

Truth:

In Ethics and Elsewhere

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All truths wait in all things,

They neither hasten their own discovery nor resist it

Walt Whitman, «Song of Myself»

THE SEDUCTION OF RELATIVITY

It is popular to make the claim, particularly when it comes to questions of value, that there is no such thing as «truth.» For some, a belief in social or cultural relativism is the source of such scepticism. Such individuals would argue that it is chauvinistic arrogance to believe that just because, from one's own point of view, practices carried out by other cultures appear to be immoral, e.g., cliterodectomies on unwilling young women, that somehow they are immoral *per se*. Others would argue for an even more radical form of relativism, no doubt stemming from a misguided view of equality, namely that any individual viewpoint is a good (or bad) as anyone else's: «from my point of view `x' is immoral, but I wouldn't dream of saddling anyone else with my morals.» Still others believe that, despite the drawbacks of a relativistic position, they must nonetheless remain sceptical about the possibility of truth in ethics in order to distance themselves from those who have inflicted enormous harm on others in the name of having a privileged access to truth. The Spanish inquisition, the holocaust, the decimation of indigenous people, were all carried out by individuals most of whom believed that they had truth on their side. On a more academic plane, the new fad is to express allegiance to «post-modernism,» a peculiar title given its striking similarity to old rationalism and later Wittgensteinian philosophy. The two underlying premises of this movement are that: (a) language creates reality, and (b) language-users create language. The conclusion deduced is that language-users, therefore, create reality, and that, consequently, it makes no sense for language-users to seek a truth that is independent of their own creation.

IF THERE IS NO TRUTH IN ETHICS, THERE CAN BE NO VALUE EDUCATION¹

Those of us who are concerned with value education need to take this pervasive belief in relativism seriously. If it is true that there is no truth (note the oddity of this claim), i.e., if it is true that there is no objectivity in ethics, then there can be no genuine ethical education. Social relativism after all, reduces ethics to sociology or anthropology: what is right is whatever a particular society says is right. Radical relativism reduces it to a matter of taste (or in more formal terms a kind of subjectivism or emotivism); what is right is whatever I happen to believe, or feel, is right. And this is not merely an academic conundrum. If there is no truth in ethics, then parents too are left in the unhappy position of trying to persuade their offspring that they ought, or ought not, to act in certain ways because to do, or not to do so, conforms to the wishes of others in that society (social relativism), or because it conforms to the wishes of the parents themselves (an illegitimate appeal to force or threat). However, if there is no objective «right» to back up these admonitions, there can be no legitimate censure, just as there can be no convincing answer to the question of why youngsters ought to defer to the wishes of others, including their parents, at the expense of their own.

In summary, if there is no truth in ethics, anyone who is engaged in value education, be they parents, teachers, social workers, or philosophers, can be described as engaged in an utterly illegitimate manipulative process that radically infringes upon the freedom and well-fare (given the potential guilt load) of those who are unlucky enough to come under their influence. Objectivity versus relativity is no small issue.

IF THERE IS NO TRUTH IN ETHICS, THERE CAN BE NO ETHICAL PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY

From a more esoteric point of view, it is important to note that if there is no truth in ethics, there can be no genuine ethical philosophical enquiry either. Why else would philosophical inquiry be perceived to have merit except on the assumption that the inquiry, if fruitful, moves us toward truth? One might try to duck this claim with the assertion that such inquiry is fruitful because it gives us a more complete understanding, or a more comprehensive viewpoint. But this move doesn't dispose of truth. After all, if we say that an inquiry is fruitful, we are implying a standard; it means that participants are in a «better» position than they were before the discussion began. And the position can be presumed to be «better» only because we are presuming that a more complex or comprehensive picture of the issue is presumed to be a «truer» picture than one that is less complex or less comprehensive. There is no merit in complexity per se.

If philosophical inquiry is genuine inquiry, and not mere chatter, in other words, its goal can be no other than to move participants towards truth. For philosophers, then, like value educators, the issue of objectivity versus relativity is no small issue. If there is no such thing as truth, much of their discipline is pointless.

IF THERE IS NO TRUTH, THERE IS NO EXPERTISE, NO APPARENT VALUE TO EDUCATION, AND NO INTELLIGENCE

What is true of philosophy is true of all disciplines. If you are an expert in biochemistry, it is because it is presumed that you know more true claims in your discipline than most of us (that's what makes you an expert), and you are also better equipped to access further truths. That is, a biochemical expert is considered an expert precisely because it is assumed that s/he knows more biochemical facts than most of us, that she knows how to conduct experiments, how to weave together theories, and so on, so as to access further truths. That is why universities hire Ph.D.'s in biochemistry, and not plumbers, to teach in their biochemistry departments - because their education has increased their access to truth - which, importantly, is a fundamental presupposition of all education.

One can not believe that there is such a thing as expertise unless one presumes the existence of truth. One can not believe that there is much point to education unless one presupposes the existence of truth. Indeed, the whole notion of intelligence makes little sense unless one presumes the existence of truth. After all, when one says that some species are more intelligent than others, or that within a species, some entities are more intelligent than others, what else can one mean except that those who are more intelligent are better able to access truth than those who are less intelligent, e.g. the chimpanzee (a non-language user) is more intelligent than the chicken (another non-language user) because the chimp is able to figure out that it is true that one way to get food is more efficient than another; while the chicken is not.

Explaining what kind of «reality» non-language-users purportedly deal with is an inherent difficulty for post-modernism, as is explaining what we language-users mean by intelligence, education and expertise. Of course the most obvious explanation for the latter is that experts are just experts in the language that creates that reality of that particular expertise, i.e., that biochemists are experts in biochemical jargon that creates biochemical reality. This explanation, however, leaves the post-modernist with the embarrassing problem of trying to explain how and why, for example, AIDS was «talked into reality,» and why, despite their protestations of benevolence, experts have not yet talked it away.

AN UNDENIABLE PRACTICAL BELIEF IN TRUTH

Truth is so fundamental to the sense of our every action, that it can be argued that anyone who claims that there is no truth, i.e., not even truths about the physical world, is being hypocritical. The fact that such individuals are alive to make such claims shows that they have predicated most of their behaviour on what they have correctly believed to be true, e.g., that certain items nourish, while others poison; that various activities, such as using an electrical appliance in the bathroom, driving over 100 mph while drunk, going down an expert hill when first on skis, jumping into a lion's den, can be life-threatening; and so on. The fact that such individuals also readily access the expertise of «doctors, lawyers, merchants, chiefs,» just ices the cake that they are attempting to have and eat as well, i.e., denying truth verbally, while acting on the presupposition that there is truth, teaching their kids right from wrong, being

members of various disciplines, seeking the intelligent opinions of experts in various fields, while all the while verbally ridiculing those who argue that the claim that «it is true that there is no truth» doesn't make much sense.² If such a relativist were to have a heart attack while espousing his/her belief, s/he could only dodge this charge of hypocrisy by refusing painful, though life sustaining, treatment. Why suffer further pain unless one believed that these medics had access to the truth about the efficacy of such treatment? I think we can dismiss the insult that the medical community created the life-sustaining treatment through language, as it carries with it the parallel implication that the medical community also created the reality of the heart attack. Would one really seek succour from the authors of one's own demise?

SOFT RELATIVISM: TRUTH IN THE EMPIRICAL REALM

Backed against their obvious own hypocrisy, many thorough-going or «hard» relativists will retreat into a «soft relativist» position, i.e., admit the presupposition of truth in the empirical realm, e.g., it is true that heparin increases the clotting time of blood, but insist on maintaining a relativist position with regard to the non-empirical realm, e.g., you might think it is wrong to rape, pillage and murder, but that is not my opinion. So let us start here, i.e., with an inquiry as to why a soft relativist's position seems tenable. Why is it that, for many, it is far less disturbing to admit truth as a necessary presupposition with regard to empirical issues, especially scientific issues, than it is to admit truth with regard to non-empirical issues, specifically ethical issues. An examination of the soft relativist's position will reveal that the reason why truth does not appear to be transferable from one realm to another, i.e., from the empirical/scientific to the non-empirical/ethical, is because the role that truth and the truth-seeking process play in the empirical realm, and in science in particular, is misunderstood. Once the distortions in our understanding about truth in the scientific realm are cleared up, it will become evident that both the notion of truth and the notion of a truth-seeking process are transferable, i.e., they play the same role in the non-empirical realm as they do in the empirical realm; they play the same role in science as they do in ethics.³

MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT TRUTH AND THE TRUTH-SEEKING PROCESS

If we examine the common lay assumption about truth and the truth-seeking process within the empirical or scientific realm, we will find therein two erroneous assumptions. The first misconception is that truth is an epistemologically independent product of the truth-seeking process. The vision is that of making a cake (to use a familiar metaphor). If I go through the process of cake-making, I will end up with a product, i.e., the cake, and that product is epistemologically independent of the process, that is, I can establish that this is a cake independently of knowing anything about the process;⁴ I can access the cake without accessing the process. The second problem is embedded in our common assumption about the truth-seeking process, i.e., that a truth-seeking process is one of verification, verification being defined as «a process of establishing the truth.» These two erroneous assumptions, that truth is an epistemological independent product of the truth-seeking process, and that the truth-seeking process is one of verification, are not unconnected. After all, if the result of the truth-seeking process is a product, i.e., the truth, the process surely must involve verification, i.e., showing that the claim, or theory, is true. Both of these assumptions are false.

SCIENTISTS DO NOT ASSERT THAT CLAIMS ARE «TRUE»

While scientists often talk about claims that are true, e.g., it is true that heparin increases the clotting time of blood, this is not an accurate turn of phrase. A more accurate way of speaking of claims that are held to be true would be to refer to them as claims *that have not been proven to be false*. As Karl Popper pointed out,⁵ science does not progress on the backs of «once and for all» truths, but rather, on the backs of falsifications. A good scientist does not attempt to prove her/his claim to be true. Indeed, logically she can not, as the reasoning would be fallacious. (If theory X is true, then Y should happen. Y happens. Therefore, theory X is true. In logic, this is referred to as the «fallacy of affirming the consequent.») What a good scientist does is to try and prove her theory false. S/he starts with the null hypothesis: If theory X is not true, then Y should not happen. Then, if Y does happen, that shows that it is not the case that theory X is not true. (This is a valid inference which, in logic, is referred to as «modus tollens.») What a good scientist does, in other words, is to examine as much evidence as possible, in a manner that is as precise, and as «objective» as possible, and only after s/he has failed to prove her/his theory *false, i.e.*, it is not the case that theory X is not true, is s/he justified in proclaiming its truth, but even then only conditionally, i.e., on the condition that the theory remain open to re-evaluation should new relevant evidence or reasoning emerge.

Few would find the claim that «a good scientist always remains open to new relevant reasoning and evidence with regard to truth claims» contentious. However, if we re-examine our assumptions about truth, it is at least odd that we do not find such an assertion contentious. After all, Truth (with a capital «T») carries with it the notion of infallibility. A claim that is later proven to be false, was not once True. It was never True; it was merely erroneously thought to be True, though, in fact, it was false all along. It is built into our concept of Truth that, if *a claim is true it must be true for all time*. Given that this is the case, doesn't a scientist contradict him or herself by making the claim that a theory or claim is true, while nonetheless remaining open to the possibility that it may one day be proven false? Surely, if someone believes that a theory or claim is open to further scrutiny, that person does not believe that that theory or claim has been proven to be true for all time. But if it is not true for all time, then, it is not true at all. Something can not be true now, and false later.

SCIENTISTS ASSERT THAT CLAIMS ARE «TRUE»

Since few scientists would claim to have discovered eternal Truths, i.e., Truths with a capital «T,» what do they mean when they proclaim that a theory or claim is true, despite always remaining open to further scrutiny? When scientists use the word true, they are not referring to a product which is epistemologically independent of the process from which it has emerged. When they use the word «true,» they are implicitly referring to a process; what is true is whatever survives the process, and since the process is not one of verification, but rather falsification, when a scientist asserts that a theory or claim is true, what s/he means is that energetic, rigorous, extensive, and objective attempts to prove the claim or theory false have been futile. That is, strictly speaking, what a scientist means is not that a claim or theory is *true*, but rather that, *having been subjected to a rigorous process of falsification, the claim or theory has not been proven to be false*. The phrase «though subjected to a rigorous process of falsification, has not yet been proven false» is cumbersome. And since theoretically, the opposite of being false is being true, and since

the claim in question is, so far as we know, not false, labelling it true with a small «t,» seems a fairly innocent move.

ESTABLISHING «TRUTH» THROUGH THE PROCESS OF FALSIFICATION IS NOT POSSIBLE: ESTABLISHING «TRUTH» IS.

Calling a claim «true» when one means that «though subjected to a rigorous process of falsification, has not yet been proven false» may appear innocuous to those close to the process; however, it is dangerous. It leads us to the erroneous assumption that truth and falsity in the absolute sense divide the world in two: that they are mirror concepts. However, they are not mirror concepts. Though we must assume that, from «a God's eye view,» truth and falsity are mirror concepts, i.e., that either a claim is true or false in the absolute sense, from a practical point of view, since we mortals can *only falsify* and *not verify*, and since in principle, falsification can only lead us to Truth in the absolute sense in those situations in which we have falsified all possibilities but one, and since we mortals can never assume that we have in fact falsified all conceivable and actual possibilities but one, we mortals can never assume that we have reached the «Truth» in the absolute sense.⁶ But if mortals can never know that we have eliminated all possibilities but one, if we mortals can never know whether or not we have accessed «Truth» with a ital «T,» are we not back again at the claim that the whole notion of truth is vacuous?

FIGURE 1

Claims that have been falsified

Synthetic truths: true claims, i.e., those that have survived a process of a rigorous objective falsification and that we, therefore, have grounds to believe are True, but may turn out to be false.

Analytic truths

The fact that most of us happily believe that it is true, for example, that heparin increases the clotting time of blood, shows clearly that the notion of truth is anything but vacuous. We believe that such claims are true because we believe that they have been subjected to rigorous attempts at falsification. And though we can never be 100% sure that this drug will work in this instance, in this way, the fact that it has been subjected to a rigorous falsification process increases the chances that this claim may in fact be «True,» though we mortals will never know for sure.

In other words, the category of claims that have not yet been proven false itself can be divided into two camps: those that are in fact True, and those that will one day turn out to be false though we mortals have not yet been able to show it (See Figure 1). And as long as we know what we mean or ought to mean by «true,» i.e., that a claim or theory has withstood a rigorous test of falsification, i.e., that the claim does not contradict the facts (correspondence theory of truth/falsehood); or that nothing contradicts the theory's predictions (pragmatic theory of truth/falsehood); that the theory doesn't contradict other «true» theories (the coherence

theory of truth/falsehood),⁷ and so on, asserting that a claim or theory is true probably facilitates communication, particularly for those claims that have endured a long test of time. However, we must keep in mind that this notion of «true» is not the opposite of false. This is truth with a small «t,» one for which the odds of it being True increase proportionality with the rigor of the falsification process, but one for which the odds are never absolute.

THE «TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION» OF TRUTH

If we mortals can never access «Truth» with a capital «T,» why postulate such a notion? The answer is that, without the notion of absolute «Truth,» truth in the sense of «not having been proven false» makes no sense. In fact, without the presupposition of «Truth» with a capital «T,» the whole notion of falsification doesn't make sense either.

The argument about the necessity postulating Truth mirrors Kant's argument that he presents in the First Critique about the necessity of postulating a unitary self perceiving independent objects. In opposition to Hume's bundle theory of self, Kant argues that in order to perceive the multiple representations of an object as the same object, those representations must be combined in one consciousness, i.e., «it must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my representations» (B131).⁸ If a different self accompanied each representation of an object, we would not be able to perceive/conceive objects as objects, i.e., as entities that are independent of our perceiving them. Thus, since we do in fact perceive objects, we must presuppose a unitary self that holds together the multiple representations of those objects. Despite the necessity of presupposing a unitary self, Kant argues that we must also presuppose that this self is one to which we can never have direct access. Since the self is the source of perception/conception, it can never be its object. Kant, ingeniously referred to this self as the «transcendental unity of apperception,» and he referred to this whole argument as the «transcendental deduction,» i.e., we deduce from actual experience the existence of a unitary transcendental entity that perceives objects that are independent of it. He referred to this truth as a «synthetic a priori» in contrast to synthetic truths, i.e., those which just happen to be true, e.g., heparin increases the clotting time of blood, and a priori truths, e.g., mathematical truths.

The argument presented here can be referred to as a transcendental deduction of «Truth,» and the claim that there is Truth with a capital «T,» can be referred to as a synthetic a priori, in contrast to «truths» with a small «t,» which are synthetic. Our everyday practical experience of being able to negotiate reality successfully, the incorporation of scientific truths into our lives, our appreciation of expertise and the value of education, our understanding of intelligence as it differs between and among species, and the acknowledgement of education, all presupposes the notion of «truth» in the sense of not being proven false despite more or less rigorous attempts at falsification. This notion of truth, in turn, presupposes the mirror concepts of Truth and Falsity that are *independent of the perceiver/conceiver*, since the whole point of the process of falsification is aimed at trying to find out whether or not a claim is false (a notion that only makes sense with its mirror image Truth), e.g., drinking water makes humans immune to cholera, or whether or not there is a good chance of it being True, and whether the odds are such that believing it is worth the risk (with the notion of risk, interestingly, also presupposing the dual notions of Truth and Falsity that are independent of perceiver/conceivers).

THE PRODUCT IS NOT SEPARATE FROM THE PROCESS; IN EVALUATING A TRUTH CLAIM, THEREFORE, ONE CAN ONLY EVALUATE THE PROCESS.

To say of something that it is true is not to say anything more than that it has undergone and survived a process. Assessing the truth of the claim, in other words, is not independent of assessing the rigor of the truth-seeking process. One does not assess one, i.e., look at a true claim, and then assess the other, examine the truth seeking method, and then see how well they match (Wittgenstein's notion of mapping the world).⁹ One can only access and assess the process. And since Truth has been transcendently deduced as independent from the truth-seeker, what is important about the process is that, as far as possible, it is independent of the truth-seeker. That is, since we have transcendently deduced that Truth and Falsity must be independent of the truth-seeking individual, it follows that the potential success of the truth-seeking process will be proportional to the degree that the truth-seeking individual can become independent of his or her idiosyncratic ways of perceiving/conceiving the world, i.e., to the degree that an individual can overcome his/her personal bias.

Let us put this point in other words. When we assert that a claim is true, we are asserting that we have increased the probability that it is True in the absolute sense, i.e., true independent of the perceiver/knower. If our assertion with regard to Truth is to be creditable, the process which the claim has undergone cannot be seen as suffering from wishful thinking, lack of precision, limited imagination, and other short-comings which can cloud the vision of the truth-seeker. We can only testify to the process, i.e., that it was objective; we can not independently testify to objectivity of the product. We can only say that a rigorous truth-seeking process was undertaken; we can not independently testify to the Truth.

MORALITY REQUIRES THAT ONE BE AS OBJECTIVE AS POSSIBLE

What is true in science, is also true in philosophy. When we say that we can make progress toward truth in ethics, what we are really saying is that, since we can subject claims to a rigorous objective falsification process, we can increase the probability of these claims being True in the absolute sense.

Philosophers have spent a great deal of energy trying to suggest ways to maximise objectivity in philosophical, ethical, inquiry. Kant argued for universalizability,¹⁰ Mill argued that one should seek to find what would produce the greatest good for the greatest number,¹¹ Rawls argued that one should imagine oneself behind a veil of ignorance, Hare^{12,13} argued for Universal Prescriptivism. As is evident just from this short list, controversy abounds in philosophy. However, this does not open up the way to relativity. Simply because we can not know *for sure* whether «a» or «b» is the best course of action in a given situation, does not mean that we can not know for sure that «g,» «h,» and «i» are unacceptable. In science, though we may not know *for sure* whether or not a total radical mastectomy is better or worse than a lumpectomy in treating breast cancer, we can *for sure* rule out singing «Gone With the Wind» at noon every second week, or eating peanuts for breakfast. Similarly, if you are the captain of a sinking life boat it may not be clear whether the best ethical course of action is to throw off some

to save the rest, and if so, how to decide who hits the water, however, we can *for sure* rule out throwing off more than you need to, letting bribes determine who stays and who goes, and raping the women and children before you toss them over.

If one hopes to have one's judgements respected as something more than sheer personal bias, whether in science or in ethics, one must be prepared to follow a process that maximises the possibility of objectivity. If claims *are not* subjected to a process of this sort, an individual has no grounds whatsoever for making the claim that they are true; an individual has no grounds whatsoever for making the claim that they are anything more than a personal whim; an individual has no grounds whatsoever for claiming that science and/or ethics is on his/her side. If claims *are* subjected to this sort of process, an individual does have grounds for claiming that they are True, but only that. When it comes to Truth, no one can ever be absolutely sure. On the other hand, the greater the rigor and objectivity with which we undertake the process, the more confidence we can have in the product.

For those who remain uncomfortable with predicating «truth» of an ethical judgement, the word «objective» can be substituted in its stead, however the meaning remains the same: that an individual has tried to eliminate personal and/or societal bias by attempting to view the situation from a «universal,» «neutral,» or «multidimension-al» perspective in order to test whether or not, from that perspective, the purported action still appears fair, just, or moral. There is no epistemological space between the process and the product.

WE MUST TEACH THE PROCESS (NOT THE PRODUCT!)

We must teach our children that, if they wish to be moral, though they can never be absolutely sure that the decision that they come to is the right one, as in science, if they follow the process as rigorously and as objectively as possible, they decrease the risk that they may be wrong. And we must teach them that the extent to which they are willing to rigorously and objectively employ the truth-seeking process with regard to the myriad of ethical issues that they will inevitably encounter in their everyday lives, to that extent they can be defined as ethical individuals, just as a good scientist is defined by the process that s/he rigorously pursues. As Kant so eloquently argued,¹⁴ it is the process rather than the product that ultimately defines an act, and the individual who pursues it, as moral, or otherwise.

Conversely, we must also teach our children that, if they do *not* subject their claims to a rigorous objective «truth-seeking» process, they have no grounds whatsoever for asserting that a claim is true, or that a judgement is the right one. We must teach them that relativity is a bogus theory; that it is not the case that anyone's opinion is as good as anyone else's. In ethics, as in science, the worth of any claim is measured by the process to which it has been subjected. We must teach our children that in ethics, as in science, it is important to think, not merely feel and emote; and the reason why thinking is important is because, if done objectively, rigorously and creatively, it will lead the thinker closer to the truth!

NOTES

1. Ross Phillips suggested this point (though perhaps not as overtly) in his paper «Motivation and the Goal of Inquiry» given at the International Conference of Philosophy for Children in Iceland in 1997 which, in turn, was a response to my paper «Inquiry is No Mere Conversation,» in *Critical and Creative Thinking*, vol. 3, no. 2, October, 1995, pp. 38-49), also published in *Analytic Teaching*, (vol. 16, no. 2, April 1996, pp. 41-50). I am grateful to **Ross** for inspiring the continuation of this dialogue.

2. This schizophrenic attitude toward truth mirrors our problematic relationship to freedom described by Immanuel Kant. Kant eloquently argued that, from a practical point of view, we humans had no choice but to believe in freedom despite apparently being confined to viewing acts as determined from a theoretical point of view.

3. R. Philips, *Ibid.*, «This claim (i.e., that the aim of a philosophical community of inquiry is to approach truth) seems to me no more extraordinary than the claim that the community of biological scientists currently working on the AIDS virus is aiming at the truth about the virus.» (P. 4).

4. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* lends itself nicely to this vision. A true claim *is* like a map that accurately maps a reality to which I have independent access so that the accuracy of the map can be established.

Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Trans: D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuinness. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.

5. Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations: the Growth of Scientific Knowledge*. London, 1963. Collected Essays.

6. Related to this point, but as an aside, it is of interest to point out that the fact that we mortals can only falsify and not verify renders the truth-seeking process an inherently creative one; and it logically demands of us that our we limit our confidence to the number imagined alternatives genuinely taken into account.

7. It should be noted at this juncture how much philosophers have contributed to our confusion about truth. Much fuzzy thinking with regard to «truth» might have been avoided had philosophy accurately named such theories as the «correspondence theory of falsehood,» the «pragmatic theory of falsehood,» the «coherence theory of falsehood,» etc.

8. Immanuel Kant. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by N. Kemp Smith. London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1929.

9. Wittgenstein, Op. *Cit.*

10. Immanuel Kant. *The Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Translated by H J. Paton. New York: Harper and Row, Pub., 1967.

11. John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism*, London, 1863.

12. R. M. Hare, *The Logic of the Moral Words*. London: Oxford University Press, 1967

13. R. M. Hare, *Freedom and Reason*. London, Oxford University Press, 1963.

14. Kant's ethics is often referred to as deontological signally that, within Kant's frame of reference, what is important about being moral is the reasoning behind the judgement, not merely the specifics of the action that is undertaken

15. Which is why participating in a Community of Inquiry that stands at the heart of the Philosophy for Children program is thought not only to enhance good thinking, but moral development as well. See S. Gardner, «Fair-minded From the Beginning, or, Philosophy: a Gender Blender.» Published in *Analytic Teaching*, Vol. 17, No. 2, April, 1997, pp. 35-44.

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