Hans-Georg Gadamer's Dialectic of Dialogue and the Epistemology of the Community of Inquiry

The idea of the classroom as a community of inquiry, and of the community of inquiry as a model for optimal classroom practice, is perhaps one of the great unrealized ideals in Western educational history. We first find it represented in the Socratic dialogues, but it is not realized there, whether because of the dominating power of Socrates' intellect, or the scribal distortions which resulted from Plato's didacticism, or both. More recently, the concept finds powerful theoretical articulation in the epistemology of Peirce, Royce, and Buchler.[1]

In the continental tradition, the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer on dialogue has provided new insight into the structure and dynamics of the community of inquiry. In his drive to reappropriate Aristotelian *phronesis*, or practical reason, for post-Enlightenment Western thought, Gadamer has shown us how dialogue is a unique epistemological event, a form of knowledge which can only be arrived at through a process that is collective and dialectical. As such, it provides an epistemological model for the event-setting of the classroom which is emergent and interactive, and which promises, if we can learn to move in it, to transform the way we teach.

Gadamer's insight has emerged, appropriately enough, through dialogue itself--in this case the form of dialogue with texts which seem alien to us called hermeneutics. For him, the hermeneutical stance is inherently dialogical and dialetical. It is dialogical because it demands a moment of negatiity, or self-lessness before the point of view of another, indicated by a willingness to place one's own point of view at risk in the interests of the truth. It is dialectical because it follows a pattern in which something unexpected and yet recognizable as true emerges from that moment. Both of those moments--of negativity and of emergence--may be included in the one well-known term from his work, "fusion of horizons."

Those who know Gadamer only through Truth and Method, can find him actually doing what he talks about doing in that book in his work on Hegel, Plato, and Aristotle. In these works--Dialogue and Dialectic (DD), Hegel's Dialetic (HD), and The Idea of the Good in Plato and Aristotle (IGPAP)--as well as in his Reason in the Age of Science (RIAS), and The Relevance of the Beautiful (RB) he demonstrates the fusion of horizons with texts that have become strange, and their reappropriation through dialogue.[2] What Gadamer reappropriates from Hegel and the ancient Greeks can play a key role in our understanding of the kind of thinking that goes on in the operation of the community of inquiry, which, as an epistemological event, is a paradigmatic example of what he calls the "structure of dialogue."

Gadamer actually reappropriates the thought of the ancient Greeks through Hegel and Heidegger. From Hegel he takes a particularly strong interest in an immanent dialectic at work in the world; from Heidegger, an idea of truth as openness to view, a self-revealing of being, and a new ontological appreciation of language. It is through his dialogue with both of these thinkers that he comes to reclaim the ancient Greek *logos* philosophy, the idea of a reason in nature, which is hidden from view, and which plays itself out, is revealed in time and its processes. This reclamation of a universal *logos* is grounded, however, rather than in a divine, all pervasive *nous* (although such a thing is certainly not ruled out in Gadamer's work--rather it is simply not taken up explicityly), in the commonality of all understanding which is intrinsic to its grounding in language. That is, language itself is the event structure in which and through which rationality emerges, and holds together.

The commonality of all understanding

Following and building upon Heidegger, Gadamer recognizes language as, not just a sign system, a referral tool or even merely a communications system, but the medium in which consciousness and world are joined, or the essential modality of the self-presentation of being, in which "that which is assumes its form for us" (IGPAP 3). He also makes us see that language is communal through and through--that "we are continually shaping a common perspective when we speak a common language and so are active participants in the communality of our experience of the world" (RIAS 110). It follows then, that implicit in Gadamer's notion of language is "the overcoming and surpassing of the subjective spirit, of the individual consciousness, in the direction of common consciousness" (RIAS 33). It is no longer in the "subjectivity of self-consciousness" (HD 12) that we find the ground of knowledge, but in our participation in the self-constitution of knowledge through conversation. Truth can no longer be thought of as predicative, analytically derived, or as something that can be known apart from its expression in language. Truth emerges in the *play* of language, the back and forth, the structure of question and answer of language, that is to say, dialogue.

This allows us to see dialogue as an ontological form of thinking. The kind of thinking that occurs in dialogue, and the kind of knowledge that emerges from it, can emerge in no other way. Gadamer goes as far as to say, "a single idea by itself is not knowable at all...In any insight an entire nexus or web of ideas is involved" (DD 119)--an idea familiar enough to us since Saussure's revolutionary linguistics. And in another essay he adds "the *logos* always requres that one idea be 'there' together with another. Insight into one idea per se does not yet constitute knowledge. Only when the idea is 'alluded' to in respect to another does it display itself as something." (DD 152)[3]

Travelling apart toward unity

The understanding which emerges through dialogue is an ever-emerging and never finished rationality. "The labor of dialectic, in which the truth of what is finally flashes upon us, is by nature unending and infinite." (DD 121) In dialogue we are always *beginning* to grasp reason (logos) in nature, and to see in nature and history "the realizations of one and the same 'reason'." Nor is this by any means an automatic emergence and grasp; it does not come about through the Hegelian movement of immanent Reason in History, but in the risky, contingent, historical, intersubjective context of the fundamental human drive to bring things to a commonality of understnding, and the progressive, forever incomplete energence of reason--and as we shall see, therefore at least a call for right action--from that event. Through the fusion of horizons of the members of the community of inquiry, the multiplicity of unfinished and partial interpretations are carried toward the unity which is necessary to any concept of dialogue at all, and which is expressed existentially as an "inexorable" "exigence of reason for unity" (RIAS 149).[4]

Gadamer is quite clear about the fact that full understanding is an "infinite task." He emphasizes over and over again the reality of human finitude, of what he calls "the incompleteness characteristic of all human thinking" (DD 153), which makes systematization an impossibility. He insists that "a simultaneous positing and being present of *all* relationships is fundamentally impossible" (DD 154). Where there is something, there is (not) present an is not (DD 153), and this essential element of necessary partiality, indeterminacy, indefiniteness, concealment, incompleteness and paradox pervades everything. Thus dialogue is not a method so much as what Aristotle called a *hexis*, a way of being, or disposition. As Ambrosio so succinctly put it, "Method is but the image at the level of reflection of a prereflective discipline operative at the

level of existence and freedom."[5]

This "prereflective discipline" which is the movement of the community of inquiry does not have the character of having begun anywhere, or of finishing anywhere. Hence each specific classroom situation is in reality a pretext for a conversation which is always latent wherever people gather to talk seriously. The occasion for dialogue--what gets and keeps the conversation going--is in fact an *aporia*, an insoluble question intrinsic to existence itself. We are, Gadamer says, responding to questions that "come from beyond ourselves."

> ... there is hidden in the speculative utterance an *aporia* which is to be taken seriously. It is the irresolvable contradiction of the one and the many which, in spite of the problem it confronts us with, is a rich source of advancement in our knowledge of things. (HD 26)

The inherent contradictions in which reason entangles itself through its expression in language, "force" or "summon" us to thinking. They move us to "compel one another to get clear about what is right and to put up an argument" (DD 114). The way out of these contradictions is the way through--through undergoing the fundamental moment of negativity which they pose to our understanding, in the discipline of questioning and searching. Through the self-unfolding of the subject matter in the logic of question and answer, dialogue calls forth a knowledge which is always partial, but necessarily implies a whole knowledge.

The dialogue is actually a form of suffering--the *pathos tou logou*, or "suffering of the word" (HD 24). Gadamer characterizes it as a "travelling apart towards unity." The experience--the *pathos*--of the dialectic always bears a negative element, a necessity that one be refuted in order to learn what one does not know. The *dia* of both words--dialogue and dialectic--stands for the process of differentiation, of a going through in which there is implicit a taking things assunder (IGPAP 98). It presupposes a certain tension, a need to hold the *now* and the *not yet* in a strategic balance, and hence calls for the "skill of developing the consequences of opposed assumptions even while one is still ignorant of the *ti estin*, the 'what' of what one is talking about" (HD 94). Its dynamic structure is simultaneously *synopsis* (seeing things as together) and *diahairesis* (division, differentiation) (IGPAP 59). According to the logical differences inherent in the structure of the subject matter, one thing is marked off from another, and we experience "the removal of the things meant from everything which is not meant" (HD 26; IGPAP 98). Some of what is contained in each perspective is confirmed, while some is cast into doubt (IRAS 15). In the dialectic of dialogue, each member of the community of inquiry submits to the dynamic of listening and responding through which the play of question and answer makes its claim upon him or her (GPDD 31). This involves placing our preconceptions, our own horizon of meaning, at risk (RIAS 15). Gadamer insists that only in dialogue--with oneself or with others--can one get beyond the "mere prejudices of prevailing conventions," and through all differentiations until an understanding is reached with others as well as oneself (IGPAP 98). Nor can we make deductions in advance about the understanding which will emerge from the play of question and answer.

The exigence toward the good

We do know of this understanding at least that it will be personal and intersubjective, and therefore have the characteristics of "truth." To think that it would be merely "information" (whatever that is) is naive. Truth is not something already given, which we are merely disintering, like archeologists, or determining in its substantial outlines like

scientists or metaphysicians; nor is it whatever we want it to be. Truth, in the Heideggerian sense of "openness to vie," is, in Gadamer's reappropriation of Plato, one of the three structural components (with beauty and symmetry) of the "beautiful mixture" which he calls "the good" (IGPAP 115).

The implicit direction of all thought, its "exigence," is toward the good. This is because it is towards unity, or the one, and "the good can simply be called the one, and the one the good" (IGPAP 31). Gadamer defines the one as "that which on any given occasion provides what is multiple with the unity of whatever consists in itself."[6] Dialogue is a risky, often agonistic, emergence towards this horizonal unity. For Gadamer, who in his dialogue with Greek thought reappropriates the ancient fusion of moral theory and ontology, the ethical and logical aspects of true dialectic are seen to be inseparable (IGPAP 99).

Such is the good as *telos*, as the direction of the dialectic of dialogue. This is a good which "is in everything and is seen in distinction from everything only because it is in everything and shines forth from it" (IGPAP 116). But the good is also, in action and relationship, "measure." As such, "the good is limitedness (measuredness, *metriotes*) in the midst of constantly threatening indeterminacy and limitlessness" (IGPAP 20). It is the exercise of virtue, or the *aretai*, in a world in which the human capacity for choice casts the very possibility of the truth and good into doubt. "It is characteristic," says Gadamer, "of the human soul that it must endeavor to maintain its own order" (DD 32). We both make our way towards the good and hold to the good through an intra- and interpersonal landscape in which both seductive pleasure (*hedone*) and "limitless drives" on the one hand, and reason (*nous*) as "the source of all measuring and measured restraint," on the other, are always present (IGPAP 111).

The danger that lurks in discourse

Ours is a "mixed" realm, a third thing distinguished either from the "noetic world of numbers and pure relationships," or "its dialectical opposite, the *apeiron*, the unbounded, the unknown. The *aretai* are necessary because of the "hidden danger" we always undergo from the distortions which arise from limitless drive. The "hidden danger in what is charmingly pleasant" (IGPAP 65) demands the chief among the virtues, courage (*andreia*). We need courage in order to resist, not only the subtle hedonic pleasures of flattery and conformism, but wrong separation or combination of ideas, confusion, as well as, and perhaps especially, "the dazzling art of the forceful answer" (IGPAP 98), which is an abuse of power, and a common one among gifted dialecticians who presume to teach. All of these make for sophism, and the "eristic dialectic which only confounds and does not instruct." (DD 9)

But for Gadamer, the danger goes deeper than even the temptations of personal power and pleasure: danger "lurks in *logos* (discourse) itself" (IGPAP 98). At one point he refers to it as "the danger of sophistic verisimilitude." There is an ever present danger of the "corruption of discourse," in that philosophical language can fail to live up to itself, can "get caught in purely formal argumentation or degenerate into empty sophistry" (RB 139).

This danger is only a reflection of an even deeper tendency within existence itself, a tendency which is articulable on several levels. On one level it can be associated with what has already been called "limitless drive." Gadamer refers to the "blindness of the life urge" (IGPAP 110). Robert Corrington, in his Community of Interpreters (CI) describes it as "the unbridled will to live" which is found in all beings, forces them to "struggle against each other for domination" (25-26) and gives rise to the "corrosive forces of solipsism and aggressive individualism" (17). The blindness of the life urge, an essential aspect of human finitude, manifests in the community of inquiry as an inability to decenter from one's own position to the point of being able to follow a

counterargument, e.g., an inability to let go within the dialectical movement of the community. For the community depends for its forward movement on the loss of self which the phrase "moment of negativity" implies. In that, as Corrington says, "... the community and not the self forms the horizon of each hermeneutic act" (CI 31), it is necessary for each individual to overcome the absolutization of his own horizon by which the unbridled will to live resists dialogue; for dialogue is a process in which each of my statements is altered in the act of its being heard by another. It contravenes the natural self-assertion of one's own point of view. It does so because by its very nature, since it is an "asymmetrical process in that one cannot go back from I to I, for both temporal and interpretive reasons. Temporally, the past is altered in its translation into the present. Interpretively, a sign interpreted is a sign changed" (CI 41).

Even this danger is, in theory anyway, avoidable. But when Gadamer refers to the "distortion which any knowing implies," he is refering to another, even deeper level of danger--a blindness which is a result of our inexorable situatedness in discursivity itself. P. Christopher Smith, Gadamer's translator, shows how this insight is an appropriation of Heidegger's epistemology:

> ... any insight which we can have emerges in finite human discourse and therefore, only partially. It is clearly "there," but all the while embedded in what is not clear, in what remains concealed. Our insights, in other words, are limited by our discursivity. What is given to us to know is given from hiddenness (*lethe*) and in time lapses back into it. Thus our human truth, (*aletheia*), is never absolute. (DD 103, n.16)

The "intrinsic distortion-tendency" of discursivity lies in the fact that in the process of bringing something else into presence, it asserts itself instead of fading out of view. Language is always something besides the thing it is presenting. In presenting itself, it suppresses what it wishes to display in it. Thus the very identity of language as a representational system creates this distortion: since the representation is not what it represents, what it represents is to a degree forever inaccesible.[7] This is related to the fact that language, in bringing its topic into the foreground, necessarily submerges the background out of which the topic emerges.

Finally, we must add to this even a further level of "the danger that lurks in discourse": the fundamental semantical ambiguity of language. Gadamer refers to what he calls "the possibility of renaming, which is implied in any giving of a name and designating with signs," which "demonstrates that the sound by which the word names the thing does not carry its meaning in it unambiguously" (DD 108). To the possibility of an unambiguous coordination of sign and thing designated--"the fruitless undertaking of defining things atomistically" (DD 109)--we must oppose "the *logos*, as the *koinonia* (community) of the ideas." This follows from a point made earlier, that "it is not possible to define an isolated idea purely by itself, and that the very interweaving of the ides militates against the positive conception of a precise and unequivocal pyramid of ideas" (DD 110). A direct and univocal coordination of the sign world--i.e. of the world of which we are the master--with the world which we seek to maste by ordering it with signs, is not language. The whole basis oflanguage, the very things which make it most what it is, are the displacements and ambiguities of metaphor.

These four, progressively more fundamental, dangers that "lurk in discourse" make of the operation of the community of inquiry a constant struggle against the tendencies of illusion, disorder, and measurelessness. "It appears that it is *the* human task to constantly be limiting the measureless with measure" (DD 155). The one who wishes to understnd the "truly good" and the "truly bad" must at the same time understand what Plato called the "falsity and truth of the whole of reality" (DD 117). Given the inevitability of this

mixture of the false and the true, we welcome the suffering of the word in the *agon* (struggle) of the dialectic; in fact we turn it to our advantage. As did the Greeks, we consider this mixture as not a burdensome but a productive ambiguity. "The productivity of this dialectic is the positive side of the ineradicable weakness from which the procedure of conceptual determination suffers" (DD 111).

We welcome the opposition we find inherent in dialogue because it is an ontic principle. "Just as resistance is inevitable encountered in the ordering and shaping of the world, so too, is it inevitably encountered in any discourse which would display the thing under discussion" (DD 121). One aspect of the courage we are called upon to show is in the recognition and welcoming of the understanding that "the labor of dialectic, in which the truth of what is finally flashes upon us, is by nature unending and infinite" (DD 121). For the Greeks as for Hegel "the adequate formulation of the truth is an unending venture, which goes forward only in approximations and repeated attempts" (HD 33). Thus we affirm as the royal road of the universal order itself, the

> ... shared inquiry which never ceases in its effort to more sharply define one word, concept, intuition, in respect to another and which willingly puts all individual opinions to the test while abjuring all contentiousness and yielding to the play of question and answer--that shared inquiry should make possible not only insight into this or that specific thing, but, insofar as is humanly possible, insight into all virtue and vice and the whole of reality. (DD 121-122).

Word and deed

It is important to keep in mind that the insight referred to here, the revealing, which is the "achievement of all speech," is not just of a word (*logos*), but a deed (*ergon*). They are inseparable. What results from dialogue is the ideal of a life harmonized rightly in a word which directs us to a deed, to choosing what is right in the moment of choice. For Gadamer, "thinking always points beyond itself," to a unity of theoretical and practical reason in *phronesis*, or "practical widsom"--a kind of thinking "oriented toward choice which flows directly over into action." *Phronesis* is not a "general and teachable knowledge," because it emerges from the event where desire and reason come together, and as such is a form of moral knowledge. As Corrington, in his interpretation of Gadamer, points out:

> The practical dimension of understanding is the drive toward the unconditional source of value that keeps communal life from sinking into the demonci and nongeneric. Gadamer insists that the ethical core of dialogue saves hermeneutics from becoming a detached purview of mere structures. The drive to interpret is in essence the drive toward healthy social life...For Gadamer, each interpretation must point beyond its object...and must illuminate something fundamental for social life (CI 44).

Through the back and forth, free play or argument and counter-argument, the community of inquiry is led, if not to the right decision, then to the painful awareness that there *is* such a thing as right decision. The telos of the individual and the telos of the group converge--if not always smoothly--in the conversation of the community of inquiry. As "every individual thing strives for its own good, its own measure" (IGPAP 144), so the drive of the community of inquiry is toward the expression of a universal truth in the concrete situation which has been taken up. "The telos is not a goal that belongs to some faraway order of perfection. In each case, the telos is realized in the

particular existent itself, and realize in such a fashion that the individual contains the telos" (IGPAP 177). This is the telos implicit in Haberman' notion of an inherent drive to overcome systematically distorted communication, which is also the drive which impels dialogue. Overcoming distorted communication leads, not to some speculative, idealized knowledge, but to a concrete sense of what is the just thing to do in each situation in its particularity.[8] Through the "unending venture" of the community of inquiry, "which goes forward only in approximations and repeated attempts," we learn to choose the good.

The unending venture of the Socratic dialectic was proclaimed by its founder to be "an entirely new kind of education, in which the concern is not so much with learning something, as with turning the whole soul around" (IGPAP 83). What emerges from the dialectic of dialogue is a form of knowledge which is neither merely technical nor informational, nor pure "value" split off from "fact," and which transcends the sphere of control of scientific method. As such, "dialectic is not general and unteachable knowledge" (IGPAP 37). One thing which makes it unteachable is that it is a result of dialogue, which is an emergent form of thinking, and hence involves a kind of knowledge which cannot be had beforehand. For another it has, as Gadamer says, "the structure of the sum number of things which precisely as that thing which all of them together have in common cannot be attributed to any of them individually" (DD 133).

By implication, the classroom is not a community of inquiry if people perceive what happens there either as a purely technical or as a purely speculative event. Rather, the classroom is an even-setting from which new meaning emerges, meaning which creates unexpected, often disturbing perspectives on the world of action outside the classroom, where dialogue is typically not the rule. This makes of the classroom a place apart, but also a place where the spell of the non-dialogical is broken, and the individual is in a position to undertake, in a group context, the risky search for personal transformation. But in the community of inquiry, personal and collective transformation are mutually necessary. Hence the inevitable political implications fo dialogue: as we learn to "choose the good" in the interplay of horizons, the demand for collective as well as individual transformation asserts itself. I am persuaded that, no matter how deeply technological ideology distorts students' or teachers' views of the classroom event, that the lure of personal and collective transformation remains as an inalterable dimension of the setting, a dimension which, so to speak, "haunts" the setting when it is denied. Perhaps this explains why students are so often in the forefront of revolutionary political movements.

The lure of personal and collective transformation may have its deepest analogue, not so much in the Peircean community of science, where "the community renews itself by placing all inferences under the skeptical eye of researchers, who are dedicated to the search for counterexamples" (CI 64), as in the dialectical journey of the self in religious formation. For someone involved in religious experience, the negative character of human experience is understood as a *positive* phenomenon for human life.[9] The person involved in religious formation welcomes the moment of negativity which characteristic of all experience as a renouncing of positivity of self. For the person Marcel called *homo viator*, a transcendence of subjectivity leads dialectically to a reencountering of a subjectivity newly aware of its finitude, and its dependence on an other which is ontologically prior to its own self presence.[10] The self involved in religious formation emerges from the moment of self-loss with a new understanding of self as a gift, and as a form of openness to possibilities which come to it from outside itself,[11] and thus even more open to experience, and committed to meaning and to action.

Thus, in dialogue, the experience of undergoing the necessary contradictions of reason is a positive phenomenon for human life. For it is only in what Corrington calls the "overcoming of the self-forgetfulness of each subjective horizon," which in turn requires its "self-humiliation in the face of that which is never a horizon or even a horizon of horizons" (CI 64), that the "whole soul is turned around towards noetic reality." And it is

only in the turning (*metanoia*) of the whole soul--of desire--towards noetic reality that critical and practical rationality meet, and the world changes. This is the promise of the community of inquiry, and of the classroom to the extent it is a community of inquiry. It is the source of that sense of drama and potential significance that haunts even the late 20th century American classroom, which is so blinded and reduced by technocracy. It is the source of our fidelity to education as an essential element of healthy culture, and will survive in some form, somewhere, as long as there are humans in search of meaning and justice.

David Kennedy

NOTES

1. Robert S. Corrington's recent study, The Community of Interpreters (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1987), is a rich, brilliant exposition of the evolution of the notion in the three Americans, particularly in its tracing of Royce's transformation of Peirce's "community of science" into a much fuller notion of a "community of interpretation."

2. Hans-George Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1975), Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, trans. P.Cristopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato, trans. P.Cristopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); Reason in the Age of Science, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: MIT PRess, 1981); The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy, trans. P. Cristopher Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press 1986); The Relevance of the Beautiful, Ed. Robert Bernasconi, trans. Nicholas Waslker (Cambridge: Cambridge Uniersity Press, 1986).

3. For a brilliant, extended further comment on this "mirror-play...through which the matter of thought is immanently and dynamically articulated," see The Relevance of the Beautiful, pp. 137-138.

4. For a more complete discussion of Gadamer's concept of "emergent understanding," see Ron Bontekoe, "A Fusion of Horizons: Gadamer and Schleiermacher," International Philosophical Quarterly 27 (March 1987): 3-16.

5. F.J. Ambrosio, "Gadamer, Plato, and the Discipline of Dialogue," International Philosophical Quarterly 27 (March 1987): 31.

6. To a certain extent, Gadamer seems here to be reading the ancients to mean that the good is *what is*, the implicit order of the world. The relationship of this understanding of the good to beauty is taken up with startling, passionate clarity by Simone Weil in her essay "Forms of the Implicit Love of God," in the section entitled "Love of the Order of the World." It is explored from an ordinary language perspective by Iris Murdoch in her essay "On 'God' and 'Good'," where she identifies the good as something we understand when, liberated from "the proliferation of blinding self-centered aims," we understand "the unity and interdependence of the moral world." See Simone Weil, Waiting for God (New York: Putnam, 1951); and Iris Murdoch, "On 'God' and 'Good'," in S. Hauerwas and A. MacIntyre, eds. Revisions: Changing Perspectives in Moral Philosophy (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983).

7. "...the state of the soul which we call knowledge or insight into the truth must also be of such a nature that it asserts itself and thereby conceals the thing itself." (DD 112) "That which is meant to present something cannot be that thing. It lies in the nature of the means of knowing that in order to be means they must have something inessential about them."

8. Richard Bernstein, in his Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics, and Praxis (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), shows the similarity between Gadamer's and Habermans' notions of praxis, and their orientation to the inherent telos--whatever the evil, delusion, and systematic distortions that plague it--of humans to do justice in social situations.

9. James Risser, "Hermeneutic Experience as Memory" Rethinking Knowledge as Recollection," Research in Phenomenology 16 (1986): 41-56.

10. This has been pointed out by Patricia A. Johnson, "The Task of the Philosopher: Kierkegaard-Heideger-Gadamer," Philosophy Today 28 (Spring 1984): 3-18.