumentally rational for us to care about ourselves, but it is reflectively rational for us to care about others. To create a richer world about ourselves, we must have regard for the interests of others, for it is in serving the interest of others that we develop and give value to our own latent potential. This is another way of saying that we can reflectively accept altruism if we can endorse from our critical stand point, the motivation that manifests itself in our acceptance of altruism as something making ourselves richer. Of course, he may not accept altruism as reason for action in his first-order desires in Dworkin's sense, but altruism may be something that he can endorse from his critical standpoint. Examples are not hard to find. The self-sacrificing action of a good Samaritan can be endorsed from his critical standpoint, rather than his first-order standpoint.

In saying this, however, we are not denying that when personal survival is at stake, it can be quite sufficient to capture our nontuistic attention. Altruistic concerns usually give way to egoistic concerns when there is a conflict. In some exceptional circumstances, we may have no need for tuistic concerns. We may not view ourselves as being able to afford altruistic concerns either. To cultivate tuistic preference when we are desperate is to cultivate frustration. As a result, it is reasonable to say that our action is predominantly motivated by self-interest. But when circumstances leave us with a free time to think and question about ourselves and our 'good life', a more reflective kind of rationality will weigh in favor of trying to develop broader interests than mere self-interests. It is rational to begin with a goal of survival, but because we are reflective, it is perfectly rational to cultivate concerns other than survival as well.

Because we are reflective, it is rational to have a variety of preferences in addition to a preference for survival - preferences whose satisfaction gives significance and value to our survival. Out of self-regard, we have a reason to nurture the enrichment of our utility functions so that they come to incorporate tuistic preferences. As these preferences become part of the function, they acquire a certain autonomy, becoming more than mere means to previously given ends. If they do not, we have not achieved our purpose in cultivating them, which is to have more to live for. We cultivate a richer set of concerns as a means of serving ends we already have(Schmidtz 1993).

In sum, we cannot afford the poverty of ends with which pure egoism would raddle us, since we are reflectively as well as instrumentally rational. As far as we have time for reflection, we need to have a variety of ongoing concerns with respect to which our survival can take on value as a means to these ends. When these further ends are in place, survival comes to be more than a biological must; an agent who has further ends not only happens to have the goal of survival but can give reasons why securing that goal is important. As a biologically given end, survival can be a source of value as far as various pursuits can take on value as means to the end of survival, but survival can also come to possess its own value in so far as it comes to be a means to our emerging further ends. Survival thus becomes something we have rational reasons to pursue, quite apart from the fact that the end of survival is biologically given.

Thus, if the above arguments are persuasive. we can say that «we don't live by bread alone» and that it is reflectively rational to say that «I can be my brother's keeper», to borrow the expression of biblical derivation.

RATIONAL ALTRUISM AND UNIVERSAL ALTRUISM

Altruism involves self-sacrifice for exceptional individuals and situations to which the usual dominance of self-interested concerns does not hold, but as a matter of routine. Altruism involves costs, of course, as does any action, but cost-bearing becomes self-sacrificial only when the agent prefers the value forgone to the value gained. Altruism is necessarily self-sacrificial only for purely nontuistic agents. For agents who have tuistic concerns, acting on those concerns will be self-sacrificial if it costs too much, but it need not do so. Needless to say, we may regret giving up one value for the sake of another, even in

cases where both values are of a nontuistic nature, as even when we have no doubt that the value gained is more important than the value lost. But however painful it feels, one is not sacrificing oneself when one sacrifices a lesser value for the sake of a greater value, as this is what altruism often amounts to for tuistic agents.

But it is important to note that as far as one is committed to a rational choice framework, even if it is a reflective rather instrumental rationality, one has to confront the limits of rational altruism. Another way of saying this is that rational altruism is the doctrine that nontuistic concerns tend to be overriding in people's motivational structures, at least until they have reached a stable and satisfactory level of well-being as security. This claim allows for the possibility that many people would be largely altruistic if they were well-off enough in the present and expected to continue to be so in the future.

There is some evidence that attainment of material as physical security does increase the tendency to engage in altruistic concerns. Economists have noted that altruistic concerns and actions are what is called «superior goods», that is, those with higher incomes are willing to spend a higher percentage of their income on them. Moreover, Abraham Maslow has posited the existence of a hierarchy of needs such that drive to satisfy needs at each level presupposes adequate satisfaction of lower-level needs. In his hierarchy, physiological and safety needs are at the foundation level, with social and affirmative needs coming after and altruistic behavior among those whose basic material and security needs are satisfied.

Taking into consideration the conception of the superior good and a hierarchy of needs, it would be irrational to nurture commitments that lead to self-sacrifice as a matter of course. The point is to have more to live for, and to satisfy the prerequisites of prudence. We usually accomplish this by nurturing concern and respect for family, relatives, friends, neighbors and so on. There are certain kinds of tuistic concerns that we can easily afford to extend to the whole world. But we have only a limited capacity for tuistic concerns in toto. If we tried to care about everyone, our lives probably would be impoverished rather than enriched. In other words, the scope of rational altruism is confined to concern for family, close friends, close associates or particular group to which the individual is devoted.

We think that this has implications for morality as well as for rational altruism. To be sure, morality requires us to respect everyone. According to an account of morality which has enjoyed high prestige in modern moral philosophy, to judge from a moral standpoint is to judge impartially and impersonally. It is to judge as any reasonable person would judge independently of his or her interests, affections and social position. And to act morally is to act in accordance with such impersonal and impartial judgement. Thus, to think and act morally involves the moral agent in abstracting his or herself from all social particularity and partiality. The potential conflict between morality so understood and rational altruism is at once clear. For rational altruism requires me to exhibit peculiar devotion to my family, my relations and you to yours. It requires me to regard such contingent social facts as where I was born, who my parents were, who my great-great parents were and so on, as deciding for me the question of what tuistic concerns are.

In this context, Confucian morality requires attention, because it might be regarded as being compatible with rational altruism rather than universal altruism. Family love holds a special status in

Confucian morality. Bertland Russell (1922) once argued that «Confucian emphasis on filial piety prevented the growth of public spirit». Certainly, whether Confucianism prevents the growth of public spirit is a matter of controversy, but whatever the case may be, what is certain is that Confucian morality requires us to give more concerns to our kin relations than the strangers we happen to meet. Thus, there is a distinction between family members, who can be relied upon, and nonfamily members who are not to be trusted except in qualified ways (Park 1999).

Having been made actually aware of in-group and out-group identities, Confucians tend to believe that relationships lacking any special ties can not become part of their collectivity. As far as Korean Confucianism is concerned, there is a continuity of tensions between family loyalties and political loyalties, between concerns for one's immediate family responsibilities and sacrifices for the larger community extending to the boundaries of the state.

Given the main tenets of Confucian morality, a question arises; Is it rational to hold a yearning for other-regarding concerns, broader than kin relations-including the closest group, that is, human race or the kingdom of ends, which transcends the clams of their particular ethnic, religions, or partisan group? It is true that rational altruism, which is confined to concern for family rather than human rice, falls short of morality understood universally or morality sub specie aeternitatis, but it is possible to say that rational altruism is more intelligible and easily accommodated than the requirement of morality sub specie aeternitatis. It is often easier to practice rational altruism than the moral law, its requirements are often, though not necessarily, clearer and thus provide a recognized standard of aspiration.

And to this mundane thesis of rational altruism we might join a more speculative claim. T. H. Green (1986) suggests that « the love of mankind ... needs to be particularized in order to have any power over life and action. Just as there can be no true friendship expert towards this or that individual, so there can be no true public spirit which is not localized in some way». The human condition being a finite one of limited intelligence and sympathies, it may be that we can only participate in what may be called morality sub specie humanitatis in partial and incomplete ways. Rational altruism may provide a realistic and reachable form for the wider forms of universal altruism. In sum, rational altruism enables us to say that «I can be my brother's keeper», but not that I can be my stranger's keeper.

MORAL WEAKNESS

The last section argued that tuistic concerns are rational and justified from one's critical standpoint and that they can figure in a sound subject of moral education. But it is important to note that we sometimes fail morally not much because we lack sufficient reason to be moral as because we lack sufficient strength to be moral. We have to confront a problem that the homo economicus of the rational choice model does not; namely, we sometimes lack the strength will to do what is in our best interest. Telling truth sometimes takes more courage than we muster, even when we forsee being intensely disappointed with ourselves if we lie. Developing one's talents and cultivate one's character is also morally demanding; seeing where one's talents lie requires honest self-appraisal, and turning raw talent into practiced skill takes courage and perseverance. Being rational in a full-blooded sense -developing oneself in a way that is true to oneself- is a profoundly demanding activity.

How can we explain the gap between reason for rational altruism and will for rational altruism? First of all, it should be pointed out that the rational choice model acknowledge this gap by making a distinction between the normative and the empirical thesis of rational choice. The normative thesis of rational choice seeks to prescribe or recommend how choices ought to be made, and the empirical thesis is focused on how choices are actually made. Also these two theses take different stands on human beings as the subjects of choice even though both of them are
based on the idea that human beings are rational enough to choose what to do. The former principle views the subjects of choice as ideally rational agents and the latter seeks the subjects of choice as real, ordinary human beings.

However, the normative and empirical theses of rational choice are not constructed independently of each other since empirical and normative theses are relevant to each other. In the first place, when one attempts to construct a normative theory of rational choice, he is concerned with same empirical questions about humane beings' capacities, e.g., whether humane beings actually could follow what the theory recommends. If the answers to the empirical questions are negative, then it means that the theory is not appropriate for human rationality. In other words the conception of human rationality means the conception of rationality which takes into account human capacities. Thus, the empirical thesis is relevant to the construction of the normative thesis.

Since normative and empirical theses of rational choice are intertwined with each other, it may not be proper to put much weight on the distinction between the normative and the empirical theory of rational choice. Nevertheless, many experimental observations show that people make choices contrary to what ideally rational agents should do.

Consider the Allais Paradox. This paradox has a following pair of choice problem where pay-offs are in money

Problem 1: choose between

A. 2500 with probability .33 2400 with probability .66 0 with probability .01 B: 2400 with certainty

Problem 2: choose between

C: 2 500 with probability .33 0 with probability .67 D: 2400 with probability .34 0 with probability .66

In experiments which are pairs of problems of this kind, many people choose B in problem 1 and C in problem 2. Compare these experimental observations what is recommended by expected utility theory, which is the standard theory, which is the standard theory of rational choice. Expected utility theory is based on the instrumentalist conception of rationality, which is defined as utility-maximization. This theory states that rational agents choose so as to maximize their expected utility. According to expected utility theory, it is irrational to choose B in problem 1 and C in problem 2: if someone's preferences satisfy the axioms of expected utility theory and he choose B in problem 1,

then he must choose D in problem 2; and if he chooses A in problem 2. In brief, the Allais paradox shows that in same problems people tend to make a choice contrary to expected utility theory.

One way of interpreting the paradox is that ordinary people are not so fully rational as to choose what is recommended by expected utility theory. Then people's choice in that paradox might be called irrational, which one would want to avoid if he were aware of it. We believe that even though the normative thesis of rational choice can be challenged by observations of people's choices, such a challenge does not mean that the normative theory has no bearing on the question of how people should make a choice for behavior. On the contrary, we think that the idealizing model of rational agents which a normative theory contains has an important implication for human practice. A normative theory, which assumes that the subject of choice is fully rational, prescribes how we ought to choose if we are to act rationally. To adopt the idealistic model of rational agents is not the same as to presume that real, ordinary people always make a choice in a fully rational way. It needs to be admitted that the ideal it prescribes cannot be fully attained in practice. However, they can serve to guide and correct our reasoning. It is our understanding that the primary usefulness of the rational choice model is to construct a normative thesis which prescribes how choice ought to be made. The rational choice model cannot tell whether ordinary people behave in some suggested way.

Moreover, with regard to a gap between theory and practice or reason and will, it might be instructive to invoke a Humean argument, basing rule-formation on public utility and then allowing the irrational adherence of praise, and blame to form accretions around these rules to make them more stable and to explain their apparent binding force. The trouble is that the mechanism which explains the existence of rules is at war with mechanism which explains their bindingness. If public utility accounts for all the rationality there is in rules, then there would be no reason to attach praise and blame to them in the suggested way. Since disobedience provides its own punishment and obedience its own reward(at least in the long run), various deterrent such as coercion and social pressure should provide all the extra stability. It would only add insult to injury to further blame them for their failures.

Meanwhile, the gap between theory and practice, or reason and will can be captured by the Greek word 'akrasia'. It is usually said to translate literally as lack of self-control, but it has come to be used as general term for the phenomenon known as weakness of will, or incontinence, the disposition to act contrary to one's own considered judgement about what it is best to do. Since the variety of akrasia is the inability to act the moral philosopher. The Socratic view that «no one does wrong willingly» receives its most detailed elaboration in the Protagoras. The context is a discussion between Socrates and Protagoras about the nature of the virtues. It is in the course of defending the suggestion that the virtues form a kind of unity that Socrates maintains that no one can knowingly choose the worse of two available alternatives.

Although there are passages in Nichomachean Ethics, where Aristotle defends the Socratic position, there are numerous passages in other of Aristotle works, where Aristotle appears to imply that it is perfectly possible for an agent to pursue an undesirable course of action while knowing full well that it is not the best thing to do.

Moral weakness is that particular form of akrasia which consists in failing to live up to one's sincerely expressed beliefs about what it would be morally best to do. We believe that nothing is more obvious than the people often do things they genuinely consider to be morally wrong.

CONFUCIAN VIRTUE ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION

The serious problem with the rational choice model is its assumption that rational reasoning and judgement are naturally linked to rational behavior. It is not necessarily true that reasons for altruistic concerns can be turned into motivating reasons. When altruism is justified as a reflectively rational behavior, it means that reflectively rational reasoning can be linked to other-regarding concerns and interests, not other-regarding behavior.

Reflective reasoning and judgement may be necessary for altruistic behavior, but cannot by themselves be sufficient. This has important implications for moral education. The rational approach to moral education has stressed training in decision-making and problem-solving skills rather than a good conduct in ordinary life. But in doing so, it has failed to help students behave morally and altruistically. There are some moral philosophers who have claimed that this failure can be corrected by a new approach in the area of character education, something that we take to be a contemporary typical virtue approach to moral education. According to character education, the contents of moral education should be constituted by the values that have been constituted to be important by a certain community and its methods should be focused on moral habit and moral conduct. This is called a virtue ethics approach.

In arguing for the importance of virtue ethics, we must clearly specify what is needed for. When we look at the Greek concept of *arete,* we know that it was the original Homeric virtues which referred to something like showing excellence in battle and being noble in word and deeds. Plato took this *arete* and tried to» civilize» it by equating it with the idea of *sophrosune,* which was originally a very different virtue meaning excellence in controlling one's passions. Eventually, *arete* came to mean a lot of different things that would be unrecognizable to either Homer or Plato. One example would be the Christian virtue of being charitable to others. Yet there are still some things that are incompatible with it. For example, the duty-oriented morality of following principles could never be included in the notion of *arete* because arete was about human excellence and never about following moral principles.

In this context, Confucian morality deserves attention, for it has had something to say about human strength to behave morally and altruistically. Throughout its long history, Confucian morality has stressed character formation or personal cultivation of virtues *('duk)* Thus it seems appropriate to characterize Confucian ethics as an ethics of virtue, not an ethics of rules or principles.

But the Confucian conception of *duk* has two connotations. First of all, *duk is* construed as power, force, or potency and in Confucian usage it is qualified as moral in contrast to physical force. The second sense of *duk is* distinctly ethical, as pertaining to the excellence of a character trait or disposition. We think that two construals of *duk* are not incompatible in the light of the Greek and the Roman tradition.

In Western world, the concept of virtue derives from the Greek *arete* or excellence, as we have already pointed out. As a role-related concept, virtue refers to the disposition to act in accordance with the standards and expectation that define the role or roles a person performs. The more sharply defined role, the clearer the virtue associated with it will be. A steady hand may be among the virtues of a carpenter and a surgeon, for instance, but not of accountant or poet. Some character traits or disposition seem useful to almost everyone, however, and these are what we sometimes talk of as the virtue-including the classical virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. By the way, it is also worthy of noting that virtue came from the Latin virtus, which carried from its association with *vir* (man in the gender-specific sense) the connotation of strength and boldness. Classical republican theorists often described men who lacked virtue as effeminate.

Given the conception of excellence associated with *arete* and strength associated with *virtus,* a good quality and efficacy, which figure in the Confucian uses of *duk,* are regarded as being closely linked with each other. Also important in the sense of *duk* as power or force in view of Confucian notion of *kunja* (ethically superior or paradigmatic individuals). By virtue of ethical achievement, a *kunja* posesses the power of attraction of influence indicative of effective agency. As Confucius remarks, the *kunja,* equipped with the virtues, never stands alone: He is bound to have neighbors, The virtue of the gentleman *(kunja) is* like the wind: the virtue of smile man is like grass, let the wind blow over the grass and it is sure to bend.

In sum, the Confucian notion of *duk* can be properly construed as ethical virtue that possess a dual aspect: an achieved condition of person through self-cultivation of commendable character traits in accordance with the ideal *duk,* and a condition that is deemed to have the peculiar potency or power of efficacy in influencing the course of life.

Of course, the difficult problem is how moral virtues can be taught in school. Generally, most modern character education programs aims at transmitting values directly in terms of examples or advice and take habituation and training to be the main ways to inculcate these values in student's minds. However, it is debatable how efficient the direct training or implanting of altruistic values and virtue can be. Because of its distinctive character and role in Confucian ethics, the notion of *ye* requires special attention. Implicit in the notion of *ye is* an idea of rule-governed conduct. In the Yegi (Book of Rites), the subject matter ranges from ritual rules or formal prescription concerning mourning, sacrifices, marriage and communal festivities to the more ordinary occasions relating to conduct towards ruler, superior, parent, elder, teacher and guests. Because of its emphasis on the form or manner of behavior, *ye* is often translated as religious ritual, ceremony, decorum propriety formality, politeness, courtesy, etiquette, good form, or good behavior.

With regard to any system of rules governing human conduct, one can always raise questions concerning its purpose. In the Confucian ethics, *ye,* as a set of formal prescriptions for proper behavior have a three-fold function: delimiting, supportive and ennobling. The delimiting function is primary, in that the ye are fundamentally directed to the prevention of human conflict. In addition, they have a supportive function that is, they provide coordinations or opportunities for satisfaction of desires within the prescribed limits of action. The ennobling function is cultural refinement, the education and nourishment of emotions or their transformation in accord within the spirit of 'in'.

Given those functions, it clear that *ye* involves the elegant form for the expression of ethical character. In other words the *ye* are directed primarily to the development of commandable or praiseworthy virtues. The beauty of the expression of an ethical character lies in the balance between emotions and form. What is deemed admirable in the virtuous conduct of an ethically superior person in the harmonious function of elegant form and feelings. In sum, we believe that Confucian *ye* education may contribute to remedying our imperfect motivation and our weakness in living up to demands of rational altruism.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have argued that reflective rather than instrumental rationality can justify altruistic concerns. But rational altruism that reflective rationality recommends should be understood as a limited morality rather than a morality sub specie aetermtatis or a morality sub specie humanitatis. In arguing for rational altruism we claimed neither that self-interest is constituted entirely by being moral neither that morality completely overrides self-interest. That self-interest can coexist with morality in a peaceful way was our assumption.

However, that reflective rationality justifies tuistic concerns should not mean that it can provide us with a strength of will to behave altruistically as well. To justify altruism from a standpoint of reflective rationality is one thing, and to have a strength of will to do altruistically is another. We have noted that because of our weakness in living up to the demands of reflective rationality, virtue is a valuable corrective to our standing temptation to do egoistically. Confucian morality characterized by duk and ye is a vivid example for the importance of the enhancement of a strength of will to do morally.

This has an implication for moral education. Virtue education is needed for moral education to remedy the common failures of imperfectly motivated people. Of course, we are not sure that virtue ethics education including Confucian ye education is applicable to a modern school situation in liberal society, but the practical difficulty with regard to the applicability of virtue education should not understood as the claim that it is useless.

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Back to current electronic table of contents