

Philosophy in Red, Philosophy in Purple:

Lebenswelt given, Weltanschauung Achieved,

Lifeworld Contra Worldview

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Light, energy, and color are corporate players in a dynamic drama, an integrated presence easily taken for granted and universally experienced. The use of color is itself a common diagnostic and therapeutic aspect of alternative forms of medicine. In both traditional Chinese and Ayurvedic medicine reference is made to human “chakras” that are believed to represent positions, or regions of energy and life force associated with the human body. Ayurveda, in particular, is a concept from the ancient Sanskrit and has been practiced in India for thousands of years. The word “chakra” is also from the ancient Sanskrit language and refers to specific energy fields that are represented by designated, specific colors that are in turn themselves associated with certain centers of energy in the body. The color red, for example, is connected with the root or base chakra said to be located at the base of the spine. It is the lowest of the chakras and refers to one’s grounding and rooted stability in this life. Its element is earth. The highest of the chakras is referred to as the crown chakra and is thought to be associated with the crown of the head. Its element is thought, and its color is purple. In this paper I will refer to these colors as metaphors for interdependent but nevertheless contrasting aspects of human experience-lifeworld and worldview. Philosophy in red will be presented as the lifeworld or Lebenswelt. It refers to the pre- and unconscious factors and experiences that ground or anchor human individuals and communities in physical and historical-cultural lifeworlds for which they have no reflective or chosen responsibility. Philosophy in purple will in turn refer to worldview as Weltanschauung and represents the human capacity for the work of ontology through reflective practices that are self aware and open to inquiry. These forces (red and purple) serve to complement and support one another in a healthy individual and society. A community that permits and encourages inquiry and growth in its members as self reflective individuals who share in sense and meaning making activities that can make a difference, provides a nurturing stability and sense of identity characteristic of the red zone out of which the purplizing process of authentic philosophic dialogue and wonder can be experienced.

Consider the possibility of a world in which relatively few people are encouraged to think reflectively and for themselves about matters of importance. The hermeneutic circle is managed and tight. Meaningful dialogue and inquiry into the warrant and implications of what has been learned is lacking and discouraged. The last thing teachers and handlers want for others is that they should engage the purple and think for themselves. In such a world one must focus on and cope with the red alone, with what is given, for little energy will be expended in helping to nurture minds that are able to formulate transformative and reasoned accounts of their own perspectives on the world and their place in it. The lifeworld, that is, the red world, would dominate personal awareness and mute the capacity of individuals to develop and achieve a unique sense of self as a cogent, creative, and transforming presence with a worldview that gives voice to an informed account of personal beliefs. Though capable of living in the purple zone, individuals would be hindered in their ability to develop a personal worldview or to uncover the worldview assumptions of those most responsible for transmitting cultural norms and values.

The claim of this essay is that the experience of worldview as purple is not to be conflated with a view-of-the-world which is primarily controlled by the red. Worldview must be distinguished from the concept of lifeworld in order to signify an appropriate differentiation of key aspects of human capacity and experience. As understood here, one’s “purple zone” is an “inner place” where Weltanschauung or worldview can be developed. It expresses a personal account or interpretation of life’s ultimate experience and meaning. It is an achieved and existential phenomenon. In contrast, one’s red zone is a lifeworld or Lebenswelt that emphasizes those dimensions and ex-

periences for which the individual has no conscious responsibility as an informed and self-expressing agent. The “red zone” represents a given, structural phenomenon of experience and includes one’s biological and cultural heritage as well as the overall historical situation in which one is brought up and comes to conscious awareness. In that sense it is neither reflective nor moral in particular. In contrast, worldview or philosophy in purple, is a rational expression of Dasein’s reflective capacity for wonder about common and ultimate human concerns and for interpreting the meaning and moral implications of human being. It is not entirely limited to or constrained by the lifeworld itself. Worldview as philosophy in purple, is achieved, and though it is to some degree a dynamic phenomenon that is open to maturation and change, it is more resistant to the relativism implicit in the situational and unreflective givenness of the lifeworld as philosophy in red.

Assertions about the right kind of life to live are often based on hidden presuppositions and unacknowledged worldview positions. The ongoing development of worldview in each individual is an exercise in the element of thought and a practice that attempts to uncover the foundations or bottom-line beliefs that serve as ultimate justification for philosophical and metaphysical claims. This is a process of understanding that acknowledges worldview capacity as a given aspect of human *Lebenswelt* experience. That is, the capacity for doing philosophy in purple is a part of Dasein’s fallenness and givenness in this existing world as we come to conscious experience and understanding (Heidegger, 1962). *Lebenswelt* does serve in part to establish a sense of personal identity in this world. It represents a description of a given view-of-the-world that is dated and local. By this one recognizes that at any given point in time there exists a unique and personal horizon; however, that fact is not sufficient to explain the transformative power of human inquiry, wonder, and imagination that is at times called on to transcend the merely provincial or given aspects of experience.

Yes, we must take into account the influential but unseen components of philosophy in red. The lifeworld of any individual or community is found in the presence of powerful though unconscious and tenacious tendencies. Personal preferences and feelings, and unreflective, unchallenged generalizations may have never been critically examined or articulated. In *Lebenswelt* the emphasis is on cultural, environmental, and experiential factors that predispose individuals to feel and act in certain ways. Such a “worldview” as a view-of-the-world is seen in mannerisms, attitudes, and expectations that arise from the historical and cultural context that serve to form one’s lifeworld or *Lebenswelt* (Habermas, 1987; Schutz and Luckmann, 1973). It is in that sense perspectival, provincial, communal, and local. Schutz and Luckmann (1973) call this “the everyday life-world [that is] the reality which the wide-awake and normal adult simply takes for granted in the attitude of common sense” (p. 3). It is a part of “the biographical situation” (Schutz, 1970, p. 167) and the “historically affected consciousness” (Gadamer, 1999) that must be considered in the process of developing a hermeneutical understanding of one’s view-of-the-world as *Lebenswelt*, a lived-in-the-world experience. This red zone encompasses many factors, including one’s genetic heritage, family of origin, personality, and the demands, opportunities, and contingencies of human embodiment and maturation, all of which play a crucial role in affecting how one sees the world and serve to define one’s “situation”.

Lebenswelt, as a red phenomenon to be distinguished from the purple zone of *Weltanschauung*, encompasses what Heidegger (1962) referred to as the fallenness, the unsolicited givenness and facticity of Dasein’s experience. It describes a condition of passiveness regarding the initial conditions under which emergent persons move toward a mature consciousness and begin to come to grips with their own capacity for understanding and change. To remain unthinkingly in this givenness and the historicity of one’s lifeworld suggests the priority and dominance of relativism with regard to philosophy and a possible worldview. But the work of philosophy and of education, regardless of any prior connection to religious and/or secular themes, should seek to transcend mere enculturation, socialization, and conformity to popular modes of thought and being. This “reaching beyond” is made possible through a kind of communicative action suggested by Habermas (1975) in which philosophy in purple can be practiced in an “ideal speech situation” that provides the space for legitimate and open dialogue that appeals to common sense universals of human rational and moral thought and to reasons and standards of reasonableness that serve to both legitimize and transform existent and worthy lifeworlds.

The openness of this kind of dialogue, characterized by mutuality and reciprocity, makes possible the formulation of a reasonable account of how one comes to answer significant human questions of belief (Jensen, 1997, p. 326). As an account, one’s worldview as *Weltanschauung* becomes a personal narrative based on intellectual and emotional commitments that are not pre-given, as it were, but arrived at through a process of examination

and reflection. It is an articulation of one's reasons for interpreting the meaning of the world and his or her experience in it in a certain way. Worldview in purple as *Weltanschauung* thus has a strong cognitive and epistemological dimension that becomes an explanation or warrant for beliefs that emerge as worldview is developed and refined over time. The human experience of that freedom is expressed as an integral part of the process of choosing a worldview that is compatible with an individual's inner commitments, values, and desires. Such a *Weltanschauung* is amenable to education and change because it transcends the fatalism and passivity inherent in radical determinism. Philosophy in purple reveals and emphasizes our ontological and existential capacity as human persons to both discover and to some degree choose our selves and our obligations. It recognizes a possibility in change and growth that drives the motives, intentions, and beliefs of individual persons. It is open to the rational and intuitive critique and appeal of a deeply seated reasonableness that seeks common bond with others and makes living together in a free and diverse culture possible.

An examination of the following table will help to clarify how I am distinguishing the ideas of lifeworld and worldview in an attempt to understand these as separate aspects of our experience; they are related but distinct phenomena. First, consider elements of the lifeworld (red) over which individuals and communities have little or no control as agents in their own right. These aspects of the lifeworld are moorings that hold individuals to a particular historical and cultural situation. They speak to that part of our experience in which we have been "born to others" (Lyotard, 1992). Secondly, regard worldview (purple), as a phenomenon and an aspect of human agency and experience that is to some degree a reflection of human choice and freedom. The phenomena included in that worldview column comprise an existential obligation of our experience for which we cannot excuse ourselves because of the choices and actions of others.

The Lifeworld Differentiated from a Worldview

LIFEWORLD EMPHASIS (RED) (Lebenswelt)	WORLDVIEW EMPHASIS (PURPLE) (Weltanschauung)
precognitive, affective, unconscious amenable to causes, structural sedimentation of previous experience discourse pregiven	cognitive, conscious, accessible amenable to reasons, existential a process of communicative discourse
language as a primary discourse	interpretation, meaning contemplative, reflective philosophy as a secondary discourse
embodiment as facticity and givenness body image temporal aspects, personal health, gender, age, personality	embodiment as alterity and discourse
descriptive family of origin, birth order, culture, norms and mores socioeconomic status era in history of world history of nation physical laws of the world geography	prescriptive, prophetic, eschatological
taken for granted, tacit empirical, inductive religion as received science, education as received given, found	noticed, developed faith, deductive religion as personally embraced education as reflection achieved, constructed

particular, perspectival

universal, metaphysical

This proposed differentiation of the lifeworld from the worldview is an attempt to both recognize and understand why philosophers and we as common men and women think as we do in terms of claimed values and assertions, especially about matters that concern ultimate issues and that seek to justify desirable moral parameters for a life that is worth living. Despite the power, richness, and density of the lifeworld experience, it need not and should not, I am claiming, control perception and discourse in such a way as to, of necessity, preclude or close off the possibility of rational discourse and a reasoned consideration of common human concerns as a manifestation of human freedom and as an expression of those capacities that differentiate us from the world of instinct and reflex. The worldview itself can be seen in some sense to inhabit the lifeworld much as Vatican City inhabits Rome; it is the ecclesiastical core that energizes a unity of belief and conviction among peoples with widely varying lifeworlds. And it is the practice of philosophy in purple that engages the ontological, creative, and transformative power of philosophy in purple that in turn engages Dasein's possibility as a rational and self-reflective being. This practice acts on the desirability of seeking personal insight and meaning as normative and fulfilling aspects of human experience. It is in the purple zone, through inquiry, reflection, and an informed desire for refinement and self-correction that we find an appeal to common human questions and universal understandings. It is there that philosophy and worldview become *Weltanschauung* and are pushed toward a more global and articulated interpretation of human meaning and experience. Philosophy in purple as *Weltanschauung*, reflects Dasein's capacity and proclivity to develop a subjective, personal account that is less bound by the merely provincial aspects of experience. Worldview in this case interprets meaning in response to life experiences, study, contemplation, and dialogue in a way that is by nature more amenable to articulation through the giving of reasons that can provide a public warrant for others to examine.

This purplized account is a process that involves maturation, enlightenment, and emancipation. By it we as individuals discover something personal about ourselves, that we are not and should not be merely and inflexibly bound by the strictures that others and their situation have put upon us, and that we do in turn have an obligation to the purple as an aspect of our calling to the examined life. We can transcend and reform habits of thought through dialogue and reflection. And we can likewise discover the roots and foundational claims that serve to support the philosophical assertions of our culture's teachers and prophets. Such rational and comprehensive interpretations about experience and the world represent "truth and rightness claims" and "universal validity claims" that "can be tested in discourse" (Habermas, 1984, p. 42). And it is in the purple zone that philosophy can enable one to "rise above" his or her particular and historical view-of-the-world (Welty, 2001, p. 225). "Historically effected consciousness [is] consciousness that can rise above that of which it is conscious" (Gadamer, 1999, p. 341), and it is this sense of rising above or transcending the givenness of one's experience that relates to the more comprehensive idea of philosophy in purple and worldview as *Weltanschauung* discussed here. It allows one to connect with the more universal claims suggested by Habermas in order to view experience from categories that transcend the "local knowledge" (Geertz, 1983) of a community that is located within the horizon of the lifeworld of a specific group or culture. It is an understanding of human capacity, experience, and awareness that works against the more extreme personalism and relativism suggested by Rorty (1982), when he eschews Philosophy and suggests that any search for Truth and Meaning represents a misguided attempt to reach beyond an inescapably provincial and time-bound set of criteria for human value and purpose.

In contrast, my claim is that there is an inescapable and human capacity for thought and awareness that binds human kind together and makes us amenable to the discovery and affirmation of universally acclaimed values that obligate us and make possible the growth and nurture of human being. Doing philosophy in purple is not, then, mere conversation, nor is it a merely individualistic practice. Its success implies the need for a community of inquiry in which the work of philosophy is not claimed or felt to be inflexibly bounded or hindered by the various and local lifeworlds of the participants involved.

The emphasis on open dialogue, reasoned interpretation, and personal response in terms of belief and commitment reflects the Socratic ideal of Truth-seeking and the expectation of the efficacy of pursuing a life examined through the patient and persistent rigor of inquiry. Socrates emphasizes the importance of the examined life and suggests that we shall become better persons for having inquired into the nature of virtue and of a just life. But he does not seem to imply that such a search, though personally useful and expedient, is essentially vacuous or misguided in terms of the larger reality. Rather, he seems to assume a morally and politically

charged stance regarding human nature and value that transcends the sophistic emphasis of his contemporaries. Philosophy in purple likewise values our proclivity for reflection and maturation in thinking, and believes that the development of an empathetic and insightful regard for the thoughts of others is among the desired ends of education in a society that values personal development in this way. We recognize and accept the desirability and importance for individuals to think and decide for themselves when faced with issues of morality and that relate to human destiny and significance in this world. Such aims require a loosening or widening of the hermeneutic circle. Provision must be made for the practice of inquiry and the development of character as a reflective and willing response to issues of importance in a way that helps to refine and transform local knowledge and experience, casting them in more universally applicable terms.

It is my belief that until individuals have practiced working through and articulating their own responses to the relevant and important issues that engage our deepest interests and that address common and ultimate human purposes, and until they have begun to develop a warranted and reasoned account for believing as they do, their habits of thought will tend to be a mere reflection of the particular red zone or *Lebenswelt* in which they find themselves. Further, to experience the refinement made possible by the common human capacity for rational thought and the emotional harmony required for the personal understanding and commitment that are a part of *Weltanschauung*, one must be involved in a process of inquiry that encourages self-reflection and understanding, an empathetic regard for others, and a clear articulation as to why some beliefs are better warranted than others and thus more worthy of commitment in terms of explanation, evidence, experience, and eventual effect.

This assertion is itself recognized as an aspect of a purplized and mindfully developed *Weltanschauung* that interprets human life and meaning in a way that values the idea that human individuals exist in some sense for and unto themselves, and that authentic moral behavior transcends a habitual reflex to the dogma and constraint of one's lifeworld. Too great an emphasis on lifeworld conditions to create habits of thought without inquiry and justification moves individuals in the direction of indoctrination and the taken-for-granted. This moves them away from the freedom and personal meaning inherent in a chosen worldview, and leaves them hindered in personal intellectual and moral growth, thus depriving both them and the community of which they are a part of the creative impulses and insights that bring revitalization and reformation when they are needed. Luther, Lincoln, Gandhi, and Martin Luther King are examples of individuals whose worldview convictions successfully confronted established lifeworld patterns and structures by appealing to universal and timeless principles. The red zones of their respective societies were not, in the end, able to sustain a rationale for their own immobile and selectively privileged aspects of culture.

Thus, the claim that there exists a noteworthy differentiation between philosophy in red and philosophy in purple becomes significant as we attempt to distinguish the status of those beliefs and values that are a part of the taken-for-granted and inherited answers to questions of ultimate human concern, from the status of those beliefs and values for which a reflective and warranted basis has been worked out. In this we recognize and accept the importance and worth of individual human experience and also our rational capacity for the kind of thinking that emphasizes and searches for reliable criteria and that values the ability for each individual to think through issues, consider alternatives, receive appeals to reason, and respond to the kinds of common human concerns that, like philosophy itself, seem to be both trans-cultural and trans-generational. Again consider the claim that a healthy *Lebenswelt* or red experience will value and make possible such "purple" activities.

An encouragement to practice philosophy in purple implies, then, a belief in those very possibilities and in the attempt to "grow" others and oneself through a caring dialogue that embraces an obligation to further both the inquiry itself and the intellectual needs and interests of those who form the community of inquirers. This means that learning and the work of philosophy are not seen merely as a code for enculturation but have become necessary parts of a lifeworld that permits questions and that seeks an understanding of one's inner life and perspective in a way that is intended to discover and help bring into focus at least the initial stages of one's worldview as *Weltanschauung*. It encourages the growth of intellectual virtues, emotional dispositions, and personal understandings that make a fulfilled and meaningful life possible and strengthens the process needed to develop and clarify a proper warrant for those beliefs and commitments that comprise one's worldview as a personal account of the reasons that support beliefs and values.

Admittedly, there is a philosophical ambiguity and irony involved when considering the language that con-

trasts the ideas of lifeworld vs worldview as it has developed and been used historically. Husserl (1970, #36, 1999), for example, employed the idea of “Lebenswelt” as a phenomenological, common-to-all, and universally experienced in-this-life-world happening that is to be differentiated from what he considered to be a more relative and historically bound experience of “Weltanschauung” as described by Dilthey. Husserl considered the latter to be a localized and provincial interpretation of experience and felt that a correct understanding of the phenomenology of Lebenswelt revealed universals that are pregiven and scientific. Such a pre-ontological lifeworld was to him a better means of expressing actual phenomenological experience as in shape, color, texture, and motion. These are the kinds of phenomena that he considered to be always “pregiven” and intuitively present to all in a way that is universal, objective and scientific. For example, the coin I pick up has a cool hardness, a curved shape, a certain color. I cannot bite through it, and it sinks in water. We are prepared as a part of our pre-ontological givenness to receive the coin as a thing of objective weight and color. Its phenomenological qualities approach universality. It sinks for everyone (in pure water at a certain temperature). These are “scientific” universals that, as such, connect to Husserl’s idea of Lebenswelt. They provided for him a scientific and common ground of human perception that was not subject to the relativism that characterized the more culture bound, provincial historicism suggested by Dilthey (1954, 1988), whose use of “worldview” focused on how we are later encultured by our various lifeworlds to receive, in this example, the coin as money that will then in turn become part of a social and moral world that demands an appraisal of its acquisition and use from the standpoint of a given community and culture.

As described, both the Husserlian lifeworld of phenomenological experience and the historicism of Dilthey are red. Husserl’s emphasis is central, basic, and representative of a unifying, common perceptual ground on which all human experience is initiated, regardless of one’s geographical or historical situation as emphasized by Dilthey. Remember that for Husserl the idea of Weltanschauung, as he understood Dilthey’s meaning, was that, in contrast to the pregiven and phenomenological lifeworld, worldview as a perspectival view-of-the-world, led to skepticism with regard to any attempt at recognizing an all encompassing expression of human concern. For Dilthey a Weltanschauung was primarily a local, encultured and historical expression in what might now be considered Rortyeian terms. However, such a provincial and situated experience, like the phenomenological lifeworld of Husserl, is red and descriptive in nature, representing a reflection of the unique historical situation in which people find themselves (Naugle, 2002). And Husserl’s attempt to clearly differentiate the phenomenon of lifeworld (Husserl) and worldview (Dilthey), contrasted what he considered to be pregiven, universal, and the common-to-all phenomenological experience, with the time-and-place-bound experience that is relative to one’s context and situation.

It is my concern here to emphasize that both of these phenomena, that is, both the physical and the cultural lifeworld, and indeed our capacity to respond to and interpret each, are pregiven to the possibilities of the conscious human individual, and that both are representative of the lifeworld as Lebenswelt or philosophy in red. They are both given. Philosophy in purple asserts that worldview as Weltanschauung is a distinct and contrasting experience to both the physical, pregiven, and the given cultural-historical situation. It, Weltanschauung, should be considered a third and humanizing possibility of human experience in terms of learning to think for oneself and to choose an ongoing evaluation of and allegiance to a particular set of principles regarding both belief and action.

In this sense we accept the possibility that, while everyone does have a red zone, a lifeworld as Lebenswelt, it may be that some do not have a worldview as Weltanschauung, in as much as they have never been encouraged to do the work of philosophy in purple and so to act upon the opportunity to question, formulate, and refine the given aspects of their experience. If one is to gain the degree of understanding required ultimately for an informed affirmation or disavowal and subsequent overcoming, reformation, and/or affirmation of his or her given lifeworld, those lifeworld factors and their implications must become the objects of personal reflection and inquiry. This understanding is to be gained in the hope of reaching the principled and rational ground of a Weltanschauung in a way that is not totally expressive of the primary givenness of the lifeworld. Whereas Husserl’s concept of the Lebenswelt puts it prior to cultural experience and interpretation, a more inclusive sense of lifeworld puts both phenomenological and cultural experience in the given lifeworld which then provides the context and the experience in which an appeal to existential, human freedom and choice is made. That choice is foundational to the idea of philosophy in purple or worldview as a reasoned and personal journey, a journey that

moves one toward the development of an informed consent and articulation regarding an account. This account is a criteria-based and warranted articulation of the big questions that have perpetually interested, perplexed, and brought anxious concern to humankind. And the formation of this account approaches a bona fide *Weltanschauung* as it provides an explanation of how a given individual may justify his or her personal commitments of belief and action in the practical matters of this world.

There are then, three experiences to consider. First is the human phenomenological experience of the life-world in which this hard, cool-to-the-touch, curved object hurts teeth if bitten too hard. It sinks in water and reflects light in a certain way. These are common human experiences of perception and maturation that, like birth, puberty, the desire for love, care, and meaning, and problems associated with anxiety and death, provide a universal ground of recognition, regard, and empathy among the members of human communities. But their meaning and value may be culturally mediated, and thus, secondly, we are born into and have fallen into an array of cultural and historical experiences and patterns that comprise the personal and relative perspectives and horizons that serve to situate individuals in a given red zone or *Lebenswelt*. Within this ground of experience, this red zone, the coin has relative value and one encounters alternative and competing claims that must be examined and out of which a personal worldview as *Weltanschauung* can emerge. But until such encounters are engaged and brought into reflection they remain passive and red.

Thirdly, and of greatest relevance here, I am suggesting the possible and desirable development of that personal account as *Weltanschauung* in which the capacity for free and rational thought comes to the fore as a part of our phenomenological and ontological heritage as human persons. This process, like the passively received and cultural *Lebenswelt*, separates individuals and communities. But a separation in terms of *Weltanschauung* or philosophy in purple is based on informed consent, choice, and on a more active and reflective basis that is open to discourse and self-correction (Habermas, 1984; Simmons, 2006). It is not simply given to the individual but is shaped by choices and values and mediated through reflection, reason, and commitments that are personal in nature. The coin and use of money has personal and moral as well as practical and cultural implications. One must decide how to gain it and how and for what purposes, once gained, to keep or use it, and why.

And despite the pragmatic and post-modern emphasis on the personal and perspectival that is found in some philosophical writings, it seems naïve to view the being of the human so inflexibly that moral and philosophical choices are rote and fixed cultural expressions. Husserl himself seems to have understood the possibility of transcending one's personal and given situation, whether described as worldview or lifeworld, for he was "specifically interested in the historical moment when a people-or individuals-raise themselves above the world or context of their own culture and ask about a truth-for-all, a transcendent, universal truth" (Moran, 2000, p. 184). Likewise, Dewey, despite his and James' claim about philosophy being primarily an expression of the personality and desires of the philosophers involved, described the process of examining one's beliefs as "a kind of intellectual disrobing" in which we "critically inspect . . . through the discipline of severe thought" those cultural habits and vestments (1958, pp. 37-38), that are a part of what is described as the lifeworld. That kind of critical inspection expresses the human reflective and ontological capacity and desire for meaning. The experience of sincere inquiry that ideally characterizes authentic philosophical discourse, will enable individuals to bare thoughts and motives as they seek to bring warrant to and/or change beliefs and assumptions that have heretofore comprised a taken-for-granted or unquestioned aspect of the lifeworld. In the challenge and opportunity to refine such beliefs and assumptions as an act of ownership and identity, the context of culture can be examined openly in a way that moves one toward a more transcendent and universal truth, because such a cohesive unity of transcultural and trans-historical human experience is eminently possible, as attested to by Socrates, Luther, Lincoln, Gandhi, King, and our own experience. This engagement of the purple zone makes it possible to build on and articulate worldviews as criteria-based accounts that describe personal insight and understanding about significant issues in a way that is open not only to self correction but also to increasing degrees of clarity and growth that are not inflexibly fixed on a given horizon.

The hope that individuals will be able to experience the sense of ownership and personal understanding described above stems from a belief that personal freedom is a possible, desirable, practical, and realizable ideal that envisions the human agency required to form a worldview based on informed and personal affirmation. And just as significantly, it encompasses a second and related hope that students of thought will learn to see clearly why others think as they do. Lyotard's (1992) lament over the "wound" to childhood caused by others, recognized

that many paths and experiences have been preordained for each individual by the choices of others. Perhaps we are, as he says, “born to others” before being born to ourselves, even as others are born to us and suffer the wounds inflicted by our own unthinking and insensitive responses to the contingencies of our lifeworld. This certainly seems true as we consider family and cultural experience, personality, embodiment, and other multiple aspects of the lifeworld that may significantly impact and influence the outlook, theoretical positions, and strategy of life in which a prescriptive image of life as it should be lived can come into focus.

Despite Lyotard’s lament, no one in the initial and ensuing stages of life has been free to choose all of those influences and opportunities that, taken together, form the red zone or *Lebenswelt* that serves to ground us to earth and from which each of us looks out onto the wider world of transcendence and possibility. In some way the factors that comprise this personal horizon represent the building blocks of a worldview. And in the effort to engage the element of thought and of worldview discovery as *Weltanschauung*, individuals are enabled to respond to the human and ontological calling to an examined life and to be moved imaginatively into the purple zone, the element of reflective thought. Each of us can be encouraged to respond with insight in new, creative, and graceful ways to our present freedom and to the demands and opportunities of life. Philosophy in purple in this way represents an invitation and an opportunity to take hold of one’s given self-life and personal heritage and then to apply oneself to the task of naming the given aspects of that life and heritage in a way that is open to refining, overcoming and/or embracing them, as one seeks to develop a worldview as a self-conscious and life-affirming philosophy. This is an invitation to reflect in a way that brings wellbeing and the chance to find, experience, and articulate some kind of admirable meaning and purpose in this world and in this way to better fulfill the *telos* of our being *Dasein*. In this practice we can do our part to avoid perpetuating a lifeworld in which relatively few people are encouraged to think outside of the red zone and to examine for themselves the assertions of a culture that does not always invite analysis, introspection, or an authentic engagement of philosophy in purple.

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