Radical Empiricism

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In the early days of Philosophy for Children, the charge was frequently made that there was a parochialism about Philosophy for Children, i.e., that it stemmed from a specific philosophical tradition and, consequently, exhibited all the prejudices and blindness of that tradition. Marxist critiques, for example, saw Lockean springs "run" through a Pragmatic filter which led to Philosophy for Children being used as an educational instrument by the dominant class to support its continual oppression of the less propertied.[1]

Charges like that have not completely diminished, although now, more likely than not, they tend to come from feminist critics who see Philosophy for Children as replicating, to some extent, a male-dominated philosophical tradition.[2] What Matthew Lipman has been able to show through the continued and expanded practice of Philosophy for Children is that even if the texts (novels and teacher's manuals that accompany the texts) do exhibit the biases alluded to, the classroom discussion, led by an educated and sensitive Philosophy for Children teacher, counteracts whatever biases may be inherent to the texts. Thus, for example, if the language or the situations depicted in *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery* hint at the sexism that runs through the Western tradition of Philosophy, the community of inquiry, that most fundamental of Philosophy for Children creations, is the most appropriate place to deal effectively with that sexism. Lipman need not claim, nor should he claim that Philosophy for Children is a sort of generic philosophy. All he need claim is that while Philosophy for Children, and here one speaks specifically of the seven novels, their accompanying manuals, along with texts such as *Philosophy in the Classroom* and *Thinking in Education*, does, in some sense, "emanate" from a specific tradition or series of specific traditions, its practice is such that it engenders frequent reflection on its own presumptions. That reflection, built into the very nature of the community of inquiry, serves as a safeguard against the wallowing in bias alluded to by critics of Philosophy for Children.

Now, let us try to translate the original into what may be called its educational equivalents. Here the argument was that as **educational** instrument or innovation, it was context-dependent in the way, *pace* John Dewey, all educational instruments and innovations are context-dependent. An instrument of reform in Situation I may be inapplicable in Situation II and may be irrelevant to Situation III. What has occurred in practice, however, is that the model of community of inquiry has emerged, clearly, as trans-contextual and, perhaps, more surprisingly, although the corpus of Philosophy for Children continues to expand, the seven novels that Lipman created along with their corresponding manuals have shown a remarkable resilience. Even that most American of Philosophy for Children novels, *Harry Stottlemeier's Discovery*, which has as one of its main themes the distinctively American custom of standing while saluting the (American) flag, is used with success throughout the world.

One has reason to believe then, as Philosophy and as educational program, Philosophy for Chil-

dren exhibits if not universality then, at least, widespread utility. Assuming that Philosophy for Children practice has established the truth of the preceding, it may be helpful, in terms of our **understanding** to think less, again, at **this** point, as to what Philosophy for Children yields and more about from whence it comes, i.e., to examine the tradition which engenders the widespread utility to which Philosophy for Children is heir. Once one begins that task, however, one begins to see how myopic a charge of parochialism really is.[3] A cursory reading of the seven novels and their corresponding manuals would find Lipman utilizing extensively the Pre-Socratics, the Sophists, the Socrates of the early dialogues of Plato, Aristotle, the Augustine of *Concerning the Teacher*, Descartes, Spinoza, Nietzche, the Pragmatists, Austin, Wittgenstein, Foucalt, Derrida and Habermas. Stated another way, the Philosophy for Children corpus can be viewed as a replaying, though not in chronological order, of the history of Western Philosophy. Stated still another way, it can be viewed as a tracing of the emergence of modernism and its culmination in post-modernism.

Very simply, there is an eclecticism and philosophical richness to Lipman's work that makes it difficult to say he is working within one and only one tradition. Just as Dewey, for example, acknowledges the Hegelean deposits in his philosophy, Lipman might as easily acknowledge a Cartesian deposit. Having said that, however, the scholar still can use various traditions as instruments for understanding the individual philosopher's works. Throughout the rest of the paper, I will use the Pragmatic tradition, most notably the works of William James in both his popular writings, i.e., *Talks to Teachers* and his more technical writing, i.e., *Principles of Psychology*, as ways of attempting to shed light on Philosophy for Children and its relationship to the educational environment.

Historically, there has been a dispute among Jamesian scholars (and here one includes philosophers, educators, litterateurs, and so on) as to which of the James, i.e, the popular James whose work is best exhibited in, say, *Talks to Teachers* and the papers that were collected as *Essays on Faith and Morals* or the technical James of *The Principles of Phychology* and *Radical Empiricism*, is most worthy of attention. The vast majority of philosophers find the popular works, if not a downright embarrassment, then far less worthy of serious attention than the technical works. The claim, in effect, is that the notoriously vague and often muddled James is at his worst when trying to communicate with a general audience. On the other hand, again as one might expect, the vast majority of non-philosophers find James' weaving together of popular culture, optimism, respect for and interest in atypical behavior, moral exhortation, and literary reference and criticism, far more interesting and evocative than the technical James. Recently, Jamesian scholars have begun to rethink the dualism and have suggested that the way to unpack James is to use the strands (popular vs technical) of James' writing as hermeneutic, i.e., the popular serves as commentary and extension of the technical, and the technical serves the same purpose for the popular.[4]

If one takes that suggestion to heart, perhaps the best place to start is not only with the most popular of James' writing *viz.*, *Talks to Teachers* but also with that article, *On A Certain Blindness In Human Beings*, which may serve as a paradigm for James' popular writing. There one finds James reminding teachers that the blindness in human beings is precisely one **about** (other) human beings.

> *Our judgements concerning the worth of things, big or little, depend on the **feeling** the things arouse in us. When we judge a thing to be precious in consequence of the **idea** we frame of it, this is only because the idea is itself associated already with a feeling. If we were radically feelingless, and if ideas were the only thing our mind could entertain, we should lose all our likes and dislikes at a stroke, and be unable to point to any one situation or experience in life more valuable or significant than any other. Now the blindness in human beings, of which this discourse will treat, is the blindness with which we are all afflicted in regard to the feelings of creatures and people different from ourselves.*[5]

Just as, using one of James' more memorable examples, your fox terrier must be befuddled by the hours you spend staring at the books you hold in your hand, precisely because she/he does not share your concerns, e.g., your desire to discover the informant's true identity, she/he will not be able to understand the significance of your activity.

Put in its context, i.e., he is talking with teachers, James is giving some very good, some very humane advice to teachers: Don't assume that you know what your students are thinking. Don't think you can know what they are thinking unless you also know what they are feeling. Be quick to evaluate and, hence, dismiss the worth of your students' mental activity and you may find yourself in precisely the position of James' fox terrier. The pedagogy is powerful when viewed, simply, as propadeutic to teacher education. But look what happens when "Blindness" is augmented by

a technical piece or two. Look at what happens when it is interpreted through what might be called the Berkelian strand of James' radical empiricism, his description of the epistemic quality of experience, and how that epistemic quality relates to the problem of other minds.

James equates experience with reality and just as it is a mistake to claim that the *esse* of an idea is not equivalent with its *percipi*, so too, for the radical empiricist, there is no noumena lurking unperceived beyond the phenomena. Experience does not wait on reality, dutifully patient to receive the imprint of the real. The qualities experienced are the qualities of the real. As experience is significant, laden with meaning, vital, so too is reality. Experience constitutes reality and, if an institution, such as the school, is guilty of denuding experience of its richness, it is guilty of a similar "ontological" crime regarding reality.

In regards to the epistemic quality of experience, James busies himself, as radical empiricist must, with eradicating the dualism between "thought" and "thing."

> *Experience, I believe, has no ... inner duplicity; and the separation of it into consciousness and content comes, not by way of subtraction, but by way of addition — the addition, to a given concrete piece of it, of other sets of experience, in connection with which severally its use or function may be of two different kinds. The paint will ... serve here as an illustration. In a pot in a paint-shop, along with other paints, it serves in its entirety as so much saleable matter. Spread on a canvas, with other paints around it, it represents on the contrary, a feature in a picture and performs a spiritual function. Just so, I maintain, does a given undivided portion of experience, taken in one context of associates, play the part of a knower, of a state of mind, of 'consciousness'; while in a different context the same undivided bit of experience plays the part of a thing known, of an objective 'content'. In a word, in one group it figures as a thought, in another group as a thing.*[6]

James is justly remembered for his replacement of an associationist theory of inert ideas with a dynamic, fluid "stream of consciousness" and the above passage points out how dynamic and how fluid that stream really is. The stream of consciousness, and we would do well to keep in mind that the stream of consciousness, given the equivalence alluded to previously, could just as easily be called the stream of reality, is constantly changing, is recreating itself and its elements. Using the language of the philosophic tradition that James inherits, knower "flows" into thing known and later becomes knower again, thought becomes object becomes thought becomes object. Imagination flows into "reality" and, later, ebbs out. And on and on. The point to keep in mind is that James rejects the dualism that yields a world filled with material stuff mysteriously attached to a world consisting of mental stuff. For James, there is, simpliciter, experience and the various situations in which it finds itself. Viewed in one way (assuming counterfactually that one could get out of the stream and occupy the position on shore where God would rest), one could see the X that is now knower metamorphize into the Y that is known. Viewed in another way, the stream washes away traditional ontological distinctions. There are no ontological distinctions among thinker and thought and thing. There are (theoretical) constructs that people use in order to deal with and talk about their experiences.

Needless to say, this is a significantly radical view of the world. It is, of course, a view which demands exploration and justification which is beyond the purview of this paper and which, may be argued, has supplied amply and well within the pragmatic tradition. Still, one can begin to see how James would construct such explorations and justifications by looking at how he deals with the traditional problems of other minds and, specifically, within the stream, distinguishing one's own mind from someone else's.

> *What I do feel simply when a later moment of my experience succeeds an earlier one is that though there are two moments, the transition from one to the other is* ***continuous****. Continuity here is a definite sort of experience: just as definite as is the* ***discontinuity****-experience which I find it impossible to avoid when I seek to make the transition from an experience of my own to one of yours. In this latter case I have to get on and off again, to pass from a thing lived to a thing conceived, and the break is positively experienced and noted. Though the functions exerted by my experience and by yours may be the same (e.g., the same objects known and the same purposes followed), yet the sameness has in this case to be ascertained expressly (and often with difficultly and uncertainty) after the break has been felt, whereas in passing from one of my own moments to another the sameness of object and interest is unbroken, and both the earlier and the later experiences are of things directly lived.*[7]

The world that James and other radical empiricists inhabit is a world characterized by conjunctival and disjunctival relations. As I attend to my own experience, as that which is me flows from experience to experience, what is also experienced is a sense of continuity, that in some sense the latter is a "yield of" the former. When, however, I "go public," when I try to understand your experience, what is experienced, what is just as forthright and as blatant as the feeling of succession when I attend to my own experience, is a feeling of disjunction, a feeling of discontinuity. Entering another person's stream of consciousness is possible. We are not the isolated consciousnesses of the modernist, windowless monads, bumping but never truly interacting with one another. Still, James is enough of a modernist to suggest that the interaction among persons and the relations among persons is always characterized by a feeling of otherness, i.e., that X's intimacy with Y, X's knowledge of Y, X's — remembering that this paper is ultimately about matters educational — ability to teach Y is always experienced as and characterized by a feeling of otherness. At this point, one might stop and contrast the richness and complexity of James' epistemology and metaphysics with what must be, if practice is indicative of theory, the epistemology and metaphysics that engendered at least some educational systems. A survey of the undergirdings of such systems might yield the following: There are two worlds. A world of pure mental stuff and world of material stuff. Teaching involves, in large part, attempting to achieve "correspondence" between the mental and the material. A person is educated, in part, to the extent that he/she sees things as they really are. There are things that are worth knowing and, hence, have a place in the curriculum and other things which are trivial, and, hence, have no place in the curriculum. Educators, even prior to meeting students, know the contents of those two categories and their task, a la Mortimer Adler and the Paideia Group, is to bring students to know what they should know. In other words, words wrested from the Deweyian lexicon, students have real interests (even if they are not aware of those interests) in knowing what they "should" know, in coming to know what educators think they should know. Educators can and should develop those interests in directions in which they already point.

Given this view, and as much as one hopes that it is a caricature, one is afraid that it is not, education is a mechanistic, inherently authoritarian affair. One person, i.e., the educated, figures out which ideas are worth learning. The task then consists in presenting those ideas in such way that students will come to know them and, if not see their significance, at least be able to recall them when asked to do so. The students task is to acquiesce.

The portrait drawn above is essentially the one that John Dewey presents in his classic *Experience and Education.*[8] There Dewey characterized what he called "traditional" education and contrasted it with an inchoate "progressive" one. The task of "progressive" education, *pace* Dewey, was to correct some of the excesses of traditional education. Dewey, as reformer, was attempting to find a middle ground, some melioristic grounds on which the educator could stand between the "either" of traditional education and the "or" of progressive education. Thus, to take a significant example, Dewey criticized traditional education for ignoring the psychological side of education, i.e., for bringing a pre-existing curriculum to the child without bothering itself with ascertaining whether the child was in a position where that curriculum would make sense to her or him. The more progressive educator recognizes education not just something that happens to the child. It is something that requires some kind of active endeavor on the part of the learner. In order to achieve this active endeavor, the educator must ascertain the child's interest and begin the (educative) process by means of some reference to that interest.

It is enlightening to look at the way the term "interest" developed over the course of three of Dewey's major pedagogical works — "My Pedagogic Creed", *Democracy and Education*, and *Experience and Education*. In the 1897 phamplet-like "My Pedagogic Creed", Dewey, as the title indicates, gives a bare-bones outline of what he believes is important for and about education. There, he says simply that education must start with interest and must be monitored at all points by reference to interest. Given the nature of "My Pedagogic Creed" — it is a statement of belief and is meant neither as explanation nor justification — it is understandable that Dewey did not define a number of key terms, most notably "interest". That, in part, was the task of Dewey's Democracy and Education. There he defined interest as follows:

> *The word interest suggests, etymologically, what is* ***between****, — that which connects two things otherwise distant. In education, the distance covered may be looked at as temporal. The fact that a process takes time to mature is so obvious a fact that we rarely make it explicit. We overlook the fact that in growth there is ground to be covered between one initial stage of process and the completing period; that there is something intervening. In learning, the present powers of the pupil are the initial stage; the aim of the teacher*

represents the remote limit. Between the two lie means — that is middle conditions: — acts to be performed; difficulties to be overcome; appliances to be used. Only ***through*** *them, in the literal time sense, will the initial activities reach a satisfactory consummation. To be means for the achieving of present tendencies, to be "between" the agent and his end, to be of interest, are different names for the same thing. Where material has to be made interesting, it signifies that as presented, it lacks connection with purposes and present power; or that if the connection be there, it is not perceived. To make it interesting by leading me to realize the connection that exists is simply good sense; to make it interesting by extreme and artificial inducements deserve all the bad names which have been applied to the doctrines of interest in education.*[9]

Here, Dewey goes to great lengths to both disassociate himself from what, in other places, he labels soup kitchen pedagogy, a pedagogy without intellectual rigor which would wallow in things psychological, and to show that interest denotes an objective relation that exists, for example, between some person and some subject matter. The task of the educator is one of discovery rather than invention. The educator does not make things interesting. Rather her/his task is to discover the real interest relations that obtain between students and subject matters and, when necessary, help students discover or experience those relations. A point which is implicit in *Democracy and Education* and which Dewey makes more explicit when he redresses grievances against his fellow progressives in *Experience and Education*, is that the interest relation need not be felt by the student.

If traditionalists had paid attention to Dewey, and here given the explicitness of *Experience and Education* one can hardly fault Dewey, they would have recognized that Dewey has an enormous amount in common with them. Dewey, although he advocated a number of curricular reforms, most notably the introduction of subjects like manual training and home economics within the standard curriculum, maintained, throughout his career, that children were entitled, within the schools, to share in their "cultural inheritance." That inheritance, in turn, was the great Western tradition of science, and technologies, and letters, the great discoveries and inventions, the poems and paintings that make a culture what it is. For the traditionalists and for Dewey there are essential elements that all children need to learn if they are to be considered educated. Dewey's argument with the traditionalists was less about ends and more over the methodology to be utilized in achieving those ends.

Here, one might stop and compare and contrast the work of James and Dewey. As pragmatists, both are concerned with arguing for the objectivity of relations. Moreover, both argue that justification for that objectivity is given within experience. When the two part company, and what may account in large part for Dewey's success as educator and James' relative failure, is that Dewey seems willing to admit that there are unfelt relations, Kantian sorts of relations that make possible experience but are not necessarily experienced themselves. Thus we have real interest relations that students do not experience and that teachers qua teachers are in the business of making experiential for their students. Just as a traditional educator could justify a seeming imposition on the grounds of importance, i.e., this is educationally important whether the student recognizes it or not, a Deweyian educator could make a similar imposition, with modifications, of course, in methodology, on the grounds of interest, i.e., this is interesting whether the students realize it or not.

This movement, however, is not open to William James. As radical empiricist, James looks **only** to the experiential. One sees this, perhaps, most clearly in James' religious writing. There James takes seriously the admittedly most bizarre of experiences. Experiences that most commentators would, with some relief, relegate to the margins of scholarship, James brings to center stage, sure that, as with all experiences, there will be an epistemic and ontological pay-off.

> *One can never fathom an emotion or divine its dictates by standing outside of it. In the glowing hours of excitement, however, all incomprehensibilities are solved, and what was so enigmatical from without becomes transparently obvious. Each emotion obeys a logic of its own, and makes deductions which no other logic can draw. Piety and charity live in a different universe from worldly lusts and fears, and form another center of energy altogether. As in a supreme sorrow lesser vexations may become a consolation, as a supreme love may turn minor sacrifices to gain; so a supreme trust may render common safeguards odious, and in certain glows of generous excitement it may appear unspeakably mean to retain one's hold of personal possessions. The only sound plan, if we are ourselves outside the pale of such emotions, is to observe as well as we are able those who feel them, and to record faithfully what we observe...*[10]

What goes along with this near-reverence for experience is a respect for the experiencer that

borders on the religious. Where Dewey, as educator, has some very practical concerns in mind — not the least of which was convincing the American educational establishment that reform was possible — James, in many ways, had the luxury of the dilettante. Dewey had to run a school during a decade of significant population shift and severe racial and ethnic tension. He had to give (and receive) advice from Chicago's burgeoning social welfare community and, perhaps, most importantly, he had to deal with the fact that he had enormous worldwide importance, i.e., if Dewey urged it, someone, whether they understood the "IT" in question or not, would be likely to implement. James, on the other hand, and one realizes that there is something just a bit odd in ascribing this to a pragmatist, had the luxury of theory. He did not have to put his educational ideas into immediate practice and hence could **suggest** a curriculum that would have no content other than that arising from the experience of the learner, a curriculum that would be driven exclusively by felt interest on the part of the learner, and a curriculum, given James' stance on consciousness, which of necessity would be personalized, i.e., that would reflect the idiosyncracy of individual consciousness.


Now, when one looks at Philosophy for Children one sees, at once, its pragmatic roots and the tension which exists between what might be called Deweyian and Jamesian strands of Pragmatism. The following are meant to be some non-controversial claims about Philosophy for Children which effect both the traditions and strands. The remainder of this paper will not attempt to adjudicate those strands. Rather the attempt will be made to show how an awareness of the tension is and can be an instrument of educational reform.

Then, on to the claims:

(1) Philosophy for Children begins with the interest of the members of the community of inquiry and to that extent is sensitive and respectful of the child's lived experience and the interests that emerge from that experience. After reading a text, one asks the members what they are interested in, what they found problematic.

(2) Interest cannot be imposed or mandated. It is a given and one finds it, mainly, by asking, and not by telling.

(3) Once the process has begun, once the community begins to inquire, the process takes on a life of its own, a gestalt is developed, and the community of inquiry, as community of inquiry, now has an obligation to follow the inquiry where it may lead.



(4) The process — the collaborative, self-correcting, sensitive-to-context process that is the community of inquiry ensures that a distinct set of thinking skills, aptitudes and dispositions will develop within the members of the community. Those skills, not coincidentally, include virtually all of the thinking skills that school systems and educational testing services now take to be important.

(5) The process is not antithetical to the teaching of the standard curriculum and the standard disciplines. Indeed the claim can be made that a community of inquiry approach to the teaching of the already existing discipline would be precisely the way to make good teaching effective.

When one looks at those standard claims, one realizes that they are exceedingly dense, complex, and open to a great deal of interpretation. They mix straightforward empirical claims with epistemic and ontological ones. They meld (just as John Dewey was prone to meld) progressive claims with traditional ones. And they promise the satisfaction of individual desires and, at the same time, societal ones.[11] Looked at one way, they are philosophically rich and evocative. They call, they demand interpretation from the reader and, as they do so, and this is why it seems to me that Philosophy for Children is so important as Philosophy and why Matthew Lipman is so important as Philosopher, they force the reader back on to her/his own interpretive grounds. To resolve the tension, or if not to resolve it then diffuse it, between the interests of the individual and the demands of the society, the respect due the individual learner and the society's stake in having that learner know and understand a specific content, one is forced to examine the philosophical tradition(s) in which those tensions exist. One is forced, for example, to ask what is consciousness; how does my consciousness differ from yours; how can you learn from me and me from you; how does it happen, if as James suggests, there are such significant differences among consciousnesses that you and I can learn together; how does it happen that a curriculum can be standardized; what does it mean to standardize a curriculum, and so on. To diffuse the tension that exists in Philosophy for Children, then, is to enter into the philosophic tradition and to do Philosophy.

As always, there is another hand. Educational systems have little interest in the tensions that exist within movements. With good reason, they demand simplicity of presentation. They demand, in effect, a flattening of discourse so that philosophical talk is translated into educational talk. Parent-teacher organizations, school boards, and principals do not want to hear what they consider internecine disputes within movements. Rather, they demand a clear univocal statement of position. Simplified, they do not want to do philosophy, they want to achieve certain (well-defined) results.

Here, it seems to me, Professor Lipman as educator faces the same dilemma that John Dewey faced. As Philosopher, he recognizes and values complexity. Where many writers within the critical thinking movement pander to the educational establishment's baser instincts with slogans, catchphrases and acronyms, Lipman has been steadfast in promoting Philosophy for Children as Philosophy. In all of his major works, as much as Lipman has attempted to persuade educators to act in certain ways, he has always been anti-reductionist. Where, for example, many of his colleagues in the thinking skills movement have been content to reduce thinking to a set of skills, Lipman has always maintained that thinking was far more than a set of skills and that to view it ultimately as skill-based was to deal with a relatively small part of thinking. Comparing Philosophy for Children with other contemporary educational movements, comparing Matthew Lipman's work with that of other contemporary philosophers of education, one is astounded by both its (his) integrity and its (his) efficacy. In three short decades, Philosophy for Children has become a world-wide force for educational reform and it has maintained its integrity as Philosophy.

At this point in its history, Philosophy for Children has another opportunity to contribute to reform and to do it through its integrity as philosophy. In the past, Philosophy for Children, cognizant of its persuasive role, has used standardized testing and the results of standardized testing as instruments for strengthening its (Philosophy for Children's) claim that it had (has) a positive impact on children's ability to think. It is understandable that Lipman in his role of persuader of the educational system would, just as perhaps John Dewey was forced to do in his late educational writings, minimize the range and complexity of experience. At least, in the United States, up until the mid-1980s, if one were to engage in educational discourse, one would have to assume the validity of standardized testing. To gain entrance into the conversation, one had to, if not ignore then hold in abeyance a Jamesian or a Deweyian view of consciousness and experience and, assume, that intelligence could be fragmented into elements which could be tested in a standard fashion. One could, of course stand on one's philosophical purity but that would have been, given the educational context, a solitary virtue, i.e., virtue without educative impart.

In an earlier century and in a different context, John Locke divided education into four parts — virtue, wisdom, breeding and learning and said that learning — what most contemporary educational theorists would consider the material of the contemporary classroom — is the least important part:

> *When I consider what ado is made about a little Latin and Greek, how many years we spent on it and what a noise and business it makes to no purpose. I can hardly forebear thinking that the parents of children still live in fear of the schoolmaster's rod, which they look on as the only instrument of education, as a language or two to be its whole business. How else is it possible that a child should be chained to the oar seven, eight or ten of the*

best years of his life to get a language or two which, I think might be had at a great deal cheaper rate of pains and time, and to be learned almost in playing.[12]

In the United States, it is not an exaggeration to say that children (and parents and teachers) are chained to the oar. But now they are ruled not by something as significant as learning, but by standardized tests. That ruling, however, has recently been called into question. Respectable educational organizations and citizens have begun to question both the ethics and the efficacy of the contemporary schoolmaster's rod. Professor Lipman has proven over the course of the last three decades that he can bring the power of philosophy to bear so as to effect educational change. He could do it once again by attacking a system (standardized testing) that denies the very diversity from which his creation — Philosophy for Children — springs.

Another way that Philosophy for Children might contribute to educational reform through its integrity as philosophy might be by bringing the "dispute" over interest to the fore of educational discourse. One of the primary things that distinguishes Philosophy for Children from traditional education is the following of the Deweyian precept — start with the interests of the child. That, of course, is a pedagogical principle but it is closely related to a whole series of ethical and political concerns, i.e., what sort of person is being taught, does she/he have rights, and so on. Simply by examining the issue more extensively, by asking, for example, whether interest should be unpacked in a Jamesian manner or a Deweyian one, would lead to a discussion as to the quality and quantity of change needed for traditional education. When we talk about Philosophy for Children vis a vis traditional education are we talking about the need for moderate reform, significant reform or revolution? As he has for years, Professor Lipman can lead the discussion which will touch on that question and other significant philosophical and educational ones.

NOTES

1. Charges like those, though infrequently published, were frequently uttered at Philosophy for Children workshops.
2. This charge was most recently made at a session on Feminism and Philosophy for Children held at an International Conference on Philosophy for Children, Graz, Austria, June 22-25, 1992.
3. The charge of myopia, obviously, cannot be levelled against feminists since whatever the tradition mentioned, one can be sure that it is male-dominated.
4. See, for example, Hilary Putnam, *Realism With a Human Face* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press).
5. William James, "On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings," in *The Writings of William James*, ed. by John J. McDermott (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977) pp. 629- 645.
6. William James, "Does Consciousness Exist," in *The Writings of William James*, op.cit., p. 172.
7. William James, "A World of Pure Experience," in *The Writings of William James*, op.cit., p. 198.
8. John Dewey, *Experience and Education* (1937; reprint, New York: Free Press, 1966).
9. John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (1917; reprint, New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 127.
10. William James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience* (New York: Collier Books, 1961), p. 260.
11. Again, as Dewey promised.
12. John Locke, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, ed. by F.W. Garforth (Woodbury, NY: Barron's Educational Series, Inc., 1964), pp. 129-130.

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