

Philosophy for Children in Native America. a Post-Colonial Critique

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As a young child, I was required by law to attend the same residential boarding school that my parents and brothers attended before me. When we moved to Regina, my brothers and sister and I were enrolled in another «Indian» boarding school in the Qu'Appelle valley. From the beginning we were criticized and humiliated by our white «educators. «Forbidden to speak above a whisper or to laugh out loud, we were shamed into silence for much of our lives. No one wanted to be an «Indian «when we re-enacted scenes from the western movies we were regularly subjected to, and we lived in fear of divine punishment for the many sins which we committed, in thought, word, and deed, against our teachers and their god. I often felt overwhelmed by the number of potential sins which I might unintentionally commit. My initially limited vocabulary also prevented me from understanding what certain words or sins meant, and I lived in mortal fear of being punished for some unknown transgression on my part. As a result, I was particularly diligent in reporting any sins which I might have committed to the priest. He would admonish me and administer a penance. Even when I had done nothing wrong, it was expected that I had, and so I regularly confessed to things which I had not done. Usually I would confess to having evil thoughts like wanting to have more than one dessert. But eventually I became more creative, developing a system of sins and corresponding punishments which would eliminate any need for priestly intervention. The first week my friend, Larry, and I respectively confessed to lying and swearing and earned a rosary each in penance. The next week Larry confessed to «blasphemy, «and I to «impure thoughts, «but neither of us could explain what these things were. Caught almost immediately, Larry and I had to attend evening and morning mass for four weeks when we told the priest why we were confessing to sins which we had not committed.

-Paul Rainville, Cree Nation

Paul Rainville writes eloquently of the ways in which he and his people have been shamed into silence, stripped of self-esteem, and left to cope with the alienating effects of «Indian» policy in North America. Along with many other Native American women and men, he draws attention to fundamental issues of social and political justice which have long been ignored within mainstream political discourse. Much of the literature in Philosophy for Children advocates a democratic approach to doing philosophy through establishing a community of inquiry which allows free and equal expression on the part of all participants.¹ Modern North American democracies are often credited with the

inspiration and the development of Philosophy for Children's democratic goals.² But I have yet to read a paper in the growing body of Philosophy for Children literature which acknowledges the ways in which our so-called democratic institutions have arisen out of, and continue to perpetuate, the political, economic, and ideological repression of Native North Americans. The lack of attention paid by Philosophy for Children, and by the philosophical community in general, to the special political and social circumstances of Native American peoples seriously undermines the legitimacy of our approach. Genuine commitment to democracy requires that we address, not only formal but also substantive, issues of equality as they arise for those who are most often oppressed within our eurocentric³ educational institutions.

It is now well known, but less frequently acknowledged, that the genocidal practices of imperialist countries like Britain, France, and Spain allowed Western European civilizations to take political and economic control of New World lands and peoples. Once control was achieved, colonial governments could develop elaborate political philosophies which espoused freedom and equality for everyone while failing to observe the political rights of Aboriginal peoples.⁴ Ensuring the continued repression of Native Americans was necessary to furthering the goals of democratic America, and this was accomplished in a variety of ways. Native Americans were excluded from political processes, including the federal franchise, until well into the twentieth century.⁵ There were laws which prevented Aboriginal peoples from hiring lawyers and arguing treaty cases in court. There were also laws forbidding large gatherings and traditional ceremonies. Moreover, federal governments maintained economic and political control over Aboriginal communities by way of treaty payments, determination of racial status, and the education of children.⁶

Repression required cultural annihilation as well, and this was carried out on both a practical and a philosophical level in colonial America. Historical accounts still begin with the arrival of European explorers, and even those accounts which acknowledge Aboriginal presence prior to contact portray colonization as inevitable in the face of Western progress. Indigenous peoples and their cultures are shown to be frail, unable to cope with «new» ideas and modern pressures, and in desperate need of «helpful» Western interventions. Negative stereotyping of Indigenous peoples became, and remains, common in the arts and media, and European scientific and academic tradition continues to dominate our educational institutions.⁷ Consequently, the physical and psychological repression which Native Americans have been subject to for many generations has taken a serious toll on Native people and their communities. Children who did not want to play «Indian» in the school yard grew into adults who embraced Western ideals often at their own expense.⁸ And the silencing of Aboriginal voices through systematic shaming and lack of political recognition has made it difficult, but not impossible, for First Nations peoples to speak out and to be heard in even the most democratic of our institutions.

Although Philosophy for Children's highly interactive approach represents a welcome alternative to the oppressive schooling which Paul Rainville and others of his generation received, as a Western construct Philosophy for Children is subject to scrutiny in the same ways that all modern democratic institutions should be. Certainly, the abolition of residential schools and the recognition of Aboriginal peoples within government directives like, for example, the Canadian Charter Of Rights And Freedoms, have had a positive effect to some degree, but many of the old problems still remain.⁹ There is

still a lack of consistent and deliberate effort on the part of Western governments to address the political, economic, and social concerns of Native American peoples. Nor can I find evidence in the literature that these issues are being consciously addressed within the Philosophy for Children program. In fact, while I have encountered a limited number of feminist and cross-cultural criticisms of Philosophy for Children material, I am worried that our purportedly neutral approach to philosophical inquiry may unwittingly contribute to the marginalization of Indigenous peoples both in North America and around the world.

Marguerite Rivage-Seul (1987) provides an insightful critique of Philosophy for Children in Guatemala which helps to illustrate my point. Although she does not focus specifically on the colonization of Native American peoples, Rivage-Seul points out that circumstances which permit the forceable repression of Amerindian Pocomch' in Guatemala, and Guatemalan «refugees» in Mexico, are not challenged in Philosophy for Children literature. In her view, the notion of democracy advanced in the core text, Harry *Stottlemeier's Discovery* (Lipman 1974), imports a «typically North American understanding» of critical thinking and democracy to Guatemala which ultimately serves the interests of an unjust status quo (Rivage-Seul 1987, 233). She claims that the lack of historical sensitivity and institutional awareness that characterizes Western liberal-democratic thinking is evident in Philosophy for Children's preoccupation with impartiality and abstract reasoning skills:¹⁰ Pointing out that overcoming injustice requires more than simply an impartial commitment to objectivity, Rivage-Seal argues that critical thinking skills are useless in the fight for social justice unless our thoughts are informed by relevant contextual details. «Conscious Partiality» requires that teachers acknowledge their own (inevitable) biases, as well as the conceptual limitations of their chosen material, while paying particular attention to the political contexts in which education takes place (1987, 242). As a result, Philosophy for Children must be willing to incorporate historical detail and socio-cultural awareness into any programs which are meant to be truly liberatory.

Walter Kohan (1995) offers similar criticisms in his discussion of Philosophy for Children in Latin America. While impressed with the aims of the program, Kohan also questions its commitment to purportedly neutral democratic ideals (1995, 25). Although he understands that nothing in Philosophy for Children literature prevents children from questioning injustice as it occurs around them, Kohan argues that we should not be **asking** how much questioning is being done but, rather, «how much does this program stimulate this land of questioning?» (1995, 26). He finds it significant that material which is intended to promote independent and democratic thinking does not call into question «the foundations of the systematic and constant discrimination and oppression that cause suffering to a good part of the people that inhabit the same world.» He also debunks the myth of so-called political neutrality, arguing that «if we don't question the foundations of a capitalistic society, we in fact accept these foundations and ... contribute to the uncritical acceptance of the status quo.» In Kohan's view, simply thinking critically about thinking itself does not adequately fulfill philosophy's «critical potential» (1995, 28). He believes that Philosophy for Children «should extend the criticism that it applies to thinking to the reality that has nurtured and contributed to forming those modes of thinking.»¹¹

According to Kohan, Matthew Lipman and Anne Sharp, (two founding members of Philosophy for Children's community of inquiry), have responded to Jane Martin's assertion that «in an unjust social reality, a desirable education should produce social critics»(1995, 30). Lipman and Sharp claim that Philosophy for

Children does not «involve shielding social institutions from social scrutiny» (Kohan 1995, 30). They argue that while it is important to help children to «understand the value of consistency between actions and beliefs,» especially in «a society in which ideals and actions are tragically split,» encouraging a commitment to social action on the part of students flies «in the face not only of the practice of philosophy but also of the commitment of educators to impartiality.» Unimpressed with Lipman and Sharp's response, Kohan points out that some of the most ideologically consistent societies have been the most unjust. As a result, «it is necessary to help children examine the social and political assumptions of their society.» Stopping short of pushing children into political action, we can raise children's consciousness of the underlying political values «that their societies presumably carry.» And there are no impartial educators, for teachers who are not committed to stimulating «inquiry into alternative courses of action» are the «best allies of the status quo.»

So far we have examined ways in which Philosophy for Children's emphasis on reflective thinking in the absence of political awareness may obscure issues of social justice. Interestingly, none of the theorists mentioned openly connect social injustice in the Americas with the colonization of Native American peoples. According to *Colliers Encyclopedia*, 54% of Guatemala's population is of Mayan descent, and Indigenous populations in Mexico and Brazil are high as well. Yet post-colonial criticisms are absent from discussions of these or any other countries. Nor is it even suggested by Philosophy for Children advocates that the ideals of Western democracy are founded upon the fundamental political misconception that we are, in fact, legitimately entitled to claim democratic authority in countries which were taken from their original inhabitants by force.¹² Yet, it is the fact that so many people were forced into accepting and acknowledging this «democratic» authority that undermines the legitimacy of Western democracy as it currently exists. Our governmental and societal institutions can hardly be called «democratic» when we consider the amount of ideological repression which has gone into their making. While some children may remain oblivious to these circumstances, Native American children who encounter democratic idealism in the classroom often know that real democracy cannot be achieved without active intervention in an unjust socio-political environment.

As a result, I am concerned that Philosophy for Children programs may unintentionally emphasize formal over substantive democracy both in and out of the classroom. How is this possible in an environment which emphasizes equal recognition, respect, and participation for everyone? For the same reasons that the concerns of Native American people are not fully recognized in the larger democratic community. A history of oppression and repression has interfered greatly with the ability of Native individuals or groups to acquire and to develop the resources necessary for full political participation. The lack of political recognition and epistemic authority which has been conferred upon Native Americans undermines, not only the accomplishments of First Nations peoples, but also the capacity for non-Native peoples to take Aboriginal issues seriously. Within the classroom we find all of the learned behaviors and negative stereotyping which affect Native American people, both adults and children, on a systematic basis. We also find a cultivated ignorance on the part of non-Native children (and teachers) with respect to both the injustices which have transpired against, as well as the current political objectives of, Native American communities.¹³ Even more disturbingly, these factors do not necessarily improve over time. Some of the most repugnant attitudes which Native American students (and teachers) must confront occur at the university level.¹⁴

Even when we set democratic goals within the classroom, children are still subject to the subtle influences and pressures which shape and constrain all of our lives. The absence of overt ridicule may be insufficient to overcome problems associated with low self-esteem or the sense of futility often experienced by those subjected to prolonged institutional oppression. And even the most politely received speaker becomes frustrated, perhaps to the point of silence, when her ideas are neither recognized nor understood by those around her. Both Native and non-Native students may be reluctant to speak out on issues of social justice if it appears that the community is not interested in hearing what they have to say.

Likewise, students may be reluctant to speak up when they feel hurt or threatened by remarks which others do not perceive to be threatening. Finally, a lack of public recognition for Aboriginal peoples and their concerns may make it difficult for students to formulate challenges toward, and to articulate their reasons for wanting to challenge, dominant societal and classroom perspectives. In many cases, children may be aware of their own, or others', discomfort but lack familiarity with the concepts or the vocabulary necessary for responding to this awareness.¹⁵ Unless educators are willing to consider these factors when evaluating Philosophy for Children curriculum, we will remain oblivious to the possibility that classroom dialogue may be biased in ways which are not immediately obvious to everyone.

In a culture dominated by contemporary eurocentric standards of evaluation, the content and characters of the Philosophy for Children curriculum can be problematic as well. Content may be problematic, firstly, because it does not lead us to question deeply enough the social injustices in which Western society is firmly rooted.¹⁶ Secondly, because it is the product of a cultural era which has been shaped in accordance with patriarchal Western values. Certainly the liberatory potential of Philosophy for Children is widely attested to in the many feminist and cross-cultural analyses of its success; however, there is some negative feedback associated with the program as well. Terri Field (1997), Walter Kohan (1995), and Francesco Valentino (1998) point out that Philosophy for Children literature often emphasizes formal analytic technique at the expense of other, equally important, approaches to doing philosophy. As we have already learned, Kohan believes that cultivating technical proficiency in the absence of social critique undermines the program's commitment to its democratic ideals (1995, 30). Field, on the other hand, suggests that the emphasis which Philosophy for Children theorists place on objective or neutral forms of reasoning may be inherently sexist (1997; 21).¹⁷ Valentino's assertion that Lipman admits, but does not elaborate sufficiently upon, an affective component in our reasoning processes lends further support to Field's cautionary remarks (1998, 29).¹⁸

Marie-France Daniel's feminist analysis of Philosophy for Children curriculum also suggests that the «third-person voice» which Lipman himself associates with the (male-dominated) «establishment» is used in the novels he addresses «to secondary students» (1994, 68). Daniel's analysis of program material is notable in its detailed attention to weaknesses in, once again, readings centered around the character Harry Stottlemeier. Like many other educators, Daniel believes that Harry's stories are of central importance to the Philosophy for Children program. Unfortunately, she identifies a sexist paradigm not only in Harry but also in the three spin-off novels Lisa, Suki, and Mark. Male and female characters correspond to gender-stereotypes commonly assigned to men and women living in patriarchal Western societies: male characters are dominant, reason-oriented, and independent, while female characters are

passive, emotional, and likely to gossip. Although Daniel does not consider the cross-cultural implications of Philosophy for Children curriculum, I believe that Philosophy for Children material is susceptible, for similar reasons, to critical analysis on racial grounds. In Western society, the gender stereotyping associated with the characters in Harry are also associated with men and women of a specific racial (and sometimes class) background. White middle-class males are often considered to be more successful, independent, and reason-oriented than either women (of any race) or men of «different» racial and ethnic origin (Jaggar 1992, 159). Women of all races are either assumed to be passive, emotional, and accommodating in the manner of middle class white women, or are associated with the stereotype most closely linked to their ethnic or racial background.¹⁹

Lead characters in the Philosophy for Children novels may be problematic because their concerns are very often those of the white middle-class variety and, as a result, are unlikely to be associated with children of color (particularly when our educators and program officials are white).²⁰ Children who can be associated with specific racial or ethnic backgrounds are usually secondary characters whose lifestyles, interests, and concerns reflect those most often assumed in conjunction with conventional racial or ethnic stereotypes. Even the lack of distinguishing features which is characteristic of many Philosophy for Children characters may work against democratic pluralism in the long run. For example, the invisibility of Native American peoples in both historical and contemporary . academic literature means that non-Native children of any race will not readily inform neutral characters with Native American characteristics. Moreover, Native American children may already be conditioned to associate learning in any form with non-Native (predominantly white) students, teachers, and advisors. It is quite possible that children will recognize neither themselves nor their Native American (African American, Asian American, or Latin American) classmates in those characters whose intellectual contributions figure most prominently in Philosophy for Children novels. Given the tacit assumption that «white is right» which dominates Western thought and behavior, it is also unlikely that children will attempt to challenge any perceptions of «whiteness» which may be inherent in Philosophy for Children material. When all of these circumstances are taken into consideration, it is difficult to ignore the possibility that white-skin privilege may combine with male-privilege in delivering Western philosophy to children around the world.

According to Sandra Harding, eurocentrism is a world view which privileges the history, accomplishments, institutions, and conceptual schemes associated with peoples of European descent (1998, 12-14). In many cases, however, those who are most responsible for perpetuating eurocentric belief-systems are neither racist nor sexist in their outlook (1998, 12). Well-intentioned philosophers and educators (of any race) may unwittingly manifest eurocentrism in our attitudes, practices, and beliefs even when we openly condemn sexist and racist behavior. Most commonly, we operate under the assumption that our teaching methods and curriculum are accurate, unbiased, and cross-culturally exportable under any circumstances. Although I do not mean to challenge the importance of equitable classroom relations, meaningful dialogue, and unqualified respect for persons in any educational system, I am concerned about the ideological presuppositions which may dominate Philosophy for Children's learning environment. Never having had the privilege of visiting a Philosophy for Children classroom, I am forced to rely on discussions and practical analyses evident in Philosophy for Children literature. In addition to problems associated with race-gender stereotyping and an enthusiastic acceptance of analytic reasoning

skills, there are instances, primarily in discussions of Philosophy for Children in South Africa, where eurocentric thought is clearly evident.

Lena Green (1997) and Helen Van den Aardweg (1994) write about the liberatory potential of Philosophy for Children in South Africa. Green argues that, for the most part, Philosophy for Children material is exportable on the grounds that it would be «difficult to create an entirely new South African philosophy for children which even approached the conceptual sophistication of the original» (1997, 22). Because she does not elaborate on her use of the term «conceptual sophistication,» I am left to conclude that it is the scientific approach to inquiry which Green identifies earlier in her discussion - evidence, consistency, inference, making predictions (1997, 20) - which lends sophistication to the program. Unmentioned by Green is the realization that this process presupposes evaluative standards which pertain not only to what constitutes evidence or consistency but also to what constitutes reasoned explanation and inference. The methodology which Green describes is consistent with the Western knowledge-paradigms which feminist and post-colonial critics have recently called into question.» Disturbingly absent from Green's discussion are any references to the impact of colonization and segregation on Africa's Indigenous peoples. Other than the neutral suggestion that teachers be allowed «to create individual new stories» (1997, 22), she appears to ignore the possibility that African philosophies and epistemologies could equal the «conceptual sophistication» of Western thought.

Van den Aardweg demonstrates a similar lack of awareness in her discussion of feminism in South Africa. Her article implies that Indigenous peoples, particularly women and children, have always been oppressed under some system or other, and fails to give a detailed account of the relationship between colonialism and race-gender oppression in South African communities. Van den Aardweg argues that South African feminists should not confuse sexism with racism because the «real issue» is sexism, something which white and African women suffer to (apparently) the same degree (1994, 86). But feminists of African descent dispute such claims for two reasons. Firstly, because acknowledging the «hierarchies of oppression» which Van den Aardweg wishes to avoid is central to deconstructing the oppressive myths and stereotypes associated with women of color. Secondly, because in many African societies, as in many tribal or pre-colonial societies in general, women held a great deal of wealth, status, and political power until patriarchal European value-systems were forced upon their communities.²² Philosophy for Children curriculums which do not reflect an awareness of these circumstances may inadvertently encourage racial and cultural stereotyping, belief in the ideological supremacy of European culture, and cultural assimilation.

Similar misconceptions about pre-colonial cultures in North America are evident in the literature as well, primarily in the form of what is left out of discussions about sexism and social injustice. This is particularly disturbing for Native Americans who belong to societies which traditionally awarded a great deal of political power and social status to female members.²³ Prior to the imposition of patriarchal European customs, values, and social structures on Aboriginal communities, women held positions of political, economic, and epistemic authority which were virtually unheard of in Western European societies. Women educated, appointed, and deposed leaders, vetoed council decisions, monitored justice initiatives, maintained economies, chose partners, and raised families as they saw fit. Honored and respected by their male counterparts, crimes against women were forbidden. Songs and narratives praised

female achievement, and political and economic policies openly reflected male dependence on the wisdom and capabilities of women.²⁴ Indigenous epistemology also reflected a wealth of «conceptually sophisticated» scientific and moral knowledge which was dispersed among members of the community in much the same way that Philosophy For Children administers its own program: through story and analysis, respectful communication, and careful inquiry.²⁵

Nevertheless, the only reference to Indigenous epistemologies and the treatment of women which I could find in Philosophy for Children literature is unmistakably negative. Here, Marie-France Daniel appeals to the work of Matthew Lipman when criticizing her own experience in the Quebec educational system, stating: «my behavior was the result of what I consider an `authoritarian and sexist' paradigm of knowledge and what Lipman [1988] calls a `tribal' model of education» (1994, 69). An unfortunate choice of words on Lipman's part when, at least in many cases, the paradigm which he critiques is European in origin. So, in spite of our commitment to liberating children everywhere from the oppressive environments in which education often takes place, Philosophy for Children's a historical approach may, in fact, contribute to the oppression of Aboriginal peoples in a variety of ways. To her credit, Ann Sharp's commitment to feminism and social justice permits her both to acknowledge the possibility that the Philosophy for Children program may contain vestiges of racism and sexism, and to seek out new insights from her (often) female colleagues.²⁶ But neither Sharp nor those in agreement with her make any suggestions for improving Philosophy for Children curriculum. Perhaps this is because we need to let go of our liberal commitment to «impartial» objectivity, and to examine our own «progress» in light of the specific cultural and historical influences which we are all subject to, before we can even begin to identify the ways in which the Philosophy for Children program can be modified and strengthened.

The relative absence of First Nations students and teachers from our philosophy programs, and the obvious absence of Native American input from our institutional curriculums, bear witness to the political injustices which Aboriginal Americans continue to suffer in the name of democracy. Hopefully Philosophy for Children, in its commitment to furthering equality through education, is willing to bridge the gap which currently exists between Native American peoples and our eurocentric educational institutions. It is not difficult to recognize the importance of honoring the presence and the possibilities of Indigenous peoples, and their philosophies, when creating more egalitarian educational programs. I regret that my own eurocentric background prevents me from making authoritative claims about how, exactly, this should be done. I do believe, however, that committed educators can reflect a genuine interest in extending, or altering, the scope of our material so that it includes both traditional and contemporary Native American perspectives. Perhaps not such a formidable task when we consider the many similarities which exist between Indigenous knowledge-seeking practices and Philosophy for Children's dialogical approach.

NOTES

1. See Ann Sharp (1991); Lena Green (1997); Keith Raitz (1992); and Walter Kohan (1995).
2. See Raitz (1992, 11) and Kohan (1995, 26).
3. Biased in favour of «peoples of European descent, their institutions, practices, and favored conceptual schemes» (Harding 1998, 14).

4. These democracies also permitted slavery, segregation, racism, exploitation of immigrant workers, sexism, and the forced internment of Japanese Americans and Canadians during the Second World War.

5. Aboriginal Peoples in Canada received the federal franchise in 1960.

6. The information contained in this and the following paragraph has been taken from a number of sources. For detailed accounts of these injustices please see: Annette Jaimes (1992), Ward Churchill (1992, 1999a, 1999b), and Patricia Monture-Angus (1995).

7. Renee Hulan (1999), Marcia Crosby (1994), and Ward Churchill (1998).

8. Paul Rainville (1999) signed off his reserve and joined the Navy in the hope that his uniform and military status would allow him to become fully assimilated into Western society. He struggled for three decades against racism and depression before finding himself again. His brother, who remained inside during the day in order to prevent any darkening of his skin, and who washed himself constantly in the hope that his skin color would eventually lighten, later died of a drug overdose alone in his room. Marcia Crosby also writes in «The Construction Of The Imaginary Indian» that she and another relative understandably spent much of their time «wanting and trying to be white» (1994, 86).

9. There is nothing in the Charter which ensures restitution or enhanced political recognition for Native Canadians. And the Assembly Of First Nations is not a fully recognized branch of the Canadian government. There is a negative legal history for Native Americans living the United States as well (Churchill 1992, 13-21).

10. A claim which appears to be borne out in much of the Philosophy for Children literature, as I will discuss later in this paper.

11. Although certain children are associated with economic disadvantage in *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* (Lipman 1974), their concerns are never subject to philosophical scrutiny. Harry Stottlemeier's detached method of inquiry centers around formal principles of argumentation and the value of impartial investigation.

12. Note as well the absence of these concerns from classroom discussion about the necessity of «saluting the flag» in *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery*.

13. In addition to the absence of these concerns from the «flag» discussion in *Harry*, there is a reference to Columbus which considers only his admirable reluctance to accept the common view that the earth was flat.

14. Based on eyewitness reports given to me personally and found in the work of Native American writers including Patricia Monture-Angus (1995, 1997) and Marcia Crosby (1994).

15. Lipman does indicate some awareness of these issues, but only for African American students, in the novel *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* (1974, 11). On the other hand, open discussion of the problem is

absent from both his children's novels and his scholarly publications. He devotes more than a chapter to a discussion about whether or not children should be required to salute the~U.S. flag, but only a few paragraphs to a description of Fran's situation.

16. Lipman certainly draws attention to racial, cultural, and socio-economic issues in *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* (1974); however, these are neither allotted much space in the text nor subject to

open discussion in the novel itself. This is not to say that Lipman's scenarios do not provoke actual classroom discussions about racism and social injustice. I am suggesting that because these issues do not figure prominently in areas of public philosophical inquiry, children are not motivated to question the underlying mechanisms which bring these unjust circumstances about.

17. Traditionally in Western thought «reason» has been equated with objectivity and with being male, and «emotion» with subjectivity and with being female.

18. While Lipman does acknowledge the importance of affective response and «caring» thought in several places, Valentino's claim does seem to be borne out in the literature (see esp. Lipman 1998 and 1977, 172).

19. These conclusions are born out in the text of *Harry*: males are shown to be more capable of, and interested in, understanding math, science, and the principles of reasoned inquiry than female students are. In addition, Male children with the names «Mendoza» and «Luther» are shown to be economically deprived, not particularly adept at philosophical inquiry, and likely to be victimized. Suki Tong corresponds to the stereotypical representations of Asian women criticized roundly by Asian feminist Mitsuye Yamada (1983). Suki is passive and caring, self-reproaching in the face of her own anger, and easily led by others. Fran is identified as an African American who wants to be a civil rights lawyer, but Harry believes that he can't count on her to speak out in defense of the classroom community of inquiry. Nor does Fran, or any other student, ever openly express concerns about racism. Anne considers briefly the harm of objectifying Suki on racial or cultural grounds but, once again, there is no consistent follow up (nor any attempt to debunk stereotypical representations of Asian women).

20. Note the differences between Harry, Luther Warfield and Sandy Mendoza. Harry expresses the dominant viewpoint (philosophical method) in the text, while Luther and Sandy neither openly express their concerns nor make decisive (intellectual?) contributions to discussion. And, apart from a brief description of Fran gracefully circling the classroom following a racially motivated incident (which, to Lipman's credit, could certainly provoke discussion on the part of his readers), there is no philosophical follow-up on Fran's situation.

21. See Terri Field and Sandra Harding for more detailed criticisms of Western epistemology.

22. Barbara Omolade (1986) and Andre Lorde (1984) speak about the relationship between colonialism and gender-oppression in Africa. See the next two notes for more information regarding pre-colonial societies in North America.

23. Paula Gunn-Allen (1986) and Patricia Monture-Angus (1995, 230-235).

24. Information in this paragraph taken from: Karen Anderson (1991); Ward Churchill (1999, 379); Paula Gunn Allen (1986) Patricia Monture-Angus (1995, 230-235, 237-238, 241-242); Nina Rosenstand (1998, 195-196); Samuel Willard Crompton (1999, 11, 59).

25. See Demeria and Rainville (1999), Cruikshank (1998), and Rosenstand (1998) for more detail.

26. Ann Sharp (1997) writes about her concerns in the introduction to a special issue of *Thinking* devoted to Philosophy for Children and feminism.

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