TRAINING TEACHERS: AN EXPERIMENTATION IN PRIMARY SCHOOLS IN QUEBEC

My purpose in this presentation is mainly to describe an experimentation of teachers' training in philosophy for children within a project in moral education. This project is pursued by a group of researchers of the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies in Learning and Development at Université du Québec à Montreal (Centre interdisciplinaire de recherche sur l'apprentissage et le développement en education).

Before considering that specific experimentation, I will first give some information on the general context of moral education in Quebec schools and on the implementation of philosophy for children in that context. Continuing that background, I will give a description of the work done with teachers in the last two years; this description will illustrate an "anthropo-pedagogical" approach which requires that we modulate our interventions to take into account teachers' remarks and face up to the problematic issues that confronted us; this descriptive section will end on an "aperçu" of our actual project focused on the philosophical education of the teachers. Finally, I will conclude my presentation by a consideration of the need for a "modelization" or design of teacher training in philosophy for children.

1. Context of the experimentation

The present experimentation of teacher training in philosophy for children took place, as I have already mentioned, within a project in moral education. In this first section, I want to draw the general context of moral education in Quebec and to explain the reasons that led us to experiment philosophy for children in such a context.

1.1. Moral education in Quebec

People interested in the development of moral education in Quebec need to know that the concern for moral education is a relatively recent one, articulated to the evolution of the school system in a pluralistic society.

Due to historic factors, public schools in Quebec are established on a religious criterion, as Catholic or Protestant. In both systems, moral and religious instruction is compulsory but the features of this subject are radically different in each. The Protestant approach to moral and religious instruction is non-denominational; furthermore, as Protestant schools had welcomed since a long time non-protestant students – notably immigrants who chose the Anglo-protestant system rather than the Franco-catholic one –, the curriculum and the organization of moral and religious instruction take into account pluralistic situations. On the opposite side, moral and religious instruction in the Catholic system is articulated, at least officially, on the Roman Catholic Church doctrine and it is seen as part of the education in Catholic Faith.

Until two decades ago, Catholic schools were relatively homogeneous, regrouping almost all Francophones of Quebec. Then diversity emerged in a context of social evolution and new political choices. The new pluralistic context of the Catholic school required an alternative for those who wanted to be exempted from courses in religious instruction. Specific programs in moral instruction appeared to be that alternative. First prepared for the Catholic school-system in the middle of the seventies, programs in moral education are now intended for all public schools, either Catholic, Protestant or eventually neutral.

The development of these programs is still problematic. People in Protestant schools don't see the opportunity of a specific moral education program besides a pluralistic moral and religious instruction which is already open to alternative ways of learning. An interesting example is Judy Kyle's experiment who introduced philosophy for children in some schools of Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal, long before this was possible on the Catholic side. In Catholic schools, there is now an option between moral instruction and religious instruction; but moral instruction still remains, (except in certain districts of greater Montreal), the path of the minority, particularly the newer "Québécois".

Many discussions surround curriculum development and program implementation in moral education; most of the questions concern the basis of moral education, the importance of social values vs personal values, the form and the content of moral education, the child development aspects, the place of reason and emotion, the role of the teacher, etc. The debate is still open since a new program is in preparation for primary schools which must start a "new generation" of programs in moral instruction.

This socio-historic detour may appear unnecessary, but it will be, I hope, useful to understand some aspects of our experimentation and the particular problems we have met.

Our research unit deals with many issues mentioned. We are particularly concerned with primary schools, which had been somewhat neglected. We are
mostly preoccupied by a qualitative intervention in a reflective way for increasing students’ moral reasoning. Our framework therefore makes us sensitive to the approach of philosophy for children.

1.2 Philosophy for children and moral education

Philosophy for children, although it is not a moral education program, includes an important component on this matter, as ethical inquiry in a dialogical approach. As Ann Margaret Sharp says:

To stimulate children to think well, to improve their cognitive skills so they can reason well, and to engage them in a disciplined dialogue with one another so they can reason well together, to challenge them to think about important ethical and social concepts drawn from the philosophical tradition, and yet to develop their ability to think for themselves so they may think autonomously when actually confronted with moral problems – all of these are the aims of the ethical inquiry program in Philosophy for children. ( . . . )

Children not only have to come to understand the logical, metaphysical, social, aesthetic and epistemological aspects of the moral issues, but they need practice in discussing these moral issues within the framework of a community of inquiry. Such a community fosters practice in respecting and tolerating a diversity of views, committing oneself to logical procedures and respecting each other as rational reasoning persons.

This practice involves systematic exploration of moral issues that affect children’s lives.

These aspects of an ethical inquiry get in touch, in some respect, with the general orientations of moral education adopted by the Ministry of Education in 1985 as a basis for the new programs in moral instruction in Quebec. These orientations offer considerations on human condition, moral life, moral education and moral instruction. Morality is presented as a content with formal and dynamic aspects but it is mostly articulated to the moral life which is conceived as a reflective process. Moral education, then, is about the learning of this reflective process conducive to moral decision and action, and to the comprehension of one’s own life in the world. For this, moral instruction must be structured upon four principal components:

- conceptualization of morality, which means learning about concepts in ethics and practicing skills for ethical reasoning and moral judgement;
- motivation to moral decision and moral action;
- consideration of moral experience by discussion of moral problematic situations of children’s lives and evaluation of the moral standards of different ethical theories;
- valuing of ethical criteria linked to autonomy, solidarity and finding of find meaning in experience.

Beyond these considerations, operationalization on the field of the classroom asks also for clarifications about pedagogy (methods, procedures, materials), role of the teacher and, on a more generic aspect, what approach the teacher will favor.

Our research group started an experimentation in 1981 on approaches in moral education. Our main interest was to measure the effects of different approaches on students’ moral reasoning. We started with the three main approaches that inspired the people responsible at the Ministry Education for the preparation of the first version of moral education programs; the cognitive-developmental approach, the value clarification approach and the rational utilitarian approach of John Wilson. Within this project, Dr. Anita Caron, who leads with Dr. Michael Schleifer our research unit, proposed to introduce the program of philosophy for children. She started in 1982 a limited experimentation of Harry in a few classrooms of the Montreal Catholic School Board.

Data of this research demonstrated that the approach by itself is not a determinator factor in moral education. These data oriented us to take into account teacher training and to check out the link between logic and moral reasoning. For this, we focused since 1985 on the experimentation of philosophy for children.

2. Description of the experimentation

I shall now concentrate on that experimentation. I will first briefly present the main characteristics of the milieu in which we work. Then I will discuss some methodological aspects with regard to the approach of teacher training and I will continue by presenting the experimentation itself.

2.1 The milieu of the experimentation

For local reasons, because of the structure of moral education, we were not able to pursue the experimentation started by Dr. Caron with teachers of the Montreal Catholic School Board. So we started a new project with teachers of Sault-Saint-Louis School Board in the west island of Montreal, where I had been a consultant.

Part of these teachers are regular classroom teachers; they are exempted from religious instruction in their own classroom and responsible for a moral instruction class. Other teachers are specifically hired
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for moral instruction in several schools. In addition to this group, some individuals joined us; a teacher of 4th grade regular classroom, two teachers of moral education in other school boards and a masters' student who experimented philosophy for children in a combined 3rd-4th grades classroom.

Moral instruction classrooms are not regular degree classrooms. Due to the option system between religious instruction and moral instruction, the number of children registered in moral education varies from school to school. In some schools, there is only one group of children, 6 to 12 of age; most of the time schools have two groups, one for the 6-8 years old and one for the 9-11 years old; sometimes, in big schools, we find three groups (6-7, 8-9, 10-11); and it is exceptionally that we can work with an homogeneous age group. All these categories were present in our experimentation.

Part of these teachers had been previously engaged in a project in moral education; they had experimented pedagogical material inspired from John Wilson's theoretical perspective and a few also participated in the elaboration of this material. I had been consultant still at that time.

2.2. An "anthropo-pedagogical" approach of training

Using philosophy for children necessitates special teacher training. For this, the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for children offers several formulas, from intensive workshop to school in-service program, which give opportunity to experience a community of philosophical inquiry. None of these formulas was possible in our context because of the lack of availability of the teachers. Our first problem, then, was to set up the requirements of training, as proposed by IAPC, and the field conditions we find in the school board. In addition, we had to take into account the relative levels of previous experience of teachers in moral education.

Also we have to say that, although our project engaged all teachers of moral education in the school board (14 teachers and one pedagogical counselor) and the project was globally accepted by the whole "team", it is hazardous to say that each one was deeply and voluntarily involved.

On that background, we suggested a formula where training in philosophy for children and evaluation of experimentation must alternate. For the first year, we obtained from the school board ten days through the year; for the second year, only five days were given.

The model used has for its purpose to create a community of inquiry where teachers "do" philosophy for themselves in experiencing the main features of the methodology suggested in philosophy for children.

After this, teachers must be able to convert their own classrooms into communities of inquiry as a way for non-dogmatic moral education. Evaluation sessions on their part must offer the opportunity to look back to experiences in classrooms. The interaction between the two aspects must have an impact on the model of training itself, in a sense of optimization.

This approach to training is related to a research in education dealing with "opensystems": Dr. Andre Morin, from Universite de Montreal, suggests for the evaluation of "opensystem" in education an approach that he calls "anthropo-pedagogy". This approach tries to understand the global aspects of a pedagogical model (here the training session) in a way to increase its effect; in the long term, his purpose concerns the construction of a "practical knowledge" that may be generalized in some respect.

Dr. Morin proposes four principles for the efficiency of "anthropo-pedagogy". First, the person responsible for the research must be in a state of questioning rather than verification. Second, the researcher must go beyond mere observation, even beyond a "participating" observation; he has to immerse himself in the process to be able to construct his own judgement with people of the milieu engaged in the research. Thirdly, the research must be conceived as a research of "meanings" for understanding what goes on in an educational milieu. Finally, as the researcher is himself implied in the research, he has to use a variety of instruments for collecting data. These principles suggest trends in the perspective of a "modelization" of teacher training in philosophy for children, a subject on which I shall come back to later on.

2.3. The training sessions

2.3.1. 1985-1986

As starting experimentation in classrooms, we suggested the use of Pixie for two reasons. The first reason is practical: Pixie is the only novel edited in a French-canadian translation, it is also the only one for which we have the entire instructional manual in French. The second reason has to do with the philosophy for children curriculum: Pixie can be seen as a kind of "preparation" for Harry Stottlemeyer's Discovery; using Pixie may prepare children for Harry but with a certain risk of losing interest for older children who may have difficulty in identifying with Pixie.

The initial project in 1985-1986 was to have three sessions of a two days workshop on Pixie to cover all the novel; four additional days were provided for evaluation of experimentation with students in the classrooms. The original planning was the following:
September: Workshop on Pixie, chap. 1-4 (2 days)

November: Evaluation session (1 day)

January: Workshop on Pixie, chap. 5-8 (2 days)

March: Evaluation session (1 day)

April: Workshop on Pixie, chap. 9-11 (2 days)

June: Evaluation session (2 days at the very end of the school year).

We, finally, worked with the teachers nine days, the later evaluation session being reduced to one day instead of two. But we weren’t able to follow the initial project. By April, only five chapters of Pixie had been covered and evaluation sessions had taken more place than initially planned. The main reason for this “overrunning” of evaluation on workshop is that the two directors of teacher training were not able, by lack of time, to do modeling and observation in the classrooms; only a few teachers received a very little supervision. So exchanges on what was going on in the classroom took, for a time, precedence over workshop on philosophical material.

The difficulty to cover the novel in its entirety may also derive from the material itself and the methodological components. Recreating with teachers what they will experience with children takes time. We are somewhat “hung up” between a systematic experience of the methodology (reading, idea selection, discussion), our desire to cover all the novel, and the importance of experiencing sound philosophical discussions. In a two-day workshop, that comes back from time to time all through the year, it seems that we always start from the same point, having difficulty to engage rapidly in philosophical discussions. But I also noticed that we meet with similar problems in intensive sessions where, most of the time, we are only able to devote an hour or an hour and a half to each chapter of a novel, This still constitutes for me a problematic aspect of teacher training.

Getting back to our experimentation in 1985-1986, I can say that implementation problems were discovered as soon as we had the first evaluation session in November. Most of these problems were linked with the “management” of the classroom in philosophy for children: difficulties in reading (ages, “allophones”, learning-disabilities), difficulties in creating a community of inquiry, difficulty for many children to enter into a questioning perspective, difficulty for the teacher to relate the ideas chosen by children to the ideas presented in the instructional manual and to guide the discussion from a philosophical point of view.

Some of these problems appeared to be irremediable (like constitution of groups) where others found their solution by themselves throughout the year (like children’s questioning attitude, children’s respect for others’ points of view, etc.). Michel Sasseville, who co-directed the session with me, started the preparation of a synthesis of the instructional manual with the purpose of facilitating its use for the teachers.

Problems of guiding a philosophical discussion in the classroom reappeared in our January session with more acuity. Some of the teachers talked about “teaching Pixie” in a relatively structured approach rather than “doing philosophy” with children. So we started the workshop (on the first part of chapter 4) with the opportunity of “stepping out” of the discussion to foster on “methodological” aspects. This possibility was used by teachers who wanted some immediate “on the spot” elucidations in regard of guiding a philosophical discussion. But this seemed not to be enough for others: they said that they were having a profound problem of “transferability” on the one hand, they were saying that they were really enjoying the possibility of participating in a philosophical discussion (at that time we had discussed subjects as “body and mind”, “right and wrong”, “reasons to do things – good reasons”); but on the other hand, this was almost useless to face the kind of questions children propose.

This major problem of “transferability” to the classroom was brought by a teacher within the discussion of chapter 4, episode 4, when Pixie goes around the house, crying after the cat. First, she proposed as a question for discussion: “What is the color of the cat?” The teacher who was guiding the discussion at that time said that her question was not a philosophical matter. “Yes”, said the first one, “I know, I can ask another question, if you want”. And she said: “Can we draw the cat? I want to make a colorful drawing of the cat. I love cats so much!” And in the silence that followed her second question, she simply added: “That’s the kind of question children of my group are suggesting; how can I do philosophy with this?”.

At that moment, I proposed to the group to collectively consider the problem: what to do when the two or three questions suggested by children are of that kind? The “pedagogical” inquiry that we started there was really, I think, helpful. Most of the teachers of the group suggested paths to get on with the problem: going back to the story to check out if the color of the cat has something to do with our understanding of Pixie’s story; asking why she, as a child, loves cats so much; looking for reasons to love cats, etc. Many of those suggestions had to do with strategies of dialogue suggested for guiding a philosophical discussion. The “self-appropriation” by the group (may be I can say the “community of inquiry”)...
of these strategies had a positive effect on the continuation of the experimentation.

To maintain such “pedagogical” inquiry (although I am not so sure that they are strictly “pedagogical”) we decided to use a kind of “model” for our future workshops:

- reading of a chapter (or part)
- idea selection
- philosophical discussion
- 1st conducted discussion
- 2nd introducing exercises
- overview of the main ideas presented in the instructional manual
- “transfer” exercise: “from here to the classroom”
- 1st ideas that children may propose
- 2nd elements of lesson-plan for these ideas
- 3rd links between the ideas, philosophy for children and moral education

This model, as you see, ends with a consideration upon suggested ideas, the aims and methods of philosophy for children, and its contribution to moral education. The discussions held in this January session pointed out that teachers were not sure that working with Pixie constitutes a way of doing moral education, although they previously had a brief presentation on ethical inquiry in philosophy for children and had received a text on the subject. Through that session then, we were confronted with problems of different levels which have in common the teachers’ understanding of philosophy for children in a comprehensive way.

This situation may depend on many factors. One of those is relative to the absence of French literature in philosophy for children. When people are introduced to philosophy for children, through intensive workshops or in-service training, they are invited to consult different texts on the program, its aims, methods, perspectives with regard to critical thinking, etc. There is nothing like this in French: we have to translate and to prepare articles, text-books, etc.; and all this is a long term project.

At that time, it seemed to us that we had to give an overview on philosophy for children articulated to teachers’ questions. This was done the next session in March, where we focused on thinking skills as tools for understanding one’s own experience; we also gave specific attention to the moral domain.

This session was also an occasion to observe that teachers began to be more comfortable with philosophy for children: the integration was on its way, even if a number still deeply felt the gap between philosophy for children and their usual approach to moral education. At that time, past experience in moral education seemed to be an obstacle in the implementation of philosophy for children, particularly for those who had participated in the elaboration of pedagogical material after discussion of theoretical perspectives. But now, I would say that those teachers are the “most” engaged in our experimentation, as if they first needed time to confront different perspectives on the practical field of their classroom before getting really involved. For this, new dimensions had been added in our experimentation in 1986-1987.

Before getting onto this, I would simply recall, to conclude on our first year experimentation, that the lack of coaching constrained us to give more time to evaluation than initially provided. However it may be interesting to notice that the introduction of a pedagogical step in our workshop process has made the sessions less strained: teachers, who had doubts on the feasibility of philosophy with children, knew that there was a time to discuss such matters; they were, then, more available to join the philosophical discussion at their own level and, therefore, to contribute to the construction of a community of inquiry. At the end of this first year, although experience with children in the classroom was widely different from one teacher to another, teachers were slightly surprised how most of the children “get into” the dialogue, developing their thinking skills and their communication capacities.

2.3.2. 1986-1987

The experimentation in 1986-1987 started really slowly. We had difficulty to fix up a sequence of sessions: only five days, with one in the last days of June, were given to hold sessions and it was impossible to start before November. The three other days were distributed into three sessions of two consecutive half-days (A.M.) in January, March and April.

In this second year of experimentation, we proposed to introduce Harry Stottlemair’s Discovery with the older children. We also suggested to take Harry for the workshop, knowing that this novel constitutes the core of the curriculum in philosophy for children. We expected that initiation into Harry would increase teachers’ understanding of philosophical inquiry with children.

In the classrooms, teachers did not start philosophy for children before our first session in November.
Meanwhile, most of them gave attention to the subject of peace, for which all schools in Quebec were sensitized for the “Year of Peace”.

Marie-France Daniel, who was a master’s student in philosophy for children at Montclair, joined me for the workshops in replacement of Michel Sasseville who was not able to pursue in 1986-1987. Our first session was very interesting from a philosophical point of view for chapter 1 and chapter 2 of Harry. Unfortunately, problems surged very quickly with some teachers and administrators. We proposed to add new dimensions in our training model: observation in the classroom, modeling and video recordings in addition to testing children with pre- and post-tests that we already had used the year before. Setting up everything took, as always, more time than provided. Moreover, I have to admit that we took things for granted when nothing is sure in educational research.

So, for our next session, we needed to take a break-off in our project of workshop on Harry. A global portrait of the experimentation was then drawn up.

This portrait pointed out firstly things that we already knew: implementing philosophy for children requires minimal conditions in order to be able to experience a community of inquiry. In that sense, some teachers had radically different conditions from the year before and this had an impact on their impact in the experimentation. Furthermore, in the discussion, teachers became aware of the impact of their own impact on students’ interests and motivation: a lack of motivation on the teacher’s side produces, most of the time, an absence of interest on the students’ side. Some of the teachers said that the approach of philosophy for children was a source of monotony for students when others said that the approach, on the contrary, invited the teacher to introduce several sources and activities related to students’ interests. These positions on students’ interests revealed finally, teachers’ motivation and teachers’ understanding in regard to philosophy for children.

The dialogue took then a kind of “functionalist” direction: teachers asked themselves why they were engaged in moral education and what were the aims of this education. They compared the way of doing philosophy for children with ways of doing moral education. They noted their commitment to a reflective process. The conclusion of this session was that teachers needed for themselves a “reappropriation” of the aims of moral education; they wanted to take time to do this in order to be more deeply engaged in the experimentation of philosophy for children. They also asked for “philosophical landmarks” articulated to the main ideas of the instructional manuals they already had.

The two remaining sessions were used to meet with the first demand: one session focussed on the general orientations of moral education in Quebec; the other one applied these general perspectives to philosophy for children through discussion of chapter 3 of Harry. In this last session, I proposed, as an exercise, following the reading, that each one pointed out, as much as possible, ideas related to the moral domain. And each time someone suggested an idea, I asked the group “How does this idea relate to the moral domain?” This exercise was an occasion to identify ideas of the moral domain that we can draw from the philosophy for children material; but it was also an occasion to consider comprehensively that “Moral Education cannot be divorced from Philosophical Education” and that Ethics need to be situated in its “interrelationship” with other philosophical fields (logic, epistemology, aesthetics, etc.).

Aware of the “pedagogical” demand of the teachers. I proposed to them, for ending our session, to prepare a lesson-plan on one of the ideas. And then a surprising thing happened. Teachers told me: “We are not able to prepare a lesson-plan on any of these ideas. What we need now is to reflect upon one, to think by ourselves on issues related to this idea.” So we were back, by experience, after a long detour, to one main conviction of philosophy for children in regard to teacher training: the participation in a community of inquiry for experiencing “firsthand the power of dialogue in stimulating thought.”

Our 1986-1987 experimentation gave us also the opportunity to convince ourself in regard of another major aspect of teacher training: the importance of coaching. With our limited means, we have experienced coaching with two teachers: one received feedback based on observations in the classroom; the other one had modeling in addition to the feedback consecutive to observations.

Observations in classrooms showed us that the factor of teacher’s motivation is finally preeminent over all other factors or conditions in implementing philosophy for children. This aspect is puzzling for teacher trainers: How can we motivate teachers who are reluctant to enter into a reflective process with students? Do we have to look for some kind of prerequisites on the teachers’ side before inviting them to experiment philosophy for children or can we think that any teacher, with help, is able to succeed in the program?

Our experience of two formulas of coaching (feedback consecutive to observations and “modeling” in addition to observations) invites us to assess the effects of those formulas on teachers’ commitment to philosophical inquiry. Which formula is the most effective with regard to the quality of the philosophical inquiry in the classroom and to the children’s
reasoning skills. This is one of the aspects we want to consider this present year.

Globally, our perspective is to focus on the philosophical education of teachers. For this we want to examine different elements in the training process: use and effect of videos, planning of intervention of coaches with teachers in the classrooms, profile of an “art” of coaching, etc. All this needs more experimentation and confrontation with other experiments in teacher training in the purpose of “modelizing” teachers training in philosophy for children. And this is the idea on which I want to conclude.

3. Conclusion: The need for “modelization” of “teacher education”

Philosophy in the Classroom, in its very first chapter, proposes a reflection on “the Need for Educational Redesign”. Logically, I think, we also need a redesign of teacher training. Experimentations in teacher training in philosophy for children must be a fundamental contribution to this redesign.

Personally, although I know that the expression “teacher training” is the usual one, I am a bit uncomfortable with it; for me, “training” connotes an idea of teaching in a way to “conform” to a specific model; in that sense, “training” is the opposite of “educating”, which connotes the idea of guiding with respect for the autonomy of the subject of education. In a way, there is a place for “training” in teacher preparation when it regards to “technical” skills; but this training must be completed by a comprehensive “education” which focuses on thinking and thinking critically.

In implementing philosophy for children, both in classrooms and in teachers’ sessions, we are trying to accentuate a reflective practice of teaching that emphasizes thinking. In that sense, philosophy constitutes a way for the emergence of a reflective practice in teaching. As Ann Margaret Sharp says:

> If philosophy could be organized and sequenced, that is reconstructed, in such a way that it could be taught to prospective teachers in the same way that they could present it to children, both teachers and students could come to cultivate:

(a) reasoning skills (such as classification, detecting underlying assumptions)
(b) logical skills (such as conversion and contradiction)
(c) inquiry skills (such as description, explanation, problem and hypothesis formation)

(d) concept formation skills (trying to identify what lies within and outside a concept such as justice or truth)
(e) translation skills (practice with standardization)
(f) social and interpersonal skills (such as building on one another’s ideas).

But she also adds:

> It takes times to learn the process of co-inquiry with regard to philosophical matters. It doesn’t happen in one year. And it takes practice with one’s peers. Further, if the preparation is complete, one would not only produce a good philosophy for children teacher, but a teacher who is capable of teaching all the elementary school disciplines in a reflective and philosophical manner, using the community of inquiry approach throughout the entire day.

The central aspect of this “education” is the participation in a community of inquiry. This way of doing is unfamiliar to most people related to education. Practitioners and consultants in philosophy for children need, then, to “modelize” or “design” their practice in a way to promote a “reflective practice” of teaching.

In a more general context, Donald A. Schon, who is interested in professional effectiveness, speaks about a “reflective practitioner” and is concerned with the problematic of “educating the reflective practitioner” for a “new design for teaching and learning in the professions”.

An interesting parallel can be made between Schon’s perspectives and those that profile in philosophy for children workshops. In both perspectives, intervention is conceived as an “art” rather than a technique, “learning” is primarily connected to “doing”; reflective process is experimented as “reflection-in-action”; education of practitioners is a matter of “coaching” rather than “teaching”.

I don’t want to continue extending these parallelisms. I only want to point out, with this example, that there are trends in which we can engage to “modelize” our experimentations in “teacher education” in philosophy for children. The design that may emerge from this “modelization” must be useful not only for trainers in philosophy for children but for all educators who are concerned with a reflective practice.

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Footnotes

7. SHARP, Ann Margaret op. cit., p. 4.
8. Ibid.