RECIPROCITY REVISITED

I had the pleasure of meeting Lawrence Kohlberg just two months before his tragic and untimely death. He told me that he had prepared some written comments on my article, "Reciprocity," which appeared in Analytic Teaching, Vol. 4, No. 2. [1] I mentioned an article I had written about his work. [2] We agreed to make an exchange. I jokingly said, "Stage 2. You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours." I sent him my paper, but he did not send his. At first I amused myself with the thought that Lawrence Kohlberg, of all people, had failed to satisfy even stage 2 moral requirements. However, I then learned that he had suffered a recurrence of a debilitating and depressing disease, and I read the sad announcement of his presumed death in the New York Times, as well as its later confirmation.

Although I have long been critical of certain aspects of Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development, I have learned much from his pioneering work. I had hoped to enter into fruitful dialogue with him, especially since he had taken the time to analyze some of my work with children's moral thinking. Fortunately, Kohlberg had already shared a copy of his unpublished paper about "Reciprocity" with Mark Weinstein, and it is through Mark that I gained access to it. [3] I wish Lawrence Kohlberg were here to respond to my further reflections. However, perhaps they will be of some interest to the many who continue, as I do, to wrestle with his thoughts.

I actually said very little about Kohlberg's theory in "Reciprocity." But I now realize the contrast between his approach and the one I favor requires a more careful elaboration. That is what I will attempt here.

In his unpublished paper, Kohlberg comments that my discussion of reciprocity with children is just what his theory would predict would occur in good developmental moral discussions. He concludes that, while "ignoring psychological moral stages and focusing on a moral philosophic understanding of Socratic inquiry," my way of leading the discussion "is much the same sort of teaching which we advocate, with much the same results." At a very general level, this is probably right. However, I believe there are noteworthy differences when we look at more specific features of Kohlberg's account.

At the outset of "Reciprocity" I noted that Kohlberg's account of moral development holds that moral reasoning is advanced by being thrown into "disequilibrium." Children find that their customary modes of reasoning are not adequate for handling certain moral problems. Successful resolution of such problems requires advancing to the next stage of moral reasoning. Stages form a hierarchy involving progressively greater cognitive complexity and advancement toward a universal moral perspective in which rights and duties stand in a fully reciprocal relation to one another. Since moral development depends on conflict, Kohlberg recommends the use of hypothetical moral dilemmas at strategic times as a teaching device in moral education.

Noting that much of moral life calls for moral discernment even though no dilemma is involved, I suggested an alternative approach. This approach, adapted from IAPC's Philosophy for Children programs, encourages children to sort out subtle and complex features of situations calling for moral reflection. Like Kohlberg, this approach emphasizes reason-giving, rather than simply conclusions from reasoning. However, dilemmas are given no special emphasis. Nor is there any need to sort out the reasoning into different cognitive-developmental stages. This does not mean that no attention need be given to the cognitive abilities of children. (To this should be added children's experiential background and affective dispositions.) The point is simply that there is no particular need to try to advance moral reasoning through the use of dilemmas--nor even a need to worry about whether there are distinctive stages of development.

Now, Kohlberg could reply that, ignoring the different stages in this way does nothing to show that such stages do not exist. I agree. Although I have doubts about

Kohlberg's stage theory of moral development, it was not my intent in "Reciprocity" to express those doubts. Later I will say something more about my doubts. At this point, however, I wish simply to reiterate that an exclusive focus on moral dilemmas leaves out much of the richness, and even perplexity, of moral life.

Well, one might say, if children are not asked to discuss moral dilemmas, what else is there to discuss that can be expected to contribute to their moral development? "Reciprocity" contains a transcription of the responses of a group of 10-year-olds to a story that raises questions about when it is appropriate to "return in kind." This story is from Matthew Lipman's novel, Lisa. The passage involves Timmy retaliating after being tripped, Harry and Timmy discussing trading stamps and lending money, and Lisa finally concluding: "It looks like there are times when it is right to give back what we got and other times when it is wrong. But how do we tell which is which?"

How does discussing a passage like this differ from discussing a moral dilemma? When we face a moral dilemma, we are pulled in conflicting directions. We think we have **reasons** for going either way--or for avoiding both ways. None of the choices seem to be without moral cost, and we are very likely perplexed about what the right choice is (or even whether there is a right choice). Now, Timmy, Harry, and Lisa **might** have viewed the situations they discussed as posing moral dilemmas of this sort. But, in fact, they do not. Timmy, at least initially, has no doubt that retaliation is called for. Even if Harry succeeds in casting seeds of doubt in Timmy's way, it is not clear that this creates a **dilemma** for Timmy. He might wonder if he really did **have** to get even. Or he might wonder if knocking the tripper's books off his desk succeeded in making things even. Or he might wonder, as my group of 10-year-olds did, what it **means** to "get even," whether it is possible to get even, and whether it is **desirable** to try.

Harry, on the other hand, has little doubt that Timmy's act of retaliation was inappropriate. He also has no doubt that trading stamps is appropriate and that one ought to repay borrowed money. What puzzles him was how to **explain** the differences among these instances of returning in kind. This is a puzzlement that Lisa shares with him. Making progress in resolving puzzlements like this is a fundamental part of moral development. But it is not clear that the discussion of moral dilemmas has any **distinctive** contribution to make here.

If children are not to discuss moral dilemmas posed by the episode from Lisa, what are they to discuss? Here are some of the things my group discussed:

> 1. The likely **consequences** of retaliating. They worried that retaliation sets off a chain of events that no one wants--other than, perhaps, the initiator, who wants attention, and an excuse to be even more aggressive, and so on.
>
> 2. Does retaliation really "get things even"? Does this notion even make **sense**? First Larry, and then Carlen, suggested that it doesn't.
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> 3. Is it important to distinguish between **wanting** to do so something and **having** to do it?
>
> 4. Is it right to respond to an acknowledged wrong by returning in kind? (Do two wrongs make a right?)
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> 5. What **alternatives** are available, and what are the likely consequences of each? (E.g., will hitting back make things worse? Will doing nothing in return discourage the initiator, or will it simply encourage more of the same and perhaps contribute to the aggressor growing up to be an undesirable kind of person? Is self-defense needed--as a first response,

or as a back-up to one's first response?)

6. What should the person who is hit or tripped be trying to accomplish in responding one way rather than another? Avoiding makes things worse (for whom?)? Get even? Teach a lesson? (Are these last two different? If so, how?)

7. How is hitting back different from a) making an exchange of goods; b) paying back a debt; c) returning a favor; d) responding to someone who does not return a favor or who refuses to extend a favor?

8. Keeping all of these examples in mind, what does the Golden Rule mean? Is it a good rule?

The children discussed questions like these in great detail, and with great understanding, for more than 30 minutes.

Without reaching consensus about how each of the situations discussed should be handled, there was an underlying recognition that reciprocal relations in human affairs tend to generate chains of "returning in kind": counterattacks encourage counter counterattacks, favors encourage favors in return, extending trust encourages trust in return. But, as children are well aware, reciprocity does not always occur. Counterattacks do sometimes work. Favors are sometimes not returned. And trust sometimes simply renders one vulnerable. How to stop an undesired chain from getting started (e.g., hitting), or how to stop it once it has started, is a challenge at any age. So, as the children again realized, ideals are to be related to realities. Chip suggested a two stage strategy: First ignore the instigator, but defend yourself if that doesn't work. In response to those who were reluctant to extend favors without evidence that they would be reciprocated, Rick replied that it is worth the risk: If everyone would benefit--from someone, even if not from those for whom one does favors. These were thoughtful responses, made in full awareness of the uncertainties present in the situations under discussion.

For me, an occasional prodder but largely a witness to their conversation, the most fascinating aspect of that 30 minute discussion was its thoroughness. What, I have since wondered, what we adults would want to add that was not considered in some way? We might make comparisons with other kinds of situations that 10-year-olds will understand and have to wrestle with only later. But this does not detract from their understanding of the moral nuances of situations within their range of experience.

Kohlbergians might accept much of what I have said so far, but reply: "Of course moral thinking is not confined to moral dilemmas. Dilemmas are useful in helping children advance to the next stage. But children within given stages think in characteristic ways. In fact, the children in your group nicely illustrate this. Their responses waver primarily between stages 2 and 3, with Rick's final remark about favors bordering on stage 4." Such a reply would satisfy me, but only partly. It would concede the main point I make at the outset of "Reciprocity"-- namely that moral educators should engage children in thinking about much more than moral dilemmas. However, as the Kohlbergian reply suggests, this concession can be made without in any way challenging the general development framework advocated by Kohlberg. This is a framework that insists, not only that moral development takes place in a stage-like, sequential manner, but also that each stage is morally more adequate than its predecessors. I have doubts about both of these features of the framework. I now turn to some of those doubts.

There is one matter on which Kohlbergians and I certainly can agree, and it is a focal point of Kohlberg's paper on my article, "Reciprocity". The kinds of comments the children in my group make are just the kinds of comments Piagetians and Kohlbergians

would predict. Where disagreement occurs is not so much over what children are likely to say (e.g., the words, phrases, and sentences they utter) as over the **meaning** of what they say and how what they say should be **morally evaluated.**

Consider Kohlberg's analysis of what Penny says. Her remark about the Golden Rule opened the discussion. I had just asked whether the group thought that it was right for Timmy to retaliate. Penny said:

> I think that when somebody does something to you, you should be expecting something from them, because like the old saying, "Do unto others as they do unto you."

Kohlberg takes this to be a stage 2 Golden Rule response. He cites a study he conducted with Selman in which they asked: "What does the Golden Rule say if somebody walks up to you on the street and hits you?" A stage 3 response involves thinking like 10-year-old Paul: "Well, it's like your brain has to leave your head and go into the other guy's head and then come back into your head' but you still see it like it was in the other guy's head and then you decide that way."

In contrast Kohlberg says:

> Stage 1 and 2 children almost always said "Hit him back, do unto others as they do unto you." Only at stage 3 did they "correctly" interpret the Golden Rule as Paul struggled to do.

But a sympathetic reading of Penny's reply would not place it in stage 1 or 2. She is not saying that Timmy should hit back. In fact, it is only somewhat later than we can see what she is saying. Immediately after her opening remark, the other children begin talking about what the person who tripped Timmy was trying to accomplish. That is, they tried to get clear **first** about the perspective of the **aggressor**--which apparently is just what stage 3 Paul says one should do ("it's like your brain has to leave your head and go into the other guy's head . . .).

Here is Penny's **second** comment, made just a few minutes after her opening remark:

> I agree with Emily. It would be better to walk away, because if . . . you push off his books, well, he was probably expecting it, because he knew that bothered you. So, if he knew you'd try to every time he saw you, he'd probably try to trip you. So if you just walked away, then he wouldn't think it bothered you.

Notice how this comment focuses on what the **aggressor** expects. Looking back at her first comment, it now seems clear that she was not advocating that Timmy retaliate. She was actually pointing out that we should give some thought to what the aggressor was expecting. That would give us some basis for predicting what the consequences of retaliating might be. So, a plausible reading of her opening remark is that it is the **aggressor** who will use Timmy's retaliation as a reason to do even more.

Rather than suggest that Penny was explaining what the Golden Rule means to her, it is more plausible to suggest that she was explaining how the aggressor would use it. As the surrounding discussion reveals, 10-year-olds are fully aware of the tactics some use to "justify" aggressive, bullying behavior. Arnie "accidentally" trips Timmy. Timmy knocks Arnie's books off the desk. Arnie now says, "I'll get you for that!"--or at least this is what Timmy fears as he runs away with Harry. So, it is Arnie who is expecting something when he trips Timmy. It is his expectation Penny is referring to when she cites the "old rule." This does not necessarily mean that she **agrees** with this interpretation of the "old

rule." But she has strong suspicions about how Arnie understands it.

Well, the Kohlbergian might reply, let's put Arnie and Timmy in stages 1 and 2, and put Penny in stage 3 with Carlen, Kurt, Chip, and Emily. This is better only in the sense that it attributes greater insight to Penny. But it is not good enough. Consider what Kohlberg says about stage three. We have already seen his example of 10-year-old Paul. Kohlberg comments:

> Stage 3 interpretations of Golden Rule reversibility, however, do not yield fair decisions nor are they completely reversible. As a result, they lead to no determinate moral resolution of a situation. In the "Heinz steals the drug" dilemma, the husband reaches one solution if he puts himself in his wife's shoes, another in the druggist's. Or again, in the Talmudlic dilemma of a man with a water bottle encountering another man equally in danger of dying of thirst, a stage 3 interpretation of the Golden Rule logically leads to their passing the water bottle back and forth like Alphonse and Gaston.

But this indecisive flipping back and forth does not characterize any of the children in my group. Indeed, they did try to understand the perspective of the aggressor. But they did not first side with Timmy, then the aggressor, then Timmy, . . . They recognized that what the aggressor did was inappropriate. The question then was: What should Timmy do? Understanding the aggressor's perspective (what he "expected"), was seen by them to be essential to giving appropriate advice to Timmy (and to one another).

What I conclude from Kohlberg's attempt to characterize the thinking of the children in my group as stage 3 is that it is a bad fit. A better fit might be Kohlberg's stage 5, which he describes in this way:

> Reversibility at stage 5 means reciprocity of rights.
>
> In this stage 5 subject's words:
>
> Morality means recognizing the rights of other individuals to do as they please as long as it doesn't interfere with somebody else's rights.

I wish I had presented such a statement to my group. They might have said something like this.

> *Penny*: Yes, I agree. Arnie had no right to trip Timmy.
> *Kurt*: Yeah, what did Timmy ever do to Arnie?
> *Carlen*: I think everybody has the right to walk without being tripped--as long as they're not hurting anybody else.
> *Emily*: Sure. It'd be different if Timmy had been kicking people as he walked by them.
> *Chip*: I agree with all that. But it doesn't answer the question. What should Timmy do? Arnie didn't have any right to trip Timmy, but does that give Timmy the right to do something back?
> *Rick*: Two wrongs don't make a right.
> *Penny*: Besides, if Timmy tries to get him back, that's just what Arnie expects.
> *Larry*: Yeah. Then Arnie will get back at Timmy, and Timmy will need to get even again. Well, actually there's no such thing as "even" here.
> *Emily*: Well, maybe there's another way. I bet Arnie will just get bored tripping Timmy and stuff like that if people just ignore him when he

acts that way.
Kurt: But what if he doesn't stop? What if he keeps on hitting?
Carlen: Then you have to defend yourself. But first ignore him.

So, am I saying that the children in my group belong in stage 5 (or even in stage 6!)? No, what I am saying is that it seems to me that Kohlberg's stages, at least as they typically are characterized, do no adequately capture the nuances of children's reflections about moral issues. Furthermore, Kohlberg seems vastly to underestimate the moral reasoning, not only of children, but also adults. According to Kohlberg, prior to stage 5, moral reasoning is heteronomous. It is either pre-conventional or conventional--but, in any case, pre-critical. Kohlberg has estimated that 80% of American adults never get beyond the conventional thinking of stages 3 and 4. I find this highly implausible. Certainly I cannot say that the children in my group displayed no critical, moral thinking. I see little reason to agree that typical adults display little or no critical, moral thinking. To say this is not to say that I always agree with the results of such critical thinking. Nor is it to say that the critical, moral thinking of children and adults is as it should be.

Kohlberg's account, however, seems to me to be much too closely wedded to a philosophically controversial theoretical framework--one that gives pride of place to a rather peculiar form of impersonal reasoning. This is most clearly illustrated in the famous Heinz example. Heinz's wife is dying of cancer. A druggist has a drug that he will not sell for less than $2000. Heinz can raise only $1000. Should Heinz steal the drug to save his wife? To determine one's moral stage, the key element is the reason one gives for whatever course of action is commended.

On Kohlberg's analysis, someone who says Heinz should steal the drug for his wife, but need not for a stranger, is using stage 3 reasoning. This is because the decision is not based solely on respect for the dignity of human life (stage 6). Rather, what is decisive is the fact that Heinz has a special relationship to his wife (stage 3). But is there anything morally objectionable or inadequate about this--In this kind of circumstance? No doubt there are circumstances in which partially to one's friends and loved ones is inappropriate. But this does not seem to be one of them. (To see the relevance of the special relationship to his wife here, consider the following: Suppose Heinz stole the drug and then discovered that the woman in the next bed--a total stranger--also needed the drug, but that there was enough for only one of them. To whom should he give the drug? Or suppose we agree that Heinz should sell a valued heirloom to raise the money to save his wife. Should he do the same for a total stranger?)

Someone who says that Heinz should not be morally required to steal the drug because it involves a substantial risk that he will be caught and put in jail would apparently be giving a stage 2 answer. But what if this judgment is based on the belief that we have duties to ourselves as well as others? Or that we have a right to refuse taking such large risks for others? It is understandable that in regard to either of these considerations, whether the person to be saved is Heinz's wife or a stranger is an important consideration.

Someone who believes Heinz should not break the law in order to save his wife or a stranger might, nevertheless, believe that Heinz should be willing to take some risk in saving his wife or a stranger from drowning. This may sound like stage 4, "law and order" reasoning. But this need not mean that the person regards obedience to law as more important than human life. This same person might strenuously argue for legislation making it illegal to charge such exorbitant amounts for life-saving drugs. Further, reluctance to endorse breaking the law in this circumstance need not imply that one would blindly, and unreflectively, insist that any and every law should be obeyed (stage 4).

There are actually two issues here. The first concerns when it is or is not morally appropriate to resolve a practical problem in terms of self-interest (stages 1 and 2), the

interests of those to whom one is close (stage 3), or an appeal to law (stage 4). Insofar as this is itself a controversial matter, there should be some uncertainty about placing particular answers on a moral maturity scale such as that proposed by Kohlberg.

The second issue concerns making inferences from how a person answers one kind of practical question to the general stage of moral development of that person. Of course, those who administer Kohlberg's questionnaires present individuals with more that one practical question before drawing conclusions about his or her moral stage. But each answer seems to be placed at one stage or another and then averaged with the others. This, however, assumes we can determine the moral stage of a particular answer independently of knowing that person's general moral perspective. In the case of Kohlberg's analysis of children in my group, it seems that the ascribed stage of moral development is determined by surface similarities to responses of other children whose stages have been determined. Of course, at some point comparisons must be made. But it is disturbing that Kohlberg could so quickly determine Penny's stage of moral reasoning by considering a single statement she made (while overlooking its connection with other statements that she and others make in the course of the conversation).

Furthermore, Kohlberg's analysis of the moral stages of the responses of the children in my group is based on a special kind of example--one which seems to be a bad fit for his theory. But if we concentrate on examples that seem to be a better fit, another problem arises. These examples, as we have seen, are examples of moral dilemmas. Kohlbergians must now make a crucial assumption--namely, that the way in which one reasons about moral dilemmas is representative of one's moral reasoning generally. But, given that much of our moral reasoning does not involve confronting dilemmas, this assumption seems questionable.

One more complicating factor bears mentioning. Kohlberg claims that "the formation of a mature sense of justice requires participation in just institutions." [4] From the standpoint of many minorities and women, at least, American institutions do not seem particularly just. No doubt Kohlberg would cite this as a partial explanation of why, on his account, so few people reason at stages 5 or 6. Suppose that large numbers of people who perceive American institutions to be treating them unjustly would give predominantly stage 1-4 answers to Kohlberg's questions. (This would be a largely speculative supposition.) It would seem to follow from Kohlberg's analysis that they would lack a mature sense of justice.

But is this right? Compare this conclusion with a remark made by John Rawls, whose Theory of Justice Kohlberg cites as an attempt to work out the implications of stage 6 reasoning:

> But it is also true that it is rational for each person to act on principles of justice only on the assumption that for the most part these principles are recognized and similarly acted upon by others. [5]

So, it would seem that, for Rawls, in a seriously unjust society it is rational (and morally unobjectionable) for at least some (the victims of injustice) to show partiality toward themselves or those with whom they have close ties, even when this might conflict with principles of justice suited for a more well-ordered society. Yet, Kohlberg takes Rawl's model of justice in a well-ordered, reasonably just society and applies it directly to our own. As the above quote indicates, Rawls himself is more careful, in that he restricts his discussion (even of the development of a sense of justice) to hypothetical societies that most would agree are clearly more just that our own.

What all of this indicates is that the actual circumstances in which moral judgments are made may make the application of Kohlberg's impersonal moral reasoning problemmatic. While Kohlberg concludes that anyone whose reasoning fails to fit his stages 5 or 6 lacks a mature sense of justice, a more careful investigation would seem to

require us to take into consideration the appropriateness of different types of reasoning in the various kinds of circumstances that typically arise in actual societies. Since Rawls does not address his theory of justice directly to this, his account seems to be misappropriated by Kohlberg. Does a judgment that shows partiality towards a group of which one is a member, and resentment toward and distrust of those outside of this group betray something less than a mature sense of justice? Seemingly, Kohlberg would say "yes." Rawls, I believe, would ask us to take a closer look before making a determination.

When we do take a closer look, it is likely that the moral landscape will appear much more unclear and problematic than Kohlberg's account suggests. Before concluding that a paucity of stage 5 and 6 responses indicates a lack of moral maturation, one must determine to what extent that paucity is a function of the appropriateness of other sorts of responses. It should be noted that if it is arguable that sorts of responses are sometimes appropriate, serious doubt is cast on the adequacy of Kohlberg's characterization of moral reasoning in terms of different stages. Instead, we might better talk about different types of reasoning that are appropriate or inappropriate for different kinds of situations. Taking this approach, those who are morally the most "mature" would be those who most consistently use appropriate types of reasoning in different types of situations calling for practical decisions. Insofar as we are in the dark about what is appropriate, we are bound to be uncertain about what constitutes moral maturity.

We may disagree about how much in the dark we are. I am not a pessimist here. But it seems to me that pointing everything in the direction of Kohlberg's stages 5 and 6, at least as they are commonly portrayed, leaves much of importance out of our understanding of the moral development of children--and, by implication, adults.

To this last thought, I add one more. I have asked myself what Penny, Carlen, Chip, Rick, and the others might have said about the Lisa passage that would elevate their reasoning to stage 5 or 6 for Kohlberg. I have no answer. This is not because I cannot imagine such mature thinking in 10-year-olds. It is that I cannot imagine what such mature thinking might be. Without suggesting that those 10-year-olds could have handled any moral problem thrown their way, it does seem to me that they handled the problems posed by the Lisa passage very well.

It might be argued that their thinking was too particularistic, that more highly developed moral reasoning must incorporate the idea of **universalizability** I agree that universalizability is an important feature of moral reasoning. But I understand this to require only that whatever is judged right or wrong in one case must be judged right or wrong in relevantly similar cases. However, I see no reason for thinking that the children in my group did not appreciate that requirement--even if their limited experiences might not suggest to them the variety of similar situations that would occur to adults. This is a requirement of **impartiality** in one's reasoning.

Kohlberg seems to confuse this requirement of impartiality with another kind of impartiality--one which precludes favoring friends and loved ones over strangers (the Heinz example). But all that the principle of universalizability requires is that the partiality one has for friends and loved ones be universalizable. That is, one must be willing to say that **anyone** in similar circumstances can justifiably be partial to his or her friends or loved ones. (Putting it somewhat perversely: One must be able impartially to advocate partiality. That we cannot always do this is clear--as is the fact that we sometimes can.)

Again, my main point is not that 10-year-olds are capable of stage 5 or 6 reasoning. In one sense, I suppose they are. But my main point is that stage 5 and 6 reasoning, as characterized by Kohlberg, is not all that it is cracked up to be. It does not capture all the significant kinds of moral thinking, and it needlessly classifies moral thinking that does not meet its criteria as less than fully adequate. I recommend reversing the charges and revising the criteria. I doubt very much that this will yield a different, more adequate, theory of moral stages. What, then, do I say about the moral thinking of my

group of 10-year-olds? "Good thinking. Let's do some more. What do you think about punishing someone who hasn't done anything wrong? How about someone who has done something wrong . . . ?"

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ENDNOTES


[1] This article was later published as Chapter IX of my book, Philosophical Adventures with Children (University Press of America, 1985). Page references will be to the book.

[2] Pritchard, M. S. (1984). Cognition and affect in moral development: A critique of Kohlberg. Journal of Value Inquiry, 18, 35-49.

[3] The title of Kohlberg's unpublished paper is, "On Philosophy for Children by Weinstein and Pritchard." The draft itself mentions only my "Reciprocity." However, Kohlberg and Weinstein had conversations about my article and relationships between IAPC's Philosophy for Children program and Kohlberg's work.

[4] Kohlberg, L. (1971). From is to ought: How to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get away with it in the study of moral development. In Theodore Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive Development and Epistemology (p. 193). New York: Academic.

[5] Rawls, J. (1972). A theory of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. p. 436.





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Age 12