though the world of golf outside. The GAME might never hear of me and Analytic Teaching outside. The GAME may never publish this article. On the other hand, the fact that you are reading this in Analytic Teaching either means that you're part of my virtual world, or that Analytic Teaching really has published it.

Finally, my moral studies students have talked about the possible use of The GAME as a way of coping with the world-wide population explosion. Briefly, the suggestion here was that the population should be culled — according naturally, to some morally arrived at formula (they were, after all students undertaking a course in moral education), and that The GAME should be used to compensate those who are to die by giving them an entire virtual lifetime of virtual pleasure before they meet their actual, physical fate. Interestingly a colleague has suggested a related use — allowing children to have virtual children. This suggestion, though interesting, seems to ignore the fact that most (though not all of) those with wishes to be parents want to share parenthood with a partner that they know and love, and a virtual child would not be shared with this partner. On the other hand, the fact that in virtual life a child might be shared with a virtual representation of the real live partner with whom they want to become co-parents, might be enough for some people.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Unfortunately, given my current job description, my opportunities for working with groups in relation to whom The GAME might realistically be thought to be appropriate, are quite limited and so I am looking for help in thinking of ways in which I can tootle or elaborate it. This brings me back to where I began. I would be very pleased if anyone who thought it might be entertaining, were to use The GAME with students — of whatever age, and of whatever subject, and let me know something about the ways in which students respond. Alternatively, you might care simply to share your own response to the material without even trying it out on students. For example, I'd be interested to hear about ways in which I might develop The GAME further — about mistakes I have made in imagining or dissecting it, and about moral, theological or logical problems it suggests. I can already hear critics muttering about the similarity between The GAME and a number of thought experiments propounded by others — including, Nozick's 'Experience Machine' in Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974) and Jonathan Glover's 'Dream Machine' in What kind of people should there be? (1981)!

Both have some overlap with my GAME though I have spelled out details of The GAME in somewhat more detail than Glover and Nozick have outlined the dream machine and the experience machine and we each have different reasons for inventing the technological wizardry that we propose. This is not the right place to go into a detailed analysis of similarities and differences between my invention and those of Nozick and Glover, though there are clear differences. In any case, I am not claiming any originality for the philosophical ideas that may be thought to underpin The GAME. I am simply inviting responses to what I have written as a piece of teaching material.

NOTE

1. Although I had heard of Glover's Dream Machine many years ago, I did not reflect on the similarities between my proposal and his until I had finished writing The GAME, though I recognise the possibility that at a subliminal level, at any rate, I have drawn on his ideas. And it was not until I was attempting, for the sake of scholarship, to trace whether there might have been any other influences of which I was unaware, that Nozick's Experience Machine was brought to my attention by a colleague. (Lesser, 1997).

REFERENCES


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Children, Philosophy and Experience

The following article is a written response to Children, Philosophy and Democracy edited by John Portelli and Ronald Red. This article was originally a panel presentation at the Lemnachs Congress held at Brunke University in Ontario in June of 1996.

JOYCE C. BELLOWS

I begin a response to Children, Philosophy and Democracy, by providing several assumptions about learning and experience, some of which are supported and strengthened by the dialogue between Portelli and Church (75-117). I assume that:

1. reasonableness is a component part of thinking; there are other components to thinking as well, such as sensing, listening, remembering, organizing, observing, planning and problems 'solving', all of which depend for their usefulness to us on philosophical experience found in a pedagogy of growth.

2. thinking is ambiguous: a. it may refer to receiving and interacting with sense perceptions so that reflection always moves back to perceptions of phenomena; on this view, growth in thinking means changes in consciousness/self-consciousness (i.e., consciousness this is the sense of thinking that is of concern (in this paper), it may also refer to thinking about thinking, i.e., pure thought which presupposes at least some one's experience (perception) in the first sense but is not dependent on (sense) experience (perception) in the same way;

3. the reasonableness we want to encourage in children must be present for them to observe in whole patterns that are accessible to them;

4. children need to experience these patterns, to practice them and identify and extract elements from them; they need to practice these elements and then to configure these elements in novel ways in order for education to be effective and to become an education of their own consciousness;

5. thinking (development of consciousness) ultimately must enable configuring praxis: i.e., reflection/action based on the selecting and placing together of components of previous experience in novel or authentic patterns of the learners' own making;

6. thinking as configuring praxis is social and requires development in the capacity for observing, perspective-taking, for example, as well as other abilities related to reasonableness and democracy;

7. configuring praxis, as a model for thinking, is necessary for a number of reasons having to do with modern life, namely, the glut of data, the diversity of views in the public sphere, the changelessness of experience due primarily to the current and quick succession of technological inventions, as well as the important demands of democracy.

Children, Philosophy and Democracy addresses the issue of teaching philosophy to children in such a way that learners are unable to identify and situate themselves within, and then participate with, a community of inquiry through practicing the philosophy of democracy. In addition, the authors demonstrate that children can be
philosophical and already are to some degree; and the authors propose that schooling should enable the development of philosophical capacities in all learners so that elements of democratic, public life will find voice in the young. In making the claim that children are able philosopher, the in the set of the ability to "dialogue" (Portelli, 22) the authors take what Michael Pritchard refers to as a "hopeful" position that there is one who resists both facile optimism and pessimism, and "clings to the hope that children can be reasonable and see about seeing what can be done to help bring this possibility into reality. (Portelli, 17) Pritchard makes his case by noting two parameters for hope, first to the pessimism, that the idea of educating reasonable adults is threatened if we do not pay attention to those aspects of life which can be found the reasonable adult, and then to the optimists, that there are degrees of reasonable and childhood tendencies need to be understood as unfinished and incomplete attempts, that is, as "seeds" of reasonableness that need to be tended. Children need to find their own voice in a philosophical discourse in which they participate and which they must learn.

What happens if we do not trust that children can be reasonable? As Sharp notes: "The abandonment of trust in the efficacy of reasonable institutions, because of a loss of hope and a sense of resignation, (which encourages) a nihilistic position that there is nothing to be done for the children so that nothing is reasonable because nothing can be done" (Portelli, 141) The authors are not assuming that children can be as reasonable as mature adults can be, children need a rich philosophical environment that encourages them to develop their own knowledge and understanding, and, while they are seen as capable of doing philosophical inquiry, they need nurture. (Portelli, 79). But there are limits to what children can do and these limits must be respected. Lipman notes that "children can construct small arguments such as a conclusion supported by a reason," but he warns that if teachers "attempt to employ force majeure, such as an enthymeme or a chain of syllogism, we shall see that he or she is outmatched and will withdraw into a resistant silence." (Portelli, 125) Hamilating the child's attempts to develop a capacity for inquiry. Effective teachers cite their own experience, appeal to children's experience and personal model arguments which are attempts to persuade children of something important to them in a reasonable way without making them young into authentic dialogue with their elders. (Portelli, 124-126) In addition, professional philosophers can "collect examples of philosophical thinking in young children and link those children to our philosophical tradition, to help parents and teachers recognize the staple philosophy in the child and then participate in and encourage reasonableness when it appears" (Portelli, 17).

If we ask the possibility of children doing philosophy, we must come to understand the nature of experience that interest us so deeply. It is the illusion that one resists both facile optimism and pessimism, and "clings to the hope that children can be reasonable and see about seeing what can be done to help bring this possibility into reality. (Portelli, 17) Pritchard makes his case by noting two parameters for hope, first to the pessimism, that the idea of educating reasonable adults is threatened if we do not pay attention to those aspects of life which can be found the reasonable adult, and then to the optimists, that there are degrees of reasonable and childhood tendencies need to be understood as unfinished and incomplete attempts, that is, as "seeds" of reasonableness that need to be tended. Children need to find their own voice in a philosophical discourse in which they participate and which they must learn.

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philosophical and already are to some degree; and the authors propose that schooling should enable the development of philosophical capacities in all learners. For the existence of democratic, public life will find voice in the young. In making the claim that children are able philosophers, in the sense of the ability to be "reasonable" (Portelli, 22) the authors take what Michael Pritchard refers to as a "hypothesis" technology (Pritchard and Jerome, 2011). They take the idea of a child as a "reasoner" who can participate in and encourage reasonableness when it appears (Portelli, 27). If we ask about the possibility of children doing philosophy, we must come to understand the nature of experience. It is one who resists both facile optimism and pessimism, and "cleans" the hope that children can be reasonable and see about seeing what can be done to help bring this possibility into reality." (Portelli, 17)

Pritchard makes his case by noting two parameters for hope, first to the pessimism, that the idea of educating reasonable adults is threatened if we do not pay attention to those aspects of our culture which found the reasonable adult, and then to the optimists, that there are degrees of reasonableness and childhood tendencies need to be understood as unfinished and incomplete attempts, that is, as "seeds" of reasonableness that need to be tended. Children need to find their own voice in a philosophical discourse in which they participate and which they must learn.

What happens if we do not trust that children can be reasonable? As Sharp notes: "The abandonment of trust in the efficacy of reasonable individuals, by a loss of hope and a sense of resignation, (which encourages) a nihilistic position that there is nothing to be done for the children, is more reasonable because nothing can be done." (Portelli, 141) The authors are not assuming that children can be as reasonable as mature adults can be; children need a rich philosophical environment that encourages them to learn and to do philosophy.

Portelli, 79. But there is limits to what children can and do these limits must be respected. Lipman notes that "children can construct small arguments such as a conclusion supported by a reason," but he warns that if teachers "attempt to employ force majeure, such as an enthymeme of a chain of syllogisms, we shall see that he or she is outmatched and will withdraw into a reenforced silence." (Portelli, 125) Hamilating the children to develop the development of a capacity for inquiry. Effective teachers cite their own experience, appeal to children's experience and model arguments which are attempts to persuade children of something important to them in a reasonable way. We must begin young into authentic dialogue with their elders. (Portelli, 124-126) In addition, professional philosophers can "collect examples of philosophical thinking in young children and link those childish thoughts to our philosophical tradition, to help parents and teachers recognize the potential for the complex feelings we have, as we converse, one or the other is able to put into words what we recognize as that which we really are, so that through our conversation we see, experience, or learn something in a new way. Experience, as a philosophy of consciousness, is something like this second type of conversation: it is a dialogue within ourselves and with others. A philosophy for the growth of consciousness is realized through a dialogue within consciousness itself between what Hegel calls natural consciousness and real knowledge.

Natural consciousness provides us with knowledge that shows up to us without any effort on our part. We may say that natural consciousness is our taken-for-granted idea of the way things are; it is effortless and there is no work involved in our gaze because we assume we already know the other in advance of reality looking. By real knowledge, Hegel means the real being of the phenomena that consciousness is concerned to explore. Real knowledge lives behind the back of the taken-for-grantedness of our ordinary experience; real knowledge refers to the way phenomena essentially and really are as they exist apart from our incomplete or indifferent object, biology, social life, philosophy, education, ethics, and aesthetics, and certainly in democracy and seems not to have been acquainted with Hegel's approach (Burke, 3-5) Dewey's logic emerged from "trying to understand the reciprocal relations between learning and experience, knowledge and action, and other disparate features of human nature which are considered to be part of the subject matter of formal logic" (Burke, 4) We might call Dewey's, the logic of the growth of consciousness, in order to follow him, and to understand philosophy in this sense, we need to see what Hegel's philosophy of experience implies for learning.

To Hegel, "philosophy contemplates what is present, in its presence" (Heddleger, 27). To make this description clear, the conceptual difference between two types of conversation. In the first, we are speaking with those who do not look at X, do not see anything; for example the idea of the light that is present which is represented" (Heddleger, 56). In terms of the two types of conversation mentioned above, consciousness literally means being conscious of, and intentionally conscious of, what presents itself to us, i.e., the phenomena that we experience. For Hegel, experience has three senses: first, it refers to receiving raw sensory material; second, it refers to receiving sensory material that undergoes some conceptual processing, i.e., experience here goes beyond mere sensory reception; and third, experience refers to a process and a product in which our intimate engagement, our attentiveness to phenomena, responds to a new shape, and some of what we understood takes a new shape (which is implied in the term sublate, as Hegel uses it). In the process of growth of consciousness, these new shapes stimulate the old shape but, to Hegel, the new bears a necessary relationship to the old shape.

Experience that makes the growth of consciousness possible is distinct from abstract philosophical thought (or pure thought), since the growth of consciousness is always grounded on experience in the first sense in which I used the term, i.e., on perception. Experience we catch sight of something, a person or a thing, for example, the way that someone's mouth is turned up at the corners of a smile. We catch sight of the fact that object, our sight of it brings phenomenon into view. In being conscious of and fully attentive to the turning up of this particular person's mouth, we do not just see the person, we see what his or her mouth is turned up at the corners of, what that person is, in a new way. Importantly, it is the other (object, person) that directs our sighting of the phenomenon to its own thoughts or notions about the phenomenon because our contribution to the process of self-consciousness' examination of the phenomenon is precisely, not to control our notions and thoughts about the phenomenon but to let the other person's mouth speak for itself.

On Hegel's view, experience differs from doubt as understood by Descartes. In doubt we have a real doubt X (my friend is not worthy of my trust) in our activity of doubting we fully consider not X (my friend is not worthy of my trust) to be the case. After we reject our doubt (we mistrust our friend) and return to X (my friend is worthy of my trust). That is, when we reject a notion as the same as they were in the beginning. In experience, as conceived by Hegel, as we entertain X, we

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become attuned to X in such a way that our consciousness of X shifts and changes shape; the new shape of X annihilates the old shape of X so that the old X dies for us and a new shape takes its place. We now have a new shape for consciousness to consider. It may be that our first awareness of the process of shape shifting is the recognition that the old concept has died—this realization is passive. As an example, I may think my friend is trustworthy because she always meets me at the precise time we agree upon. I trust her because she never fails to show up. Trust rests on never having been let down. If she does not come one day, I may become attuned to her not coming and to the relationship between the conceptual shape I have for trust and her being. In dialogue I may come to see that she has a complex life and so do I and that trusting her does not mean never being let down; it means something more, with more hope than certainty in it. But I risk pain and loss in the process and I cannot look forward to a comfortable place to which I may return. I cannot go home to my old concept but neither is the new one entirely strange and without any relationship to the old one.

Experience is a process of reaching forth, reaching and serving somewhere now; experience is not knowledge but a mode of being present (Heidegger, 119). The shape shifting consciousness that Hegel lays out for us, is both an ongoing process and a product, i.e., the new shape. He proposes that consciousness goes forward in a necessary and progressive way which the real nature of things in present as makes possible. On this view of experience, being reasonable implies a developing willingness and ability for the social and personal growth of consciousness as opposed to dogmatic attachment to a settled shape for ideas that we hold to be important. Growth of self-consciousness is social, as far as Hegel is concerned, because consciousness has three notable features: a: it proceeds through increasingly adequate stages, i.e., it grows; b: it is essentially interpersonal and requires the reciprocal recognition of self-conscious beings (an I that is a way, a we that is an I); c: it is practical and cognitive: self-consciousness exists in a world of alien others and finds itself in those others, this implies the establishment and operation of social institutions as well as scientific and philosophical inquiry.

How does this view of experience relate to philosophy for children? At this point I only want to raise some questions. How does learning to be reasonable in the social and changeable way that the authors propose include the sort of relation between experience and learning laid out above?

There is a delicate balance to be maintained between the skepticism of experience that brings growth and the need to constitute children in an identity that lets them show us (and themselves) who they are and what they are good at. That is, children who eventually become good philosophers as adults must not grow up merely convinced about their concepts. Skepticism is essentially a way of avoiding phenomena in which we suspend our own thoughts and opinions about what we are observing in order that the thing itself can show up to us — on its own, as it really is. This is a profoundly important capacity to develop. How do we teach children to observe in this way without persuading them that there is something bad or inadequate about their views? A careful reading of Rousseau’s Emile may help.

Both for Rousseau and Dewey, experience and careful observation of phenomena ground experience in a most constructive way. Yet, reading a text in a group develop the skill of observation required by skeptic and practised by Emile? Is reading the same as observing for the child? While I have questions, I appreciate the project that philosophy for children promotes. I think it is necessary. I, too, am hopeful about the capacity children have to be reasonable.

NOTES
1. I am not suggesting that the authors themselves make this.
2. This may happen at the personal level and the structural level such as pronouncements that God is dead or that man is dead.

REFERENCES

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READER RESPONSE TO
"Children, Philosophy and Democracy"

The following article is a written response to Children, Philosophy and Democracy edited by John Portelli and Ronald Reed. This article was originally a panel presentation at the Learnsed Congress held at Brock University in Ontario in June of 1996.

RICHARD MOREHOUSE

there is much more in this work than originally meets the eye. The authors state in the introduction: "Children, philosophy and democracy represents an attempt to deal with the evolution of a leading critical thinking movement to emerge in the 1970s and 1980s, and issues (primarily ethical, political, and pedagogical) that arise from this evolution." (Portelli & Reed, 1995, p. 26). The book is organized around these themes, but each author is left to develop her thinking about the topic on her own, and no attempt is made to pull these very diverse essays together. While this in some way represents the current state of the Philosophy for Children movement, it also represents a lost opportunity for presenting the common elements of this diverse movement. I address each section of the book by themes and connections (articulated and unarticulated), and then move on to make some comments on some individual articles. A final (short) section of my remarks will relate some common themes across sections of this edited volume. Some themes are stated declaratively, while other potential themes must be stated as questions.

SECTION I: CHARACTER OF PHILOSOPHY FOR CHILDREN
Themes and Connection

Five essays make up section one. I begin by looking for the way these essays are organized.

There appears to be an order, or perhaps better, a nesting of themes that can be recognized by a series of questions. The first question is: What does Philosophy for Children assume about the nature of children? – the central question of this section. All of the essays address this question to some extent. Both Pritchard’s essay and Matthes’s essay address this question quite directly; though focusing on different elements of philosophy, both argue for considerable continuity between adult thinkers and younger thinkers.

The next question addressed in this section is: What is the “So What?" question, or Why Philosophy for Children? What is its value? What does it contribute? Both the McColl essay and the Portelli & Church dialogue address this question specifically. McColl states the role of philosophy in developing a valued self-esteem, while Portelli and Church show how whole language and philosophy help to increase thoughtful reading and writing through discussion. Pritchard, by looking at the goals of ethical inquiry and exploring children dialogues, shows that children can inspire ethical reflection. Matthes shows the ability of children to ask and explore complex philosophical issues. The answer to the “So What?" question from Pritchard is to continue the development of ethical thinking in children. The answer from Matthes is that philosophy is something that needs attention if children’s natural inquisitiveness is to continue into adulthood.

The next question addressed is: What is the role of narrative in philosophy? Reed’s essay most directly addresses this question by comparing two types of characters: text characters and lump characters. Reed sees narrative not only as part of a pedagogy of Philosophy for Children, but more