

Community, Alteridad* and Difference

The voices of difference

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**TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: The term alteridad, used for many years in philosophical discussion and writing in Latin America, has no sufficient translation into English. The meaning, as understood by the translator, is a cross between change and difference. When neither of these terms entirely fits the context or meaning, alteridad is used.*

We live in an age without certainties. The all-encompassing and universal tales of a highly metaphysical slant, impervious in their totalizing generality to the differences that give meaning to history and to our present, have suffered throughout this century a fate of disappointing dissolution.

Based on this statement, our intention is to reflect on the role that philosophy and philosophizing play - in conjunction with the notion of community of inquiry - in our times, as reflected in the crisis of certain contemporary philosophical-narrative forms.

POSTMODERNITY: AN APPROXIMATION BEGINNING WITH NARRATIVE FORMS

Early on, Lyotard characterized our postmodern condition as the decline of the great stories¹, that is, a disbelief more and more generalized before the great sense-giving systems. The break with modern totalizing reason is presented to us as a "goodbye" to the meta-narrations and the fundamentalism of the great legitimations a rejection of certain futuristic forms of the totalizing thought that are expressed in utopian fashion, that is, as utopias of reconciliation and universal harmony.

We can refer to modernity in the sense that it is understood as "historical era", the period that confers worth or a sense to history, a dimension that we could also call teleological. Modernity develops, in worldly terms, the Judeo-Christian inheritance of the notion of "history of salvation", with all that it implies: the concept of progress, of overcoming. The meta-stories acquire their legitimacy based on the future that they must achieve, which, once the events are completed, give it its sense of project (of emancipation, of universality).

For example, science needs to legitimize its rules of the game, "...since it is not reduced to enunciating useful regularities, and searches for the truth"², and therefore maintains a discourse of legitimation of its own protocol, called philosophy. Modern science is what refers to the great tales as the dialectic of the Spirit, the hermeneutics of sense, the emancipation of the reasoning subject or worker in order to legitimate itself. The crisis of the meta-stories that sustain this notion is what leads certain thinkers to speak of "posthistoire"³ - citing Gehlen - to refer to our contemporaneity. These cosmovisions, who attempted to mark the events in accordance with a progressive chronology of history, and simultaneously tried to reduce the change to the development of a singular, supposedly universal history, have noisily collapsed with the turning of this century. I am mainly referring, following Lyotard's idea, to the Marxist, liberal, scientific, and religious meta-stories. They are all suffering from a serious legitimacy crisis - there are few who believe in their promises of emancipation, in an ideal future that smilingly awaits us in the near future.

These meta-tales, narrative devices whose purpose, similar to that of myths, is to keep change and events in place, constitute the story of the *Self*. I am borrowing this narrative figure from Michel Foucault's philosophical

ideas⁴ in referring to the modern discourse characterized by a radical impossibility for the recognition of difference.

In the preface to *Las palabras y las cosas*, Foucault unfolds a sharp analysis of western history in function of its logic of exclusion, defining it as a “history of the order of things”⁵ that is opposed to the change of the figure of the *Other*. This represents a threat for sameness, for norms, and embodies exception, chaos. It should be reduced, exterminated, silenced. Its voice shall not be heard. An opposition between *norm* and *exception* is how Barthes defined the agnostic of our culture, a confrontation between words and silenced.⁶

Postmodernity reflects a particular state of spirit that does not trust these narrative devices of exclusion. As a consequence of the incredulity toward the meta-narrative device of legitimation, philosophical discourse is dispersed, fragmented into smaller stories, into “clouds of linguistic narrative elements”⁷, where the voices of difference are made heard. We believe that the realm that a community of inquiry provides us, understood as space for the development of cognitive and ethical skills and abilities in a format of equality and respect for the other⁸, constitutes a new place for the reterritorialization of the philosophical praxis in this end of the millennium.

Likewise, these times seem to be characterized by a sort of revolt against the establishment; those who have occupied a marginal place throughout history cry out for their rights. We can say, then, that the heart of “postmodernism”, or even more, of a postmodernism of *resistance* - according to the Albrecht Wellmer and Andreas Huyssen⁹ - would be a kind of compromise, not only philosophical but also political, with the minorities of both sexual orientation and ethnic or cultural order. That is to say, an ideological compromise with *change*, with those who are excluded from modern discourse, those to whom the attempts of universalization of a model of white, western, adult, heterosexual, normal and “civilized” man, had been kept in the shadows of the light of the enlightenment: women, blacks, orientals, children, gays, lesbians, the mentally ill, “savages”. We could also include in this non-exhaustive list nature itself, which has become another place of dominance in the passing of our modernity and of the techno-scientific development that accompanies these steps.

In this sense, the criticism of dominance (be it political, economic or cultural), the respect for difference, the vindication of change, the right of dissent before the particularity of a dominant *culture* afforded the rank of universal, comprise, in large traces, a sketch of what we could call a *micrological ethic*. This has many points in common with the suppositions of the Philosophy for Children Program in referring to the installation of spaces of philosophical dialogue where power does not rest with a few, rather is distributed equally and horizontally - not hierarchically - among the members of the community. Postmodern criticism of notions such as centrality, power and dominance materialize in this proposition that leads to taking into account the other, in this case, children. This recognition unbalances classical pedagogical forms, articulating itself as an essentially dialogical and democratic proposal where everyone, without exception, is invited to do philosophy.

MODERN META-STORIES, POSTMODERN MICROLOGIES

Let's return to Lyotard's idea with regard to the distinction between the great modern tales and the postmodern micrologies. The metastories are characterized by their universality and attempt, through their generality, to embrace the human genre. They include this genre in a kind of teleology of history, that takes form of a universal project.

However, this would-be universal project, aimed at the emancipation of all humanity, has been unable to hide its failure. Humanity has split into two parts in this century's end. One tries to somehow endure the complexity produced by the development of technology, without being able to escape - try as it may - a certain “cultural malaise” foreseen by Freud at the beginning of this century. The second and less fortunate fights to survive in the face of much more sophisticated yet much more concrete and radical problems: hunger, poverty, unemployment, social exclusion, death.

Despite the decline of the modern project and the tales that accompany it, the political class continues in its discourse to drive the rhetoric of emancipation. This is still believable for many, since the decline mentioned does not imply an absolute decadence - simply look at the vertiginous development of technology in first world countries.

Nevertheless, we cannot continue to speak of progress, but simply of development, which has become impossible to legitimize due to the promise of emancipation of humanity. And this is not because the promise ceases to cross the lips of the politicians, rather that the very development impedes its success. Lyotard is pretty blatant in this regard: "Neoliteracy, the impoverishment of the people of the South and of the Third World, unemployment, the despotism of opinion and therefore the despotism of the prejudices amplified by the media, the law that what is good is what is "performing", all are the consequence not of the lack of development rather the exact opposite. Therefore, no one dares call it progress."¹⁰

The arguments of Jean-Francoise Lyotard against the purely formal nature of modern stories of emancipation reveal their more obscure aspects, that is, they are no more than discursive practices that legitimize, in one way or another, the status quo and its injustices, at the service of an anticipated future that continually gets farther from reach.

That said, postmodern de-legitimization resends us an old problem of philosophic discourse, the problem of meaning. The exit on the postmodern crossroads can be seen if we consider - in a radical way - the possibility of a reevaluation of the micrological, at the moment of giving meaning to our vital experience.

The micrologies, or small tales, always contextual, heterogeneous and changing, present themselves as an alternative in the face of the large systems of meaning elaborated throughout the history of philosophy. If these tales are not totally credible, this does not imply the renouncing of all meaning, "its decadence does not impede the existence of thousands of stories, small and not so small, that continue to weave the threads of daily life."¹¹ The search for meaning, carried out between subjects, forges new roads to the philosophic, opposes the romantic ideal of the creative genius and affirms the need of the other in the construction of shared meanings. A supposed postindividualist gives life to the action of the community of inquiry, where thought is conceived of as necessarily relational and dialogical, that is, naturally communicative despite the differences and above all, thanks to the differences. What dialogue is possible without the existence of at least two logos, two discourses that find one another?

These small tales arise from many forms of life, and Wittgenstein's notion of language games is basic in the understanding of discursive ethic proposed by Lyotard. His concept is supported primarily in the development of the societies of this century, where social interaction has suffered great changes, new languages and language games have appeared as a result of a heterogeneity of rules.¹² In a certain way, this is explained by the crisis of the meta-discourses that attempted to recognize all reality, legitimizing a language play - its own - and ignoring the infinity of word plays, that is, other narrative forms of recognizing reality or of establishing reality through discourse.

These games are irreducible to one another, as they are to a unifying meta-language, since the set of rules they use to establish the reality of their referents is different for each of them, which makes them incommensurate to each other. Of course, this does not imply a renunciation of dialogue, rather just the opposite. It expresses a profound respect for the plurality of languages, in no way reducible to a superior or unifying language game.

In this sense, a critical revision of what we understand as community becomes central. It is time to reflect on a language ethic that favors the development of new forms of community rationality, forms that escape the totalitarianisms that have marked a large part of our recent history. I think that the simple enunciation of the famous "respect of difference" is not sufficient - it is necessary to confront the issue from a philosophy of language that specifies, in a believable way, the indisputable right to the word.

PHILOSOPHIZING BASED ON DIFFERENCE

When postmodern skepticism reaches the subject and his language, fragmenting both, we can consider this fission not from a philosophy of the faculties of the subject, rather from a philosophy of the propositions.¹³ Philosophy, or philosophy as discursive genre, has the single rule - according to Lyotard - the discovery of its own rules.

Our discourse, if it wishes to be philosophical, should link its propositions with the search for its rules, that is, the interrogation that characterizes philosophy interrogates itself where the making of its answer is concerned. This is clearly connected to the development of the meta-cognitive processes, that is, thinking

about thought, or, translated in linguistic terms, asking of itself about the question - thanks to the infinite resourcefulness of language - it becomes the form par *excellence* of the philosophic quest.

The propositions that circulate within the community of inquiry - understood as a linguistic community - are dispersed in innumerable, incommensurable "families", and we can reflect on or through them, but not from a unifying metacriteria rather "according to steps" between heterogeneous propositions and in respect of its heterogeneity.¹⁴ With respect to the genres of discourse - cognitive, aesthetic, religious, etc. - these impose certain obligations to the heterogeneity of regimen of phrases that comprise them in order to therefore achieve certain ends - to know, teach, motivate, convince, and so forth. In this sense, the philosophic genre is characterized by the indetermination of its own rules, which does not exempt the philosopher - as its only rule - from the need for reflection on her own discourse and on more than just the object of self.

A group of words become philosophical if they oblige their recipient and their sender to ask themselves about these words, inciting the recipient to search for the rules that govern his own discourse, and to elaborate it instead of accepting the words at face value and without questioning.

On the other hand, the ideal of reflection should not reduce itself to just transforming the differences in litigation, translating the different language games confronted with a superior and unifying game in order to resolve the differences and disagreements. In accordance with a micrological ethic of the word, reflexive responsibility passes for thinking about these differences, this heterogeneity and fragmentation, from the same heterogeneity, not from a meta-language that attempts to name and terminate all difference.

Truly philosophic reflection and dialogue pass, following Jean-Francois Lyotard, for "discerning, respecting and making others respect different opinions, establishing the incommensurateness of the transcendental demands of families of heterogeneous proportions, and finding other languages to express what cannot be expressed in the languages that exist today."¹⁵ Philosophy results from an attempt - of Foucaultian inspiration - to "think in another way", and, obviously, this attempt should also be reflected in language.

No predetermination, no prejudice should exonerate our thought and our words from responding to each of the cases that arise, taking the voice of the other as our own, an event that is not reducible to meanings established prior to the event. Philosophy should not avoid its dialogic nature by hiding in the great narrations or in "fixed phrases"; if we choose the latter, we would speak, we would speak a lot, but unfortunately we would speak and say nothing.

On the other hand, philosophical activity, if in tune to difference, has much to say, and one of the objectives of this dialogical and community praxis would be to denounce disagreements that are not considered as such by totalizing and homogenizing readings, and to find new languages so that the differences can be expressed, that is, to institute new recipients, referents and meanings in order to contribute to the expression of what to this point has not been able to be expressed.

DISSENT AS POSTMODERN ALTERNATIVE

This micrological ethic defends an irreducible pluralism of "plays on language," and accentuates the local character of all discourses, agreements and legitimizations. The only rationality of the modern project is fragmented in postmodern philosophy, into multiple contextualized rationalities, in micrologies that, in the face of the decadence of totalizing discourses, have the power to give a certain coherence to our daily experience.

I think that these ideas attempt to demonstrate, in a convincing way, that the act of proclaiming a universal reason was always to proclaim the universalization of the rationality of whoever made the proclamation; the risks of this attitude stand out: the unfamiliarity with the other in our own singularity, the violence, the terror. Instead, pushing for the recognition of the heterogeneity of rules of the many language games and the possibility of dissent seems, beyond a doubt, to be a more open and democratic bet, in keeping with the essentially dialogical nature of philosophy.

Consensus has become, in post-modernity, an antiquated and even suspicious value. But how is it possible to arrive at an idea and practice of justice that is not linked to consent? The solution proposed by Lyotard in *The Postmodern Condition*¹⁶ is, on one hand, the recognition of heteromorphism of language games understood - in the fashion of Wittgenstein - as forms of life, which implies the renunciation of the terror that

supposes and attempts to carry out its isomorphism. On the other hand, in the case of gaining consensus in a given community, the consensus should be local, that is, obtained by the participants of the dialogue and subject to an eventual rescission.

This proposition drives key ideas of the postmodern proposition: the idea of temporary contracts, the idea of negotiation and, primarily, the idea of an irreducible and very “local” pluralism of the rationalities and of the discourses that accompany them, in this way pointing, as an ideal utopia, to a flexibility in the social system that permits the pacific coexistence of infinite nationalities and language games, favoring the rise of new linguistic “plays”.

Lyotard expresses it very well in a dialogue he had with J.P. Dubost, “to recognize the plurality and intranslatability of the intertwined language games, its autonomy and specificity, not try to reduce one another; with a rule that would be paramount, a general rule, “Let us play ... and let us play in peace.”¹⁷

In the area of aesthetics, things are not very different before a growing complexity of our understanding of contemporary art; the commentaries on same become infinite, and meanwhile, these commentaries also become a sort of art form, that is, they themselves are appreciated and become objects of commentary. The web formed by these infinite commentaries, lacking a common code or, if you will, a unifying meta-criteria, gives us a line to follow in the formation of a postmodern aesthetic rationality, the recognition and acceptance of this heterogeneity without trying to subsume that rationality to a universal code. Facing the problematic of contemporary art - I think that this is also true for the other “spheres” of rationality - Lyotard considers that the only desirable consensus the one that would encourage diversity and dissent.¹⁸

Philosophic thought emerges from the separation, dissemination and loss of unity and understanding, which does not imply that with it unity and understanding are necessarily achieved. Nonetheless, the opacity of understanding is never total or absolute, and we cannot even experience its absence and reflect it in our words. Meaning, in the philosophical praxis of the community, does not dry up after one last response that concludes all questions, rather in the dialogue that renews itself without stopping. This is what all those who surround the philosophical “Tower of Babel” have in common; not an absolute language, rather the hope of expressing, through their words, some meaning.

Let’s risk a pressured affirmation: all communities are, above all, a *community of interlocution*. What appears to be trivial ceases to be so when we recognize the ontological power of the word. Eliot Deutch, in his book *Creative Being*, under lines the importance of speech as the world’s constitutive element.¹⁹ According to this idea, it would be correct to consider the philosophical practice in the community as a discursive practice of a performative nature, that is, the community constructs its own world based on the overlapping and intertwining of the words of its members.

This world, installed through language, can be considered an illusion. Nevertheless, to recognize the creative capacity of the word is a good route for the construction of a notion of truth, not as *correspondence* rather as *interpretation* - always linguistic, therefore, contingent, provisional - of the world and of others. We can conclude from this that the plurality of interpretations, that is, the multiplicity of possible worlds, constitute the linguistic framework of philosophy understood as constructive activity of meanings.

At the same time, language not only possesses a conceptual function, but also an axiological one, constituting, based on its deployment, of a sign of the value that contains it. Everything enunciated constitutes an ontological affirmation, words open horizons of interpretation for those who listen to them, they are presented as forms of discernment and evaluation. Paraphrasing Wittgenstein, we can say that the limits of community are the limits of its language. A community open to dialogue and to argumentation is a community that expands, through interlocution, its symbolic comprehension of the world and of itself toward new horizons of meaning.

COMMUNITY, ALTERIDAD AND INTERLOCUTION

After this brief visiting of some postmodern topics and their connection, based on what we have called ethical micrology, with certain aspects of the *Philosophy for Children Program*, we would prefer to concentrate, by way of conclusion, on some interesting overlapping between the notion of *alteridad*, common ground for postmodern discourse, and the notions of *community* and *interlocution*. We consider that, based on recent

theoretical elaborations of the philosophy of Lyotardian language, these three notions can be articulated in a coherent manner, constituting a starting point for reflection regarding a particular style of philosophizing, oriented by the ideal of the community of inquiry as it is for *Philosophy for Children*.

In a recent conference titled “The Rights of the Other,”²⁰ Jean-François Lyotard wondered what is the foundation that makes possible every man’s being treated according to what he is: neither more nor less, a man. A man is not that, until he is not at the same time the *other* man. That is, to be a man, or better yet a person, implies the recognition of our condition by others. This recognition involves the idea of *community*, the idea of a *we* that integrates, at the same time, sameness and difference, the I and the *other*. “We are all equal because we are all different” - this phrase expresses - in paradoxical form - our condition, sameness, similarity, and relies on the difference that embraces us all in the way in which we all are simultaneously, sameness for ourselves and otherness for the others. The community assents in this oscillation between *belonging* and *uprooting*, between the I and the you.²¹

At the same time, language weaves together the threads of the plot that comprises the community. The pragmatic function of language, that is, the linguistic need that makes all phrases refer to something or someone and that they, at the same time, be destined to someone or something, presupposes the installation of the figure of the other as *referent*, as the *recipient* of my words. In this sense, each word awaits a response, and carries within itself the implied hope of a speaker that constitutes, based on his word, a *community of interlocution* that involves us both.

Language itself is the condition of the possibility of all dialogues, and the verbal persons and the personal pronouns comprise the linguistic structure that leads us to interlocution. The I and the you reflect this ambivalence of the discourse, this oscillation between the word and silence, between speaking and listening. These instances cannot be fused, and the speakers successively occupy the place of you and I. The *we*, which is created based on this community of linguistic signs and instances, arises with the putting in practice of the dialogue - it is not a metaphysical entity that precedes dialogue, rather it is the result of a process that is incessantly renewed.

The community is formed by the accord of its members, it is stabilized in function of a contract. This principle is at the same time a political principle that governs the organization of the sociality. Still, in this case, the politics join with the ethics, and this articulation overlaps the political idea of *contract* with the ethical notion of *charity*, that is, a solidarity that arises from reciprocity more than from contract.²²

Reciprocity is what makes all contracts possible. Lyotard distinguishes the *republican principle* from the *democratic act* in their classic understanding. The *we should* is presented as a natural-cultural community, and its members are recognized by a common language, that is, a common culture that identifies them among themselves and distinguishes the others. The other is the stranger, the strange, the one that does not speak the language of the *we should*.

Conversely, what Lyotard calls *republican principle* recognizes the right to interlocution with every person. The idea of a global citizenship is supported in this civic principle that opposes the *democratic* in its Greek sense. The distinction is clear - “difference (concludes Lyotard) refers to the taking into consideration of the interlocution, which modifies the figure of the other. The town maintains outside itself the figure of the other, the city interiorizes it.”²³ This internalization takes place in the way in which we recognize all people’s right to language.

The multiplicity of languages is not an insurmountable impediment to the principle of the universalization of the right to language. To the contrary, the linguistic and cultural diversity, the plurality of visions of the world are, more than anything, a perpetually open invitation to discourse. Translatability is, certainly, a good metaphor for referring to the interpretive process borne of the meeting of different world perspectives. There is much translating in philosophizing, in the sense of the building bridges between different subjectivities, which sparks inquiry in the community.²⁴

This infinite semiosis, this tireless dialogue with ourselves, others and nature, manifests a characteristic belonging to all language, the function of *destination*, which can in fact be expanded to all confines of reality. In the case where he who receives my words is a person, this person is immediately converted into my speaker, and the locution reaches the I and the other inasmuch as they are recipients of my words.

This power of language gives us the line to follow at the time of founding the right to language, “if all humanity can be a possible speaker for other human beings (affirms Lyotard) then he should be able to be one.”²⁵ The confusion that can be seen between the *capacity* and the *right* is telling, and is supported fundamentally by the universal nature of the capacity to speak. Nonetheless, this appellation to nature is not totally satisfactory.

Following the philosopher’s idea, then, we can distinguish three levels that interact at the moment of arguing in favor of the “right to the word”. In the first instance, we find the appellation to the feasibility of interlocution, present in all human language. Secondly, the legitimization of the word is affirmed in its newness, in its expression of what I do not know due to its difference, that is, since it comes from the other who is revealed to me through language. Finally, we arrive at the legitimacy of the dialogue, that is, the positive right to speak to others who, in a certain sense, mixes the first two instances of argumentation on recognizing as legitimate the relation of parity between the speakers and on reaffirming, at the same time, the respect for differences that all those engaged in dialogue represent.

This legitimacy of the word is articulated on two levels; the first demands that all language attempt to say something different from what has already been said, and the second prohibits the privation of language based on respect for the difference involved therein and in the hope that in it will be found what has yet to be expressed.

Denying the right to language is for us a condemnable act due to its ethical implications. A simple “shut up!” implies a lack of knowledge of the other in his quality as a person, or similarly, in his quality as a speaker. With this simple gesture, the person is exiled from the community of dialogue, and is kept from the community of that language, the possibility of his being recognized in the other and being recognized by the other through dialogue having been denied him.

As we have seen, the legitimacy of the word is not a natural right, rather a potentiality that is realized, developed, acquiring its dignity in function of certain parameters of validation. What is it that makes the voice of the other so important? An initial response could be that the word is important in the way that it is capable of - using a limited repertoire of signs - engendering an infinite number of phrases, that is, installing new meanings that enrich our vital experience based on new symbolic interpretations of the world. This confidence in language, regardless of who produces it, is a first step toward the respect of the other in terms of difference. Even so, this seems insufficient, and we feel that this micrological ethic is also an ethic of respect for life and all its manifestations, and this respect translates into a philosophical compromise with this richness and plurality of all living things, which is also expressed, in this case, in discourse.

This is certainly the bet for the discursive event present in a new, unknown phrase that, shuffling the order of knowledge, makes visible certain aspects of reality previously in the shadows. A bet, we can say, in that it exists as incommensurability in language, which makes all new words be more than the repetition of a meaningless group of signs.

To favor the deployment of language, as intersubjective construction of new signs, is an important task to which all dialogical and community practice should be attached. The community of inquiry should concern itself with avoiding all forms of insult, including linguistic practices. *Insult* - using an expression by Lyotard - is even worse than *harm*, as in the second case the one who suffers can give testimony to that effect, and in the first case the victim lacks the right to be heard. *Insult* constitutes the exclusion of the speaking subject from the community of speakers, which implies a radical impossibility of enunciating the injustice to which the person is subjected.²⁶

If sameness, the desire to include the singular with the universal - often in violent ways - was the *leit motiv* of modernity, the forms of exclusion of the Other that mark our time are presented to us as the postmodern illness, the sickness that causes the ideas and strengths of modernity to enter into crisis, from Auschwitz to our times.

Philosophy, in service of the community dialogical praxis, is one of the good antidotes that we can turn to at the time of confronting terrorism, the fanaticism and the totalitarianisms that are harming the end of this century. *Philosophy for Children* carries, programmed into its formation of a community of inquiry, the promise of a more just and more humane present and future. It is certainly a valiant attempt at establishing, starting with philosophical practice as valuation of dialogue and of intersubjectivity, respect for the other and for difference.

NOTES

1. Cfr. Lyotard, Jean-Francoise, *La condicion postmoderna* (trans. By Mariano Antolin Rato), Madrid, Citedra, 1989, pp. 73-78.
2. *Ibid*, p.9
3. See Vattimo, Gianni, *El fin de la modernidad* (trans. by Alberto L. Bixio), Barcelona, Gedisa, 1990, pp. 19-21.
4. See Foucault, Michel, *Las palabras y las cosas* (trans. By Elsa C. Frost), Mexico, Siglo Veintiuno, 1995, pp. 66-71.
5. *Ibid*, pp. 8-10.
6. Cfr. Barthes, Roland, *El placer del texto* (trans. By Nicolis Rosa), Mexico, Siglo Veintiuno, 1995, pp. 67-71.
7. Lyotard, Jean-Francois, op. Cit., p. 10.
8. Cfr. Sharp, Ann M., “~Que es una comunidad de investigacion?” (trans. by J. C. Lago Bornstein), *Aprender a pensar*, #2, second semester 1990. Ediciones de la Torre, Madrid, pp. 7-19.
9. Cfr. Wellmer, Albrecht, “La dialctica de modernidad y posmodernidad” (trans. by M. Jimenez Redondo), and Huysen, Andreas, “Cartografia del postmodernismo” (trans. by A. Torregrossa), both in Pico, J. (Comp), *Modernidad y postmodernidad*, Madrid, Alianza, 1988.
10. See Lyotard, Jean-Francois, *La postmodernidad (explicada a los ninos)* (trans. by E. Lynch), Barcelona, Gedisa, 1990, p. 110.
11. *Ibid*, p. 31.
12. Lyotard does not imply that all social relationships are of linguistic order, rather that the language games are the indispensable minimum element of relationships so that sociality is instituted as such in a determined community.
13. “It is not the thinking or reflexive” (affirms Lyotard) “that resists the test of universal doubt, it is proposition and time. My existence does not result from the proposition I DOUBT, it follows that there was a proposition.” Lyotard, Jean-Francois, *La diferencia* (trans. by Alberto L. Bixio), Barcelona, Gedisa, 1988, p. 77. Also: “The only undeniable thing is proposition because it is immediately presupposed (to doubt that one formulates propositions is to always formulate a proposition, to remain silent represents a proposition).” *Ibid.*, p.9.
14. Lyotard, Jean-Francois, *El entusiasmo* (trans. by Alberto L. Bixio), Barcelona, Gedisa, 1987, p.130.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 131.
16. Op. Cit., pp. 35-41.
17. Citing in Wellmer, Albrecht, op. Cit., p. 109.
18. See Lyotard, Jean-Francois, *Peregrinaciones* (trans. by Maria Coy), Madrid, Citedra, 1992, pp. 69-70.
19. Cfr. Duetch, Eliot, *Creative Being*, Honolulu, University of Hawaii Press, 1992, pp. 97-107.
20. Lyotard, Jean-Francois, “Los derechos del Otro” (trans. by Alfredo Rando), *Spinoza*, year III, # 7, 1994, Buenos Aires, pp. 14-17.
21. See Vattimo, Gianni, *La sociedad transparente* (trans. by Teresa Ofiate), Barcelona, Paidos, 1990, pp. 78-87.
22. Cfr. Fraser, N., Gordon, L., “Contrato versus caridad” (trans. by P. Frances Gomez), *Isegoria*, #6, November 1992, Madrid, pp. 65-82.
23. Lyotard, Jean-Francois, op. cit., p. 15.
24. Cfr. Johnson, Tony W., “La ensefianza como traduccion: la dimension filosofica” (trans. by M. Teresa de Garza), *Aprender a pensar*, #3, first semester of 1991, Ediciones de la Torre, Madrid, pp. 37-45.
25. Lyotard, Jean-Francois, op. cit., p. 16.
26. Cfr. Lyotard, Jean-Francois, op. cit., p. 17.

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