John of Salisbury. An Argument for Philosophy within Education

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Many commentators on the movement known as Philosophy for Children stress the notion that this movement is not simply a specific curriculum or program. Lipman, Sharp and others invite us to re-examine the role and nature of education within society by exploring the transformation of education by the philosophical community of inquiry from a meaningless artificial activity into a passionate intellectual adventure. Intimately connected with this examination is the proposal that philosophy as a reflective, social and critical human activity offers us both a method and content for educational renewal.

Critiques of education abound in recent times. What is unusual is the suggestion that the inclusion of philosophy within educational curricula may offer some answers to society's questions and concerns. In fact, the inclusion of philosophy as integral to a college education is relatively rare in the United States now. Despite this contemporary indifference to the presence of philosophy, a history for its centrality exists. When the P4C practitioners and theoreticians point to the invigorating presence of philosophical inquiry in the elementary and secondary classroom and when they argue for the necessity of including philosophy as a central key in educating the young, they unwittingly echo the thoughts and arguments of many a medieval writer.

In Europe during the twelfth century, a similar proposal was advanced by the English statesman and scholar John of Salisbury who has been described as "the best classical scholar of the age."[1] A brief consideration of his work, *The Metalogicon,* and the educational and social issues it addresses affords us a platform of reference from which we in late 20th century America can enter into dialogue with a thinker from another time and place who shares our concerns about the education of the young and who argues for the role of philosophy in that enterprise.

This paper will first describe the current debate over the place of education within culture today and the methodology "wars." At this point we will introduce John of Salisbury as a medieval voice which speaks to these questions. We will explore next the controversy over the value of education as John describes it in his work, *The Metalogicon.* Finally we will suggest some parallels to our contemporary educational debates and offer some comments towards a fruitful pairing of John's proposals and the proposals of Lipman and others who advocate the inclusion of philosophy as an integral subject within American education.

THE CURRENT SITUATION: THE EDUCATION WARS

Today a debate rages in American education between those who advocate a return to basics and support the teaching of the Western canon and those who see the role of education as foreword-looking and preparation for the twenty-first century. These positions might be loosely labeled conservative vs. liberal. The liberal side claims that the explosion of technology has rendered traditional curricula obsolete and ineffectual for the student who must sojourn into an unknown world and deal with ever new situations. This "skills movement" de-emphasizes the importance of actual content curriculum and highlights the needs for decoding skills: reading, writing, computing. What is needed, it is argued, is not more content but the skills to find the data when needed[2] The dramatic surge of interest in computers in education (and the actual willingness to fund such inclusion) illustrates the persuasiveness of this position. Likewise, this position which stresses the skills needed to operate competently in the realm of developing technologies fosters the wide-spread

enthusiasm for critical thinking programs which purport to help children (and adults) become better thinkers through various exercises and activities.

In the other camp individuals like E.D. Hirsch insist that the reason American children perform so poorly on standardized tests is the lack of real content in their studies. They simply do not know what one needs to know to be an educated person. Hirsch, the creator of the concept of "cultural literacy," argues extensively for a more rigorous national curriculum based on the facts of science, history, literature, etc. He blasts the liberal establishment centered, he claims, in Columbia Teacher's College for systematically watering down the curriculum offered to children over the last several decades with no visible improvement in their ability to understand and function within their world. As Hirsch sees it the liberal movement in education has had four decades to establish and prove itself. The results have been dismal: American children appear to lack both the skills and the content needed to function as truly literate members of the international community. Especially at risk are the children of poverty who lack a rich educational home environment to supplement the weakened form in the classroom. Much of the failure of contemporary education is blamed on a methodology with roots in Romanticism which advocates a "natural" approach to education (allowing the child to explore and discover on her own) and which also treats the very concept of education suspiciously as intrinsically false and artificial. Hirsch notes that the most vocal opponents of formal education and supporters of naturalism are themselves products of the system that they criticize and that has prepared them to argue so eloquently against it.[3]

While both sides agree that the educational system today is not functioning properly and that it needs renewal, they continue to rage against one another as the source of the problem. What becomes evident, however, is need to recognize the cogent points of each side and to pull critiques together as complementary and not as contradictory. E.D. Hirsch's most recent book begins to do that.[4] As he recognizes the strength of constructivism and promotes the acquiring of "intellectual capital" as a step towards a child's feeling of competency and growing self-esteem, he joins forces with such liberal positions which advocate active and programmatic learning. Hirsch offers a intriguing point of convergence with the ideals of Philosophy for Children when he suggests that the most potent methodology for learning is one based upon stories, the use of narrative:

> *The focused narrative or drama lies midway between narrow drill and practice (which has its place) and the unguided activity of the project method (which occasionally has its place) Sir Philip Sidney argued (in 1581) that stories are better teachers than philosophy or history, because philosophy teaches by dull precept (guided instruction) and history teaches by uncertain example (the project method). The story, however, joins precept and example together, thus teaching and delighting at the same time.*[5]

However, Hirsch never quite clarifies how one is to achieve this active student involvement within the content disciplines and, at times, he seems to offer only glib assurance that if we simply teach a rich and involved content students will know automatically how to think well within it.

PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN - AN ALTERNATE

In his work *Philosophy Goes to School,* Matthew Lipman labels the two movements in educational reform that are detailed above as the "thinking skills approach" and "tribal method". Lipman credits each side with well made points: the need for a rich content approach to education and the importance of acquiring the skills needed to operate in new situations and environments.

However, he points out that these two approaches are also open to serious criticism. The "tribal model" too often becomes a glorification of rote learning, divorced from context and remote from the interests and needs of the students who are subjected to a barrage of meaningless data taught mostly in the preparation for a standardized test of some sort. Likewise, the "thinking skills approach" isolates skills from context, focuses upon scientific modes of thinking to the exclusion of reasoning skills, tends to emphasize non-linguistic skills (pattern recognition), and finally, is descriptive in nature without the evaluative element found in

philosophical thinking.[6] As a *via media,* Lipman presents the reflective method of educating which centers learning around philosophical inquiry in a community setting.

The ideal learning environment is described as one in which children and teacher together explore a problematic aspect of experience through dialogue provoked by the attention to a narrative event. Learning is active, social and constructive. If the children can claim ownership of the discussion, they invest care, attention and energy in the learning process. The very intrinsic nature of philosophy as contentious and problematical renders it ideal as a model of learning. Lipman urges the extension of this methodology into the teaching of such disciplines as history, mathematics, science by using the metaphor of language acquisition. We can claim to know a foreign language to the extent that we can think in that language. In the act of thinking within a language we take possession of the ideas and concepts of that language as we create them in the act of speaking and writing. The language is an interior one, not the external one of painfully translating word for word from our tongue into the other. History, for example, becomes a living language and we acquire the ability to think historically, as historians, not simply to memorize facts (as memorizing vocabulary words in the other language.)[7]

Despite the arguments of Lipman and others within the Philosophy for Children movement, their proposals have been largely ignored by the educational community. The community appears unable to seriously consider the concept of philosophy as integral to general education. Is philosophy intrinsically disconnected from mainstream education? How would such a discipline be successfully interfaced into the curriculum as it now stands? Perhaps a visit to an historical parallel might offer us another perspective.

TWELFTH CENTURY SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES

The twelfth century saw the growth and development of an educational system similar to the one we know today. The "cathedral school" (an organization of pupils and teacher centered around a holy see and developed to produce clerics) was followed by the university, initially a loose collection of teachers who set up shop and competed for students. Paris and Bologna were two such centers for these "free-lance" scholars. Around 3000-5000 students congregated in Paris during this time. Students came from all over and tended to group themselves in national enclaves. To control both rowdy students and unscrupulous teachers, guilds arose which governed the behavior of both parties.

Teachers, by virtue of being in an urban and now guilded setting, began to work together and the university was born. Paris was chartered during the 1150-70s. Famous teachers of this era included Anselm of Laon, Peter Abelard, William of Champeaux and Bernard of Clairvaux. These teachers often hated one another and competed fiercely for students. Despite the squabbles among the faculty, the university as an educational ideal blossomed and these centers of learning sprang up around Europe.

The medieval course of study at the university level was comprised of the seven liberal arts divided into the Trivium and Quadrivium. In the Trivium one studied grammar, logic (dialectic). and rhetoric, the art of speaking. Grammar included a mastery of the correct method of writing and speaking and encouraged the acquiring of knowledge of the poets and historians. Rhetoric represented grammar in practice while dialectic/ logic included the science of reasoning whereby the scholar could synthesize Greek philosophy and Christian theology and take on the pressing philosophical and theological issues of the day. The Quadrivium was comprised of the "mathematical arts" of arithmetic, music, astronomy and geometry. Before one could enter into the study of philosophy, theology or law, one needed to have mastered this general curriculum.

The rapid rise of educational institutions led to the quick advancement to master level of many a scholar. However, this meteoric rise was not always justified and many unqualified or simply poor teachers set up shop at Paris and other university centers. At the same time students clamored for easier curricula and faster rates of success. A Roman biography of Virgil by Donatus had criticized a person named "Cornificius" for his ignorance of the greatness of the poet. "Cornificius" became the 12th century symbol of the poorly trained scholar who tended to talk and argue about more than he actually knew. Cornificians always supported the importance of logic and rhetoric but, it was claimed, they did not fully understand these subjects and wanted only the quick ability to seem reasonable and sway the common (or rich) man. The sign of a true scholar became the knowledge of literature. A pretender could perhaps talk himself into a career in law, philosophy

and theology with a poor knowledge base but could not do so in the realm of literature. Such critics depicted Paris as the place to go for such subjects as law, philosophy and theology but Orlean or Chartres as the home of true scholarship in grammar, literature, the classics and poetry.

These events set the stage for the critique of education that John presents in *The Metalogicon.* A number of issues surfaced: old vs. new, method vs. content, invention vs. orthodoxy and the developing concept of auctoritas.

The old methods of educating which stressed the role of the knowledgeable tutor and eager student was being replaced and challenged by the communal nature of the university setting. Students were impatient with the old texts and did not see a need to study Cicero, Virgil, Ovid, Seneca and the other Roman and Greek writers. They wanted to achieve a quick degree of success as measured by an ability to win over one's audience and claim victory over the opponent. The model of a successful prosecuting attorney comes to mind. At the same time that students were rejecting the need for a well-grounded liberal arts education, the educational establishment clung to the role of the authoritative text. This would peak in the 13th century where Aristotle was simply referred to as The Auctoritas as recognition that everything one needed to know was available in the works of Aristotle. While this position would be questioned in the 14th century, it would endure through the Renaissance in many quarters. This opposition of new thinking to traditional authority is echoed today in the educational debates discussed above.

JOHN'S CRITIQUE OF EDUCATION

The Metalogicon (written in 1159) opens with a vivid portrait of Cornificius, condemning him as the ultimate example of false education and describes him as "Verbose, rather than eloquent, he is continually tossing to the winds verbal leaves that lack the fruit of meaning."[8] I Composed of four books, *The Metalogicon* systematically defends the Trivium against its detractors. Book I introduces the problem and discusses how grammar should be taught. Book II and III focus on the logic of Porphyry *(the isagogue)* and Aristotle *(Categories, interpretation, and Topics.)* The work concludes in Book IV with a general review of reasoning and the question of truth.

In Book 1, John outlines three types of natural abilities with respect to learning. One can fly, walk or creep.[9] The person who flies learns quickly but just as speedily forgets what he has learned. The crawler never "gets off the ground" and accomplishes nothing. The middle way of "walking" is recommended because the walker:

> *... has its feet on the ground so it can firmly stand, and because it can climb, provides prospect* of *progress, and is admirably suited for philosophizing. Nature, I believe, has provided in the latter a basis for the arts. For study enhances its effectiveness.*[10]

John argues extensively that natural ability is not enough; one must receive a proper education for that ability to blossom and grow and function well. The liberal "arts" are associated with the Greek word, *ares,* virtue, and the study of them "liberates" the man from care so that he can seek wisdom. "The chief aids to philosophical inquiry and the practice of virtue are reading, leaning, meditation and assiduous application."[11] Book I includes an extensive justification for the teaching of grammar as "grammar equips us both to receive and impart knowledge. It modulates our accent, and regulates our very voice so that it is suited to all persons and matters."[12] In John's day grammar included not only the structure of language and speech, but also general literature, poetry and history. These parts of the subject grammar give a richness to the liberal arts curriculum that is not immediately apparent from the title of the subjects included therein.

The Metalogicon continues with a detailed account of grammatical and logical points of the precise curriculum that John is advocating, one steeped in the tradition of Porphyry and Aristotle. As he proceeds through *The Metalogicon,* John establishes links among the study of logic/dialectic, an acquired knowledge of literature and other studies, and philosophy. In various places John emphasizes these connections:

> *It is accordingly evident that dialectic, the highly efficient and ever-ready servant of eloquence, is useful to anyone in proportion to the degree of knowledge he possesses. It is of the greatest advantage to he who knows much; and of least use to one who knows little.*[13]

...there is little or nothing that lies concealed from one who is well read. [14]

Our own generation enjoys the legacy bequeathed to it by that which preceded it. We frequently know more, not because we have moved ahead by our own natural ability, but because we are supported by the (mental] strength of others, and possess riches that we have inherited from our forefathers.[15]

While the shape and form of his logic is Aristotelian, John argues passionately for the inclusion of a general attitude of careful thinking within the educational experience. He uses the popular debate over the nature of universals" to illustrate the confusion into which he feels philosophical inquiry has fallen. John admits that his professional obligations have kept him from following in careful detail the up to the minute situation in academe but he carefully charts a middle course between the rejection of current thinkers and the ignorance of the past masters." He advocates a careful reading of important texts, such as those by Porphyry and Boethius, "with sympathetic mildness, and not tortured on the rack."[18]

As his text progresses, John moves from his initial description of the contemporary critics of the Trivium curriculum as represented by "Cornificius" to a general defense of the curriculum. He defends the study of grammar and then continues his defense of logic in Book II and what he judges to be the appropriate way to teach it. Book III contains detailed reviews of important classics in logic while Book IV moves into broader questions of cognition and ends with accounts of the faculties of sensation, imagination, reason and intuitive understanding. Scientific understanding and wisdom are also differentiated[19] and the goal of reason is clearly seen to be truth: "Reason is, in a way, the eye of the mind. ...Reason's special function is to investigate and apprehend the truth."[20] While only God can grasp truth in its entirety, humans can obtain a glimpse of it. However, the search for truth is fraught with peril:

The human heart is so seduced that it but rarely succeeds in attaining knowledge of the truth. The many impediments to understanding include invincible ignorance of such things as the mysteries of the Holy Trinity, which reason cannot explain; the frailty of man's condition, the brevity of human life; the neglect of what is useful and [corresponding) concern with what is unprofitable; the (perplexing) conflict of probable opinion, sin, which makes one unworthy of seeing the light; and, finally, the great multitude and vast expanse of subjects to be investigated.[21]

These faults support the presence and necessity of faith in one's life to complement the work of reason when it fails. That "the world is subject to vanity"[22] is confirmed by John as he ends *The Metalogicon* with an account of the controversy over papal succession[23] and Henry 11's claim on the property in France due to the familial connections of his wife, Eleanor of Aquitaine.

This, in short, is the content of *The Metalogicon.* While contemporary scholars may disagree as to the centrality of such thinkers as Aristotle, Porphyry and Boethius to the project of becoming learned today, we can nevertheless distill the importance of his message into the following themes. Firstly, John addresses the state of education in his times as one fraught with the need for rethinking and reform. Students had lost a sense that knowledge has value in its own right and they displayed an interest in education only limited to what they could do with it, i.e., the practical application thereof. They rejected learning the literature of the past and insisted upon a curriculum that clearly related to their immediate interests and needs. Faculty were coming up through the ranks with the same impatient attitude towards the traditional curriculum and a desire to show off as knowledgeable, irrespective of whether they really were or not. John's many references to the loss of interest in the classical writings and the superficiality of an academia led by the Cornificians clearly point to a situation in education where utility took precedence over learning for its own sake. History was lost to the political urgency of the present moment.

In detailing remedies to this situation, John introduces the importance of logical thinking.[24] A competent philosopher obviously needs to master logic but must pair those techniques with a strong knowledge base as well. Logic is presented as the tool of a careful thinker. It is also interesting to note the central place allotted to talking in John's account of education.[25] The young child should not be discouraged from speaking but, as his education progresses, the goal is to eliminate "excessive verbosity"[26] through guidance of his teacher and practice of the art of disputation. All of this is achieved through a melding of clear critical

thinking, careful articulation and a solid knowledge of the arts, the literary tradition.

John sees education as not merely utilitarian in a sophistical sense but as a central key to one's personhood for the goal of the human being is the acquisition of truth in kinship with virtue:

> *'To know oneself is' according to Apollo, 'practically the highest wisdom' Of what use is it to understand the nature of the elements and of things composed of the elements, to study the principles of quantitative and numerical proportion, to speculate about the opposition of virtues and vices, to pay careful attention to inferences in reasoning, and to dispute with probability on all sorts* of *points,* if, *meanwhile, one remains ignorant of himself?*[27]

The impetus behind the human desire to know is a foundational one of the search for selfknowledge. A proper education will transform not only the individual but also the espoused goals and behaviors of citizens as a group and can help the community avoid crises similar to the political and religious ones that John depicts in his last chapter.

JOHN'S MESSAGE TO P4C

It is here that we discover an intriguing convergence of John of Salisbury's critique of education in the 12th century and the contemporary arena of educational discussion. John argued extensively for the importance of the liberal arts in education. His lengthy pleas for the continued study of the Greek and Roman authors, the tradition, suggests some parallels with the writings of E.D. Hirsch and his core curriculum based on a rich tradition of past learning. His criticisms of the Cornificians as shallow and showy sound a contemporary note as we bemoan the unpreparedness of students today and their one-dimensional view of the purpose of educational as economic.

But John does not simply argue for a return to the tradition, the classics. He also insists that education is incomplete without the cultivation of the art of careful thinking, logic or dialectic. However, instead of seeing logic as isolated from the tradition, John pairs logical analysis with the tradition of Latin leaning that he feels has been ignored or denigrated. In weaving his concept of dialectic into the studies of all the liberal arts of the Trivium and Quadrivium, John offers us a medieval version of Lipman's vision: philosophical inquiry as integrated within the curriculum of leaning. At the very birth of the western educational system of schooling, we find the suggestion that critical thinking must be included in tandem with the recognition of the richness of the heritage of past learning. Philosophy for Lipman centers around the act of inquiry and the cultivation of critical, creative and caring thinking.[28] This concept of philosophy has its roots in the medieval notion of dialectic as thinking towards the truth.

A postmodern vision of philosophy is hesitant about, if not outright hostile to, the concept of truth in any other than a contextual sense. Theorists of philosophy for children echo this stance in the many references to the concept of meaning-making as more important within the community of inquiry than the search for truth.[29] Often, the concept of truth is rejected as limiting and dogmatizing. Nevertheless, the community which dialogues must move in some direction other than an aimless ramble around the parameters of an idea. It is in the forward thrust of the dialogue that we can carve out a niche for the notion of truth. One need not espouse a sense of truth as inert and as exclusionary to advocate its importance in philosophical inquiry. Perhaps this notion of truth will take the form of a horizon towards which we move as we seek to better approximate its boundaries.

What I would suggest is that we cannot speak meaningfully of a "community of inquiry" dedicated to the shared search for "things that matter" unless we assume some sense of truth. Perhaps this will not be the certain truth of John of Salisbury for whom God functioned as the ultimate standard of being and truth and cognition itself. And yet, interestingly enough, John does speak of the limitations of human knowing and projects the divine standard of cognition as an ideal to which we can only hope through faith to achieve a semblance there of.[30] But the thrust of *The Metalogicon is* towards an acknowledgment that knowledge has standards of excellence that we must recognize and seek out. It is its own reward and, as such, infinitely valuable to us on our journey of being human.

John (along with his medieval peers) and Lipman and other contemporary practitioners of philosophy for children share a passionate commitment to the search for wisdom. Otherwise there would seem to be no impetus to care about a discussion or to be willing to share one's ideas and listen to those of others. If one were truly disinterested and distrustful of the concept of truth, then why bother to even form a community of philosophical inquiry with rigorous standards of thinking well and caring-ly? What would be the point? So, despite the vast evolution of epistemology between the 12th and 20th centuries, there are still threads of continuity.

Consequently, we see both John and Lipman sharing a vision of education which moves beyond the popular notion of education as a mere utility, a means towards the ends of employment, power, financial status. Education represents a fundamental "enlarging of self"[31] I and takes us out of the immediacy of the present so that we can contemplate things of value.[32] In a recent book, *The End of Education,* Neil Postman argues that unless education has an "end", a goal or *telos,* it faces its own demise. Postman goes on to consider some ends that he sees as bankrupt and paltry (consumerism for example) and others that he suggests might have enough richness to give meaning to the methods and contents of the educational enterprise.[33] The proponents of the movement of philosophy for children have stressed recently the importance of educating for democracy or civic values and the centrality of the community of inquiry in that process. Philosophy offers both an articulate methodology of inquiry which deals with its participants in an "objectively passionate" manner and a enriching provocative content of questions, problems, issues that haunted the medieval mind and refuse to leave even as we approach the 21st century.

In conclusion, we see that the vision offered by Lipman and others in the Philosophy for Children movement has its supporters in the arena of historical philosophy. While one might not immediately imagine the medieval philosopher as a congenial partner to postmodern educational theorists, we find intimations of connections across the centuries that can be seen as an affirmation of the importance of philosophical inquiry in the education of the young and the difficulty of avoiding the lure of the specious.

NOTES

1. Charles Homer Haskins, *The Renaissance of the 12th Century,* New York: Meridian Press, 1957, p.225.
2. See Theordore Sizeris *Horaceis Hope.*
3. *The Schools We Need,* chapter four.
4. 4. Ibid.
5. E.D. Hirsch, op. cit., p.174. His concept of "philosophy" here clearly assumes a didactic methodology of information transmission. This is quite different from Lipman and Sharp's model of philosophy in the classroom as we will see below.
6. Lipman, Matthew, *Philosophy Goes to School,* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988, chapter 4.
7. While Lipman offers some suggestions towards this extension of philosophical inquiry into other disciplines in *Philosophy Goes To School,* this movement still demands much attention and actual working through. Marie-France Daniels has begun to develop materials to encourage philosophical reflection in mathematics and science.
8. John of Salisbury, *The Metalogicon,* translated by Daniel D. McGarry, Glouster, MA: Peter Smith, 1971, p. 13.
9. John, op. *cit.,* p.35.
10. John, op. *cit., p.* 35.
11. John, op. *cit., p.* 64.
12. John, op. *cit., p.* 61.
13. John, op. *cit., p.* 93.
14. John, op. *cit., p.* 150.
15. John, op. *cit., p.* 167. This echoes the famous quote attributed to Bernard of Chartres: "The moderns are to the ancients as a dwarf on the shoulder of a giant. if the dwarf holds his seat, he can indeed see further than the giant." from Christopher Brooke, *The Twelfth Century Renaissance,*

(1969), p. 60.

16. This particular debate raged into the 13th century and involved the question of whether universal concepts as expressed in common nouns existed independently of the word and concept. Realists argued that universals did enjoy independent existence (following a Platonic tradition) while nominalists recounted with the assertion that words were signs made up by humans to represent the grouping of real objects with like characteristics but that these characteristics did not exist except as in the particular things around us. Abelard is credited with developing a middle path called "conceptualism." John's discussion in Book 11, chapter 17, is often cited as an excellent summary of the issue.
17. See the prologue to Book III.
18. John, op. *cit., p.* 148.
19. Book IV, chapter 13: "It is customary to speak of 'science' relative to human things and of 'wisdom' with regard to divine things", p.222.
20. John, op. *cit., p.* 266.
21. John, op. *cit., p.* 268-269.
22. John, op. *cit., p.* 273.
23. At the death of Adrian IV, Emperor Frederick I supported his own candidate, Victor IV, over the duly elected Alexander 111.
24. John quotes Augustine: "For dialectic teaches both how to teach and how to learn. In dialectic, reason discloses its own identity, and makes manifest its nature, purpose, and potentialities. Dialectic alone knows [how] to know, and it alone both wills and has the power to make men learned.", op. *cit. p.* 242.
25. During this period, the ability to speak eloquently and well was far more important than writing simply because of the rarity and expense of producing written materials. The focus of education was on the disputation.
26. see John, op. *cit., p.* 197 and following for his discussion of the process of helping a student to argue clearly and avoid sophistry.
27. op. *cit.,* p.270.
28. See Lipman, *Thinking in Education.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
29. recent writings of Ann Margaret Sharp (see "The Community of Inquiry: Education for Democracy" in *Thinking, vol.* 9.2, pp. 31-37) and David Kennedy (see "The Five Communities" in *Analytic Teaching, vol.* 15.1, pp. 3-16) explore the concept of meaning-making as integral to the nature of the community of inquiry.
30. See John, op. *cit.* Book IV, chapter 40 for discussion of the limits of human knowledge and its imperative.
31. Lipman, op. *cit.,* p.18.
32. "The aforesaid three things, which we should prefer to aught else, are genuine goodness, unadulterated truth, and sound, trustworthy reasoning." John. op. *cit.,* p.246.
33. Such as citizenship and ecological stewardship; see Neil Postman, *The End of Education,* New York: Vintage Books, 1995.

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